GERMANS AND POLES.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XLIV, Issue 14820, 20 October 1920, Page 2

GERMANS AND POLES.

(Fwta it Diplomatic Cot-respondent.) In view of the persistent difficulties which are being placed bv the Soviet authorities in the way of communications between the Polish plenipotentiaries at Minsk and AVarsau', it would occasion n<s surprise were the Polish Government to i'eerill its peace delegation and suggest the transfer of the present negotiations to another venue, from which either party c&uld freely exchange views with its Government, Incidentally I learn that ;i number of Bolshevik messages have been intercepted in the Baltic States-, messages which disclose tho grave military, economic, and administrative plight of the Moscow Government. That plight is aggravated by tlio failure, due to the defeats sustained by the Bolshevik army in Poland, of tho plans previotisly agreed to between the "Red" command and. certain German organisations ili East Prussia and Upper Silesia, for cooperation against both the redeemed and unredeemed Poles. The German agitators in Upper Silesia- aro now quietening down, having been disabused by the collapse of their Russian confederates, while the impartial mea. sures just taken by General Lerond and the Inter-Allied Commission far the maintenance of order in that region will tend to removo any excuse for fear of provocation by any party whatsoever. It is significant, however, of the German spirit in East Prussia, as also perhaps m Berlin, that the local authorities there, tinder the pretext of Germany's obligation as a; neutral to disarm and intern all such routed Bolsheviks as may be forced across tho border, are once more urging an increase in tho Reichswehr and Sicherheitzpofizei forces at their disposal. What has happened, fit Danzig should serve as a. sufficient warning to the Allied Governments against considering any such request. For the Use to which such reinforcements could be put is pretty obvious. They might help to reorganise tho routed Bolsheviks. They would ' certainly help to increase the menace to the Polish communications across the corridor and the Danzig Free State to Danzig harbor.

The rather critical situation which has arisen at Danzig, owing to the hostility to Poland of the German population there, need not lead to any fresh riit in the Anglo-French lute, provided it be handled in the right fashion, as I have reason to believe that it will be handled. The German Government and the German officials of the Free State, piously assert that the sabotage both at the docks and 011 the railways is a Communist, or at least a Socialist, demonstration, wlioreas it is nothing of the kind, but a Chauvinistic one, connived at by all the German parties and the Municipality itself. It is, like Hie ultra vires . resolution passed by the Danzig Constituent Council, which interprets the neutrality of the Free State as entailing an embargo 011 the passage of munitions for Poland, a deliberate aiul unwarrantable attempt to destroy the Danzig section of the Treaty of Versailles. The British FSreign Office recognises this as fully as the Quai d'Orsay. Neither does Sir Reginald Tower himself deny the absolute right of either the French l or the Americans to land munition's at Danzig. Ho could not lawfully' do so. But he can neither provide the necessary Gorman labor nor the British troops to do the unloading; 1101;, again, can he guarantee the safety of Polish or other workers engaged on such business and the free passage of the munitions to the Polish frontier. With 2000 British troops at his disposal he claims, with some measure of justification, to be powerless Lsut if our French Allies or the American warships .insist, in these circumstances, upon disembarking munitions at Danzig, they are entitled to do so, although the High Commissioner cannot answer for the consequences of such action. It is, of course, an open question as to how far liis estimate of 20.000 Allied troopsws the minimum force required for the maintenance or order at the port and along the railway is correct. Without necessarily endorsing the 'French estimate of 7000, it may lie said that German truculeiice at Danzig would promptly subside were the German authorities and population convinced that stern measures of repression would follow upon any acts of violence. The presence of the Allied warships should suffice to inspire respect in this connection. and I believe that the French naval commander has instructions from his Government, which he will duly communicate to the High Commissioner, to stand no nonsense from the Germans. The French munitions will Inlanded under the protection, if need i;e. of a French naval brigade. Meanwhile it is quite clear that the Allies must vindicate their own and Poland's treaty rights by giving adequate naval and military protection to the Polish dock laborers, who will have to unload the vessels if the German dockers persist in their refusal to do so. I see that the intervention of the League is invoked by some of our Paris contemporaries. But the League, so I understand from its own officials, docs not enter upon its duties as the statutory protectress of Danzig until after its constitution and the relevant convention .regulating the Free State's relations with Poland have been duly ratified by the several parties concerned, and this stage has not yet been reached. Until then the supreme authority resides in the Allied Council, from whom the High Commissioner derives his exclusive executive authority for tlio time being. It would appear that in Italy the Polish victories have had a marked influence upon public opinion. There is certainly an incipient revolt against the pro-Soviet- policy among several of the bourgeois parties. Nationalists. Catholics,'and also Libera®, 'flu. leaders or this movement are Signor Orlando audi Baron Sonnino. It may be recalled that early in 191!) Signor Orlando was envisaging a triple alliance between Italy, Poland, and Roumania.