THE NEW ZEALAND IMBROGLIO. (From the Economist.)

Otago Daily Times, Issue 584, 31 October 1863, Page 9 (Supplement)

THE NEW ZEALAND IMBROGLIO. (From the Economist.)

The great success attained by General Cameron against the natives in Taranaki, on the 4th June., has only served to show that if the imbroglio in that unhappy settlement is to be. unra-elled at all, General Cameron, if properly supported with reinforcements, is the man to effect it. But it would be the highest folly to anticipate that the storming of an insignificant pah, defended by tribes who, though they murder freely, are not the real fighting men amongst the Maori-, has secured anything except the prestige of success for our first military operations. The military problem is only attacked, and this too, under circumstances exceptionally favorable to our troops. The political complication, which j is by far the most complicated of the two, and of course intimately connected with the military difficulty, is not yet in course of solution. _ First, as to the military difficulty,, it seems certain that the outbreak or delay of a great war depends on the attitude of the Waikatos; by far the most powerful, formidable, and courageous or the Maori tribes. What part they inteniied to t.«ke wai not yet known when the last mails left New Zealand. But every one seems to admit that the gallant action of the detachment of the 57th regiment, under (Jolonrl Warre —the one which had lost oiticers and men by the Maori murders iv the previous month - would have been much more costly of life, even if it had succeeded at all. had the rifle pits and pah which were then carried bsen defended by Waikatos instead of by. the poorest tribes among the : disaffected Maories. The Waikatos would have held the rifle pits to the last and kept up a stea-iy fice on our exposed soldiers. We miy eqjeec gallantry as great, or even greater, from our own soldiers should the Waikatos come into the field, but we.may expect also far greater occasion "for it. It is well that the first success was so' decisive, but it will be ill if we mistake a mere fortaste of victory for the substantial success which nothing but a final defeat of the united strength of the Maoris can achieve. So little does our brilliant engagement ati'ect the Maori imagination, that on ttie very evening of their defeat, they la.id an anibuscride in the scene of the massacre of the previous month, for some of the English who were rising- back in aivaiice of the troops to the settlement, and fired on Messrs Harris, Carrington, anrl others, though without hurting any one. ft is stated confidently by friendly natives that even th? Kingites, as they are called, who have just beeu aoneiikted by the Government's strange surrender of the Waitara block—the subjectmatter of the old war—have quite made up their minds to join the enemy. Indeed, no one in .New Zealand douots that war on a great scale i 3 imminent. One motive, indeed, which opsrates very powerfully with tht natives in this -direetbn is the passage in the Duke of Newcastle's receut despatches, in which he iutimates so clearly that the c'oionists must gradually prepare .'hemselves to do without unlit-ry aid from Great Britain, and that if they do not conduct their native affairs with discrimination, tka must even withdraw what military aid it now gives. The Maorfc-s have printed and eagerly disseminated the Duke's words, and constantly taunt the Euglish wicli the probable withdrawal of the soWiers. They point to the words "Her Majesty's Government do not recognise the obligation of supporting the burden to which tf reat Britain is now .subject until the authority of the law is re-est iblished." " The willingness of Great Britain to continue its assistance " they remind the English in the-words of the Puke, "will be most materially affected by the disposition of the colonists to adopt such measures as iv your [Sir Gfeo. Grey's] ' judgment are calculated to remove immediate difficulties, and to place the relations of the races on a sound basis" *; I trust that by availing themselves freely of your advice," says the Duke, 'the colonists will be able to place the Government of the Maories on a footiug which will render the duty of providing for their own interiiH.l defence ltps onerous than they at present anticipate." All these expressions were, no doubt, pnxiousiy calculated to discourage the colonist? from rashly embarking in war on the strength of military aid from Great Britain,—to inculcate that, so far from wishing to give fresh aid, the British Government wished gradually to, withdraw it; but they have had a sort ot effect the Duke scarcely anticipated. They have perhaps discouraged the colony from aggressive measures. They have still more, however, roused the Maoris to aggressive measures, and all accounts alike state that the confidence thus produced that no fresh, aid will be forthcoming from Great Britain, has been one principal cause of the new

outbreak. "We know, and probably all Englishmen would feel instiru-tively. that the threat was meant to . have a moral effect, not to be carried out. We kuow that the Gwernwent does intend to reinforce Sir George Giey. But the Maories are not yet enough of politicians to calculate the difference between language meant to discourage quarrels, by a Secretary of hlate who has imbibed a notion (mistaken enough we believe) ihar, all the quarrels originate in th* aggressiveness of the settlers, aud language meant to convey a fixed resolve to be at no further expense iv the matter. The despatch, meant to curb the passions of the settlers, has_ in fact been wliip and spur to the passions of the natives. This despatch possibly may have prevented a " settlers' war,'' but it has certainly precipitated the present struggle for political and physical supremacy—for that, and that alone, is the matter now in dispute. There is no land question at is^ue now; the only question being whether the Qieen shall rule over the Northern island or the Maori King shall reign in her steau. Even fcir Geo'-ge Grey must see now that the first condition of order is not conciliation upon land questions, but an exhibition of the real power and purpose of the British Government to rule. The Maoris once convinced of tin's may become manageable'; the settlers ones convinced of this m/iy become manageable; but till this is settled, neithercan. the former be governed at all, nor the l«tter governed with any ease and comfort to the administration, either iv New Zealand or at home. And even when this is definitely settled, one of the most difficult of political knots remains to bs unloosed. The Duke of Newcastle's great "responsibility despatch" lias made a most perplexed question, the true government of the natives, more complicated still. The Horn« Government says it has resigue 1 the control of native affairs:— " This reltnquishment does not require the assent of the colonists to make it effectual. It is completed by tue Act oi the Home Government, which (in.conformity with requests which is now too Lite to recall) no longer requires of you to take personal charge of the Native Secretary's department. If you. [to tiirGL Grey] resume to retain the peivsuntl control of that department, it will not be in obedience to instructions «T°- m- ■ e 'l)ut either at the re luesti of fie responsible Mmisters, or under tome pre sing necessity occasioned by their action or iuaction, and for tne consequences of which, therefore, the Home Government are not responsible. " Your constitutional position with regard to your advisers will (as desired-by your late Ministry) be the same in regard to native" as to ordinary colonial afikivs; .that is to say, you will be generally bound to give effect to the policy which they recommend for ■ your-adoption, and for which, therefore, they will be responsible. "I say, generally, because there remain several cjntingencies in which it would be your duty to act upon your own judgment in opposition to theirs. . "You -would be bound to exercise the negative powers.which you possess, by preventing any step which invaded Imperial rights, or was at variance with, the pledges on the faith of which, her Majesty's Government acquired the Sovereignty of New Zealand, or by any other way marked by evident injustice towards her Majesty's subjects of the native race. "In the interests of the colonists themselves you might find yourself bound, under conceivable circumstances, to appeal from your Government to the General Assembly, ami from she General Assembly to' the constituencies, in. case the policy recommended for your acceptance. appeared to you clearly disastrour. "You would be bound to judge for yourself as to thejuttice and propriety of employing, and the beat mode of employing, her Majesty's Forces. In this matter you might of course fortify yeurnelf by taking the opinions of your Ministers, but the responsibility would rest with yourself and the officer in command. '• Lastly, the fact that the safety of the colony depends for the present on a force of the Queen's troops, maintained at the expense of Great Britain, gives this country a right to require from the colonists that their native policy, on which the continuance of peace or the renawal of war depends, should be just prudent, and liberal." Now, we know; no prob'em. ever set before a Government, much'more difficult than the carrying out of these instructions. In fact, the New Zealand Government themselves are utterly at a loss how to comply with them. The native affairs are handed over at a moment when war is imminent—a war which has since broken out—to the responsible Ministry of New Zealand. But. at the same time, it is clearly intimated-that the Governor mv t assent to nothing wbich in fact involves a war policy. The responsible Ministry are to do -xavtly what they please, bus not what the colonists please, to. whom they are responsible. A war, eince begun by the natives, has for <ome time been clearly inevitable. The Duke of Newcastle foresees it, washes his hands, of it but warns air George Grey that he himself must prevent it, if he can, but also comply with the recommendation of these who will advise him to meet boldly the inevitable difficulty. Nay, lie is not only to be responsible to the colonists f-r his policy, butresponi sible to the H >me Government for the use of the , only military, power which can support tiiat policy. _ The two responsibilities are clearly enaugb. meant to balance themselves, for if the colonists say " fight," • Sir George Grey is responsible if he does not declare ■ war; and yet after declaring war he is responsible >to the power which says '• dont fiu-ht" L for sending the troops against the enemy. °And even when it is at length known in New Zealand that aid from home will not be refuse 1 for this most inevita- • ble war—the same general difficulty will remain about : the time, mode, and conditions of peace, and of governing the natives after the peace. The colonists will wi»h for decisive victory and strong government m the native districts. To them Sir George Grey will be responsible for the end. The Home Government will desire to save money and men by a hasty c inclusion of peace and a conciliating- attitude, and to them Sir George Grey will be responsible for the mean?. Surely a more unmanageable problem was never submitted to any man, and Sir George Grey will show far more ability than he has yet given proor of, in this New Zealani imbroglio, if he comes out of it with success.