THE UNITED STATES NAVY SQUABBLE.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XLIV, Issue 14010, 15 March 1920, Page 7

THE UNITED STATES NAVY SQUABBLE.

An inquiry is now being held by the United States Senate into allegations made by Admiral-Sims in reierence to the . administration of miva I matters in connection with the war. The Admiral's indictment of the Navy Department for inefficiency m the conduct oi the war was set forth m a long letter which ho wrote to Secretary .Daniels and read before '• a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. At the end of this letter ho summed up his charges as follows: — "The manner in which our naval operations were conducted clearly shows that the following grave ''errors were committed in violation of fundamental military orincipals; and- it is manifestly ~ desirable that such violations should be avoided in the future.

"1. Although the war with Germany had been imminent for many months prior to its dechiration, there.was no mature plan developed or navy policy adopted in preparation for war in .so far as its commander in Europe was informed.

"2. Tho Navy Department did not announce a policv until three montii3 after war was declared —at least not to its representative and Commander of the Forces in Europe. "3. The Navy Department did not enter whole-heartedly inlo ' the campaign for many months after we declared war, thus putting, n great strain on the morale of the fighting forces in the' war by decreasing their confidence in their leaders.

"4. The outbreak of. hostilities found many important naval units widely dispersed and repairs. :■ 'Destroyers arriving in -the wai-. zone.' had been cruising extensively off our seaboard in the Caribbean, and when war was declared were rushed ..through'-', a brief and inadequate preparation for distant service. "

"5. During the most critical months of the enemy's submarine campaign against the-Allied lines of communication, the department violated the fundamental strategical principle of concentration of maximum forces in the critical area of. conflict.

"6. The department's representative with, the Allied Admiralty was not supported during the most critical months of the war, either by the adequate personnel or by the adequate forces that could have been supplied-. "7. The department's commerider in the critical area of hostilities was never allowed to select his principal subordinates, and was not even consulted as to their assignment. : A fundamental principle of the art of command is here involved.

"8. The Navy Department made and acted on decisions concerning operations that were being conducted- 3000 miles away when conditions were such that full information (onkl not have been in its possession, thus violating an essential precept of warfare that some decisions necessarily depend upon complete information. :. "0. Instead of relying upon the judgment of those who had had actual .war-experience in this peculiar warfare, the Navy Department, though lacking not only this experience, but also lacking adequate information concerning it, insisted on a number of plans that could not be carried out.. "10. Many of the department's actions so strongly implied a conviction that it was the most /competent to make decisions concerning operations in the war-zone that, the- result • was. an impression that it racked confidence in the .judgment of its representative in the council of the Allies and its responsible commander in the- 'field..' - It is a fundamental principle: that, every action on the, part'"of superior authorities should indicate confidence in subordinates. If such confidence is locking, it should immediately be restored by ruthlessly changing, the 'sub; ordinate. •'ll. 'To interfere with the command in the field or afloat is one of .ths most common temptations, of the Government —and is generally disastrous.'— 'The InHueftce -of Sea-Power Upon History.'—Mahan. . "The Navy Department did not resist this temptation, and its frequent violation of this principle was the most dangerous <noi committed dining the naval war " So far as we aie auaie the onlj reply made by Mr Josephus Daniels, the Secretarv of the Naw, was m a letter addressed by him to -Mr Page, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, wherein he described the onditions under which Admnal Suns - s sent to England as follows "In the latter part of March 191", after relations had been bioken off vith Germany and the Ameucan Navy h-id begun to arm merchant ships, Real -Admiral Sims was summoned to Washington. . ■■ %

"He was informed by me that lie had been selected' to go to London as specia} and confidential representative of the ; Navy Department. . '. ... "At that time Congress; had not._,<leclaredwar. Admiral Sims'was cautioned to'perform no act .arid to make no public statement that could commit this country to any•cour'se pending declaration of the country's policy by the President and the Congress. "In this connection I reminded ; him of the statement in his Guildhall speech in England when he was _ a,- younarer man, for which he was* reprimanded by' President Taft: .'lf the time_ ever comes when- the British Empire is seriousKmenaced. by an external enemy; it is my opinion that you can count upon' every man, everV dollar, every- drop ,'pf blood of your kindred across the sea-"

- "I told him he was selected 'not. because of this speech, but m spite of it, belicvinir he would exercise the discretion and diplomacy which the Confidential nature of his mission necessitated, and that his wide acquaintance wJth naval leaders abroad would facilitate/his obtaining' for the department at first hand the information desired by this Government."