THE AIR PROBLEM.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XLII, Issue 12823, 15 April 1916, Page 3 (Supplement)

THE AIR PROBLEM.

XO. REASON WHY BRITAIN SHOULD NOT OUTDO GERMANY

■By C. G. Grey. It seems to be one of the fired ntles of life that an idea shall arise in England and fail to find adequate support, that a German shall get hold of the idea and' make it into something like a. working proposition —generally achieved clumsily; and that the French shall perfect the idea and give it practical form. It is well over two years ago since Brigadier-General Henderson, now Major-Gcneral Sir David Henderson, K.C.8., commanding the Royal Flying corps, set forth at a meeting of the Aeronautical Society that military aircraft would .include special types of fast, machines to prevent such penetration. If my memory serves me aright, ho also hinted at the possibibty of big-homb-dropping machines, though m those, days bomb-dropping • was not highly thought of by those concerned witb/aviation.

In tho early stages of the Avar all the belligerents used almost any type cf aeroplane for any sort of task that was required. The British happened to have the advantage in owning a small but very effective supply of highspeed scouting aeroplanes; the Germans happened to have a large' number of high-power biplanes which they used for bomb-drQppiug to a greater extent than the Allies; and the French had .possibly a greater number of "pusher" biplanes, with the engine at tho back and a machine gun in front. SORTED OUT.

It was not until well into 1915 that all the belligerents began to sort out their aeroplanes into separate types for separate undertakings, and it way the French who first began to mention officially in their communiques "aeroplans do bombardment" or bomb-drop-pers, "acroplans d'e chasse" or destiovers, and "avions-canons" or fighting* machines, carrying a quick-tirer bigger than an ordinary machine-gun, tlio latter being used for penetrating the enemy's lines to clear the way for scouting "machines and for patrolling tho French lines to prevent German aeroplanes penetrating. The word "avion" is now used as an. alternative to "aeroplair' by the French to indicate specifically a war aeroplane, the word- being given by tns French to indicate specifically a war aeroplane, the word being given by the late M. Adcr to his first experimental aeroplane which just managed to get off the ground into the air m the year 1897. lhat. it may be noted, was the first occasion of which evidence could be found of a self-propelled heavier-than-air machine leaving the earth. Afcuch about the same time that tho French introduced their bomb-droppers, the Germans began to talk in their official communiquqes of "battle aeroplanes," and it has now become apparent that the duty assigned to these •'battle aeroplanes" was almost entirelv that of patrolling behind the German lines to repel the Allies' scouts. These machines, as 1 mentioned some time ago, are large biplanes, each with a single engine, between 150 and 200 horse-power, and carrying two, and sometimes three, machine guns, so that they can bring a very formidable broadI side to bear on anything which comes within range. THli CASE OF PARIS.

This system of defence seems to have been developed and perfected by the French, for one now hears regularly of "acroplans de barrage," otherwise barrier aeroplanes. Apparently the French, with characteristic thoroughness, have told off apropcrlv constituted force of armed aeroplanes to beat- off all German machines which venture behind the French lines, whether as scouts or as bombdroppors; and it appears that this method of obstructing enemy aircraft is exceedingly effective, as one scarcely erer hears*of bombs being dropped anywhere behind the French lines. The result is that, although Paris is only a matter of sixty miles from the nearest point held by the Germans, the city had not, till Saturday, seen a German aircraft of any kind- for something like a year, the only machine that apprenrhed the suburbs of the city having been promptly driven off. - At other tfmes attempts have been made by German aeroplanes flying very high to" get to Paris hidden by clouds but in every case/they have been discovered by the aeroplane patrols long before they reached the neighborhood of Paris.. Consequently, what with the ibanfet - Aeroplanes by day and the searchlights and anti-aircraft guns by nights, Paris has seen very much less of the enemy than London has. TUB ONE ESSENTIAL.

Naturally the establishment of such a complete system of barrier aeroplanes means enormous numbers both of machines and pilots, and these numbers arc only obtained' by a very high state of organisation; a quality in irliich the French excel when the necessity arises. Bven organisation, however, could not produce the quantities of aircraft now Iwing built in France if it were not for the enthusiasm which the French workman puts into his work. The French aeroplane mechanic has in many cases done his turn in the trenches himself, and in every ease he has been rery much closer to the war than have the workpeople in this country," which fact imparts to him an enthusiasm which is unfortunately lacking in the majority of British workshops of all sorts. This enthusiasm, coupled l with the natural" skill of the Frenchman as a mechanic, results in the output of aeroplanes and engines being very much higher in proportion to the number of hands employed than it is in this country. Nevertheless, with the immense onpineennc resources at the disposal of the British Government, it should be possible with efficient organisation, combined with well-regulated effort, to stir up the enthusiasm or the workmen, to' prodifce in the British Isles an air fleet not only capable of supplying all tht barrier aeroplanes required, but also sufficient, fiebting machines; bombdropners, aVid destroyers to outnumber anvthing tlA> Germanic Powers can possibly prodye during the war.