NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN

Otago Daily Times, Issue 11675, 7 March 1900, Page 3

NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN

OUR RETURNED SPECIAL

INTEKVIEWED,

(Fkom Our Own Cobeespondent.)

)' '/' ' WELLINGTON, March 6. 'Mr'J.' E. Moultray, who up to the time lie'was laid aside with fever did such good work for your journal at the front in South Africa, 'was in .Wellington1 to-day, arid . the fpllo'wing _interestiug interview with' him. appeared in .to-night's post:— .■ .>. ,

Mr;■' Moultray said it was to ,be, regretted that the public wero so severe in their condemnation of some of our generals.■'■ It was apparently forgotten that Lord Roberts required, over 40,000 men to accomplish what General Methuen had been endeavouring' to do; with 13,000. If the latter had made a serious'blunder at Magersfontein in delivering a frontal attack upon a position that was afterwards found to be impregnable, yet it should be borne in mind that to have attacked the position on either flank would have compelled.'him to expose his own base and lay open the whole country to the Boers as far as Do Aar.. Of two evils he chose the leaser. Whether. the undertaking was directed with the requisite wisdom and skill it was not for liim (Mr Moultray) to judge.' The feeling in Qa-PO.-Gqlony against General Buller was very strong after the second defeat, but to anyone who had seen the country it was marvellous that he' had ultimately forced a passage through to Ladysmith. The general who has gained the greatest reputation oiit of the war so far was (next to Sir George White) Lieutgenoral French, to whose cavalry division Mr Moultray was attached. Some people were inclined to blamehim for the Suffolk disaster, but that-was a case of the Suffolk commander endeavouring to clo more than he was authorised by his instructions. There were two kopjes near the camp, the further of which was held by the Boers. The Suffoiks' orders were to seize the nearer hill. During the night the artillery,, who proceeded by a different route, were, to, open fire at daybreak from another position, and when the defenders .had been sufficiently shelled the Suffoiks were to storm the kopje with the bayonet. That was the plan. This was how it was carried out: The Suffoiks reached the first position all right. Through tlie darkness tlicy could see the outline of the next kopje looming: up dark and silent; indeed, the silence was; so intense that the Suffoiks were deceived, and, thinking that the position had been abandoned, they were marched across, and jstrode into a perfect volcano of fire and sriioke. • Men" were falling on all sides, and iri the; darkness and confusion the Boers bawled out orders in English, which were obeyed, With the result that a number surrendered, while others made a dash through tl;e darkness for liberty, and arrived in cam]) with an account of the disaster. It was also reported that the artillery, according to its orders,'came into action, and in carrying out its programme commenced to shell the position, sending its deadly projectiles amongst both friends and foes, thus unwittingly com-pleting-the panic. _ The public may x rest assured of one thing, says Mr Moultray, and that is that the conduct of this campaign will be well threshed out. in the British Parliament, but not until the war is concluded.

As for our field guns, when in one of his leftprs he wrote about them being outranged, Mr Moultray simply described what he ac-, tu'ally saw. The weapons were horse artil-' lery 12-pounders, and the Boers certainly made excellent practice against them: but, whether'" the weapon they used was what is called a, gun of position or a- field piece, it was impossible to say. A field gun is intended to keep up with infantry, covering three miles an hour over rough country. For this purpose it'must be light, and to secure this litrhtness its length of barrel must, .be curtailed with'the, result that with a, weapon about 6ft long it is impossible to.get accurate shooting much beyond 4000 yards. Our weapons ars sighted for a much longer range. Our naval 4.7 m gun more c!o?ely resembles the Boer guns in accuracy, but it is a long nnweildy weapon, requirine- a large team to drag it, and quite incapable of the rapidity of movement for which our field guns' aro so' well cdanted. If vie. had always had our guns at"1 the long range we would not have lost so many men: but at Arundel Mr Moultray saw the: guns being worked within rifle range of the,'enemy, and in anproaching them a gunner-was seen to fall, shot through the bin with a'Mauser bullet, fired about ,900 yardi away : while our correspondent, himself hod to" pass'into the fire zone, where bullets were plouq-Jiini? up the ground before lie could speak: to the gunners. It will be remembered that.'; General Buller lost 10 guns because Colonel Lone took them" within the rnnpo of the Boer riflp=. The conclusion Mr.Moultray comes to is that if our guns were worked at long range they might eoual the enemy's in distance, but he doubts if our gunners will break off the habit that they have of always pushing...their guns further up.

Mr Moultra.v cannot praise our medical service too., highly. It is simply perfect. He always found the Red Cross waggons well up towards the fiehtimr line ; and, with reference to the Boers firiui?- upon them, he considers that we have our.=»lves to blame, for lhe flag flown is only about the size of a, pocket handkerchief. A large crops oainted on the white tilt would be a decided improvement, "he Boer medical service is rather antioue, where it exists at all. A refugee told him