BOER FIGHTING

Otago Daily Times, Issue 11809, 11 August 1900, Page 2

BOER FIGHTING

INTERESTING CRITICISM.

The following suggestive notes are from the "Army and Navy Gazette": —

An article of great interest concerning Boer tactics is in " Seribner's Magazine." It is from the pen of Mr Thomas F. Millard, who has been with the Bosrs in the war, and is an enthusiastic admirer of their methods. Not all his opinions are well founded, though doubtless, many practical lessons are to be drawn from the war in South Africa. Mr IVlillard goes beyond this. He says that any given number of Boers, almost under any ct/ncoivablo circumstauces, can defeat, and in a prolonged engagement destroy, an equal number of any regular troops in the world n's tiiey are organised at present. _ The strength of the Boer is in his individuality a.s a fighter, his individual method being-reduced to "a tolerably well-sustained unit" —the Boer commando. It is not- true, says the critic, that the Boer is only good in delensive positions, but rather the contrary; and he .cites Nicholson's Nek, Spion Kop. and what the Boers call the Platrand, which is the ridge forming Cresar's Camp and Waggon Hiss, as examples. He assorts that at Colenso the Boers lost only six killed and 14- wounded —that day upon which our losses were so terrible. .In regard to the attack, Mr Miliard says that the Boer movement is slow, so sk>w, in fact, !that at times it loses momentum, whereas; in the attack of the trained soldier, when momentum is lost, the atlacic fails, v<i'm sa it is immediately rallied and started a^ain. In the case of the jiosr there is no alignment and little semblance- of concerted fiction, although the concerted action is there. 'i'o conceal himself behind what would seem ridiculously inadequate cover is an instinct with the Boer, who advances in a^ crouching attitude, tae thin, widely-scat-tered line, moving forward uiHil a point is reached within effective rifle range. Then the real, attack begins. Each man has dropped behind-some obstacle or inlo a tiny sluit, and t!io assaulting line has disappeared. English officers rise up to scan the field, and aic at onco sliot down. The Boers are creeping closer and closer, crawling forward bit by bit, to soize some advantageous lise in the ground. '1 ho whole a-.lcance is fitful, until the decisive point is reached. ' "Up spring 50 or JOO men, with rifles held loosely at a trail, and dash forward at full speed, leaping over the ground like Zulu runners. A few scattered shots give warning of the hotter iiro to come. Prone'on tlie earth go the ciiargiug-Bo6i-s. Cr-r-r-as'n ! comts thfi volley. Up again, and a wild F-r-ury ori for half a ininute before tue second volley can come, then down again, each man under cover. ' In all these attacks, says .Mr Miliard, the •Boer sharpshooters play a great part, sheltered behind his schanze.

-Turning to the defence, Mr Millard says that the Boer method is based on the same principle, and .that the echanzes built by individual Boevs at points selected for their own poiEonal ideas, without regular formation or alignment, are vastly superior to regular Irur.c'ies.' In support of this contention ho. reports that in the attack on the 2?]atrand, the Boers, being on lower groundj. cpuld get parts of our loop-hole sandbag trendies against the sky-line, and that they waited until the loop-holes .were darkened before'firing. "In. one trench carried by the Boers more than a score of Englishman were found shot through the head near the right eye, conclusive proof that they were killed at'a loop-hole." Moreover, according to this enthusiastic admirer of the Boers, they, can build a schanze anywhere in five minutes. The other great feature of the defence, is fire discipline. The Boers never waste a. shot. Thus, according_ to the ■ observer, 'at Colenso the British inarched 'within 300 yards of the schanzes without .havjng the least intimation of the presence of the enemy. He gives an account of the attempt to recover the abandoned guns: " When the British had retreated, after abandoning the guns, the Boer fire dwindled away and soon ceased altogether. Somebody. ordered the guns to be brought off, and the men in charge. of the. extra battery, horses • tried to -do it. No more fleadly rifle fire could be conceived than that which frustrated their: brave attempt. General Botha stood, partially sheltered by a huge rock, just opposite, the abandoned guns, watching the movements of the % British through his field-glasses. Teams of' six horses hitched two together, directed by three mounted drivers, essayed the impossible task. They came at a full gallop, with a huge iron hook ready to attach to a gun and haul it off- In the. '.schanzes' :the Boers waited. . Nearer and nearer came the galloping teams, the ground shaking under the thunder of hoofs. Genertil -Botha's powerful voice cpuld be heard admonishing '"s men: -'Hold, .'your fire. Let • them get closer. Wait wait. Steady. Steady. • Steady. Not yet—not yet—not yet—Now!'" Crack.. A leader is down. :GfaekV ; Crack. A wheeler topples over. Crr-r-r-ash! Down they go in a heap, an indescribable tangle of men and animals, many of the drivers being crushed, or kicked to death by the maddened brutes; some of jthe horses perhaps unhit, and struggling wildly to break their traces, only to. meet death a little farther along. Such ■was the fatei of every team sent to bring back those-guns, fully a hundred horses and half as many men being killed before the attempt was abandoned. In this battie, r General Bulfer - stated the British loss to have been 1100 men and 11 guns. • The Boers lost-six killed and U Wounded." "Undoubtedly this, narrative is that of an observer who hvs seen what he describes, but it .seems more than likely that, when he sat down to record his experiences, he lent a little colour to the story, and the Boers have certainly been slow to attack