DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XLII, Issue 12823, 15 April 1916, Page 3

DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

| A most interesting personal account of | hi? experiences during sis months at the Dardanelles is given in the February numj ber of "Blackwood's Magazine" by a writes who appears to have been an officer in one i of the British regiments engaged in the i operations on theGallipeli Peninsula. He I relates how puzzled tney all -vera at the 1 fact that the Turkish batteries on Achi ! Baba survived the terrific bombardments from the ships of war. In the early days of the landing the Achi Baba position seemed to be literally battered out of recognition by shell fire. "How any gun emplacements could live through such a series of earthquakes as were mode to happen all round the flat summit of that wholly unimposing hill quite nonplussed us," says this officer; "but they had, for messages began to come in that the fire from Achi Baba was worrying the right flank, and so on. As the warships started excavating again with high explosives, 'K'e said to each other, 'lt will be interesting when we get to Achi Baba to see how they had the guns hidden.' After a lapse of six months, when I am still looking at Achi Baba from the wrong side, I repeat it will be interesting. We have a theory that the bill is honeycombed in tiers, and that the guns axe loaded at the back, run through to the front, and fired, and perhaps slid along a trolley into some new gallery to be loaded afresh !'* Yet it would seem that Achi Baba was ■ all but carried the first day of ths landing, when the King's Own Scottish Borderers dauntlessly pushed through from "Y" Beach to Krithia, almost unopposed, fought their way through the ruins on to the farther slopes, and then, "owing to lack of supports," marched all the way back again under a devastating fire. "Could you have done anything else ?" the writer asked a Scottish Borderer s later occasion as they sat watching tho iilL Very deliberately the man took his Sipe from his month and said. "Ah aeeve, properly reinforced in the rear, ■wo could a' taken Achi Baba by 12 noon _ca the day o' the landin'." The expedition suffered throughout from numerical deficiency, and at one period about 1000 Greek labourers had to be recruited for work oa the Helles beaches, and they seem to have conveyed information to the enemy by light signals and in other ways. At Anzac during the first few days it was touch and go whether the landing would prove s failure. "At one period," according to this writer, "all transports were called up and ordered to prepare to re-embark troops. That such a calamity was averted must," he adds, "be ascribed to nothing but the steel-true courage of the Ansae warriors, for none knew better than they that they were within an ace of extinction. It was not only that they were fighting with their backs to the wall—lfaey were fighting with their backo to the ess. ' Particularly noteworthy is the explanation here given of the purpose and failure of the Suvla landing of August 7. For some days before the landing a small flotilla of destroyers had nightly gone to Suvla Bay and vigorously bombarded the coast, but no reply was made by the enemy. This confirmed the reports of aerial scouts that the bay and the amphitheatre of tho Sari Bair range Tie uninhabited by Turkish troops. About three milea serosa country from the bay was tho small sown of Boghali, a supply depot on the Turkish line to Achi Baba. This was known to bs held by two battalions of infantry. Two miles beyond Boghali were Maidos and the Narrows. The idea was for a force to effect a surprise landing at Suvla Bay, and "'push inland at dead of night to overwhelm the garrison of Boghali, _ march on Maidos, and hold up tho Turkish line of supply to and retreat from Achi 3aba. In the light of known facts it seemed a good plan, reasonably certain of success. The navy accepted the scheme; dispositions were made, and troops allotted. Everything seemed to promise well The troops in transports and lighters sailed from Kephalos Bay, in the Sand of Imbros, about 11 o'clock on the night of Friday, August 6. The rest may be told in the words of the Blackwood contributor : "About 2 a.m. the convoy entered Suvla Bay. Their presence there with the warships was either unnoticed or (as was hoped) assumed to be the nightly visit of the destroyers. Disembarkation began in the dark quietly and methodically. _ By <* a.m. the beaches were thronged vn" ;-v; silent invaders. A short advar. o ~r 4 _ ordered before dawn, but 3ome liii..- ...y" inland, near the dry bed of the SaL the force was halted. As the grey drr.ggad up the gold of morning in the east the men were already wet with sweat, digging themselves in. The sun came up to snow the astonished Turks a new force landed—but only just. Then began the painful uncertainty of the troops as to whether a blunder had been made. Why couldn't they go on? . Their passage was hardly challenged as yet. No orders came. Superior officers looked blank at each other, and gritted their teeth. The morning wore on. And each hour helped to strangle the hope of success, of which the essence was surprise. So that by breakfast time our men were being engaged by growing numbers of the enemy, to whom was allowed the choice of the very best defensive position they could find. To us waiting 'down the line' it was an awful day of suspense. We could see that they were having a brisk time at Anzac, but Suvla was out of sight, and, a-3 naual, there was a fertile crop of rumoure _ before anything authentic came back. First. news was passed round that the advance was going on famously, but that report ! soon wore itself thin, and the later newa : that the advance was indefinitely held up, though astounding in itself, seemed all too likely after our previous experience at Helles and Anzac. And so it was. Someone had blundered. The naval transport staff undertook the safe arrival at Suvla Bay by 7 a.m. on the morning of the landing of all the transports, containing stores, mules, and carts. When it ws' found that these ships had not turned ug the telegraph discovered moat of thsm ot'Jii lying at Mudros, 60 miles or more awa". Corps headquarters did not see fit to tmi. men forward in an arid land—even for £-c miles, even for three—before the wst-ii supply was assured. And so the e3ser;oE of the movement was destroyed, for a tvr hours'- hesitation was all the Turks needed to throw 20,000 men from Bulair into the breach at Sari Bair."