THE NEW ARM.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 10605, 7 November 1910, Page 6

THE NEW ARM.

ITS FIGHTING VALUE. (By General Langlois.) I have been asked by the editor of the Daily Mail to give my opinion on the services which airships and aeroplanes can render the armies, and on the strategical and tactical consequences of their use. The question is embarassing, for these, new "war, instruments" have not yet arrived at their final stage of perfection, and the means of destroying them are still being studied... I therefore express my view's under reserve. - _ ■ -' /.' The problem navigation.;haSj, been resolved iti-Cwb tion —the ''lighter-thah-airi". o-rj;; diri-: : gible, system—and bj'f^aylationr^tliei; "heavier v.thanTair''. ■

tern. ' ,„ .'W . . ' The chief characteristic 'of : the diri-" gible is its great radius-of action. Th.e Zeppelin 11. remained in the. i\ir for thirty-eight hours, and 'covered'- one. thousand kilometres (625 miles), j Tllis' airship is, further, able able to, carry a -substantial a 'great offensive "power as soon?'as "an" extremely effective explosive, has been discovered for its use." "Certain im-' provements which are already .anticipated, such as the use;, of liquid.-or

solidified hydrogen, will increase some day the radius of action' and the offensive power of dirigibles. - The possibility of fitting airships with wireless appa-. *atus allows them to "transmit the information they. gather as. they- travel. The speed of the; dirigibles is not and )will never be a great one. This is a weak point in a battle; .but, tlie capacity which it has of-'reducing its speed, and of stopping, as it were, gives the men on board a better opportunity of making observations. The disadvantages of the,dirigiblc are. -its, great cost, r its extreme frailty, the fart that it is most sensitive to' atmospherical conditions, the necessity of special sheds, and, finally, its extreme vulnerability, which will exist so long as iit is unable to rise, to and remain at a sufficient height to escape gun lire

__ One may gather from this that it is as yet impossible to define with accuracy the use of dirigibles, since a number of elements have, so far, not been determined. However, already in 1908 M". Painlove expressed the following opinion:—"lt is not _ evident that dirigibles are ncaring the limit of their progress?"

, The main characteristic of the aeroplane is its great speed—soto 65 miles per hour; this is a precious advantage as Regards reconnoitring and the transmission of information. It also spells invulnerability for the machine and advantages in a fight against airships. But as the aeroplane is unable to moderate ifs speed it seems to be capable of general observation only. There lias been much talk of the use of the aeroplane for regulating and readjusting the firing range of ar.cillery. I have little belief m this, for the rapid rate 'of travelling precludes the precision and continuity of observation which rangefinding .demands. For this particular operation .captive.balloons and kites remain superior. The aeroplane is not very expensive, ,and the piloting of one is relatively "easy—which is shown by the fact that i a large number of pilots have been successfully trained in very little time. These two qualities make it possible to build a large aerial fleet of "heavier-•than-air" machines. Finally, the aeroplane is not very vulnerable ; its speed and small proportions seem to render it practically free from the effects of artillery.: The foot-soldier would be a more dangerous enemy to the'aeroplane; but the sights to:be used depend upon two. factors — —distance and altitude—and it appears difficult to establish the rules for rifle'firing against such a machine. -. ' On the other hand, the "heavier-than-air" has had until now a somewhat restricted radius of action, and this is the smaller since the aeroplane pilot has himself to hand in the information he has gathered. But the amazing progress achieved quite recently in mechanical flight allows one to foresee in the near future other important improvements. ■: ■;. ■■ ,-. - ■■-, From these various points one may conclude that in. the present state .of things tlie dirigible is able to render certain services which cannot be _ obtained from the aeroplane. In addition to its offensive power, the "lighter-than-. air" is chiefly made for long journeys, which would be .particularly useful, ; -in the initial stages of' hostilities, for reconnoitring the places, of and the points of landing; of■ this. hostile forces. In the battle itself th'e^diri-

gible look out for the general reserves of the ar-mies—reserves ; winch, in the future will be kept very far from the fighting lines. ■■~-.lt is the dirigible again which will most efficiently connect besieged towns with- the rest of the country. It is obvious that in their present state aeroplanes could not today connect Metz .and. Paris" separated by:invaded territory as was the case in 1870. ... ~,. One is, however, inclined to wonder if the dirigible would be able .to es-: cape easily from its enemies—airships, aeroplanes, and artillery. As for the aeroplane, it is mainly:

made for short-distance reconnoitring, for, investigation of the likely battlefield, for the•-locating of reserves and: of masked batteries, and for connecting big units withj one another, etc. Will not the ''heayier-than-air" be-

come some day the terrible adversary of the dirigible? It is certain that the consequences of the use of aerial navigation by the armies will be to bring, about at the very outset of hostilities a fight to the death between the opposing aenal fleets I can do no better in order to give the . probable aspect of such a duel than quote the woids. spoken two yeais ago by Captain Ferbcr, the martyr of aviation, who had so ably foreseen its incredible progress "How will that fight take place 0 In the same w ay as -all lights between birds have ever taken plaice. When a falcon, for instance, wants to attack a raven, it first pursues it, and as soon as the raven feels itself overhauled, it" ascends slowlj, in spirals, and the falcon starts to use m a parallel line. It the raven can rise higher- than the fal-

.con it is saved; if it cannot its recomse is to drop although dui--1 ing the descent it is liable to be Jiemmed in by the falcon. Every time the falcon darts upon the raven the latter will try by means of a. clever "side slip" to avoid the impact. If the falcon has been dodged there is respite, tor, carried bejond its aim, the falcon loses an elevation which it must 'gainfully regain. The race for altitude may recommence, but now the fight is no longer doubtful; the raven will finally come to the ground and will be vanquished", In, *Jika* manner will-aerial ciafts struggle, and, if one wishes to apply those, rales to a dirigible halloon and an aeroplane one will see that the formei. is doomed. For in a speed race the! aeroplane will easily 'overhaul the an ship - "i As legaids altitude,, one did not at that time foresee that "heavier-than-air" machines would rise above seven thousand feet, a height at which airships cannot maintain themselves very long Are we, then, to toll the deathkueil of the dirigible? Is the time so neai at hand when the aeroplane will have completely-triumphed over its nvalf Will aerial navigation cause —as many saj it will —a 'momentous change in the art of war 0 I do not think so for'a single instant. Of the two adversaries, the victor in a the. aeual battle will have an indisputable advantage over its almost "blind" enemy. But it was'ever so.- one'of the was ever better informed "than_.the, other. .. Evidently, from the strategical, standpoint, the information will be' more certain than m the past, and, above .all,', more rapidly transmitted.- This will, allow an able-general better i use of his reserves. But, on the .other hand,' thanks -to'the rapid 1 means ofr and motor-cars — th£ adversary will modify the placing of his troops far more "rapidly than heretofore, so that it will be possible for the information supplied by the aerial craft to be, as in former dajs, quite inaccurate by the time that craft reaches its destination,, I therefore but one sluvcgical consequence in the use of aerial navigation: the growing importance of the. ability of the Commander-in-Chief and his staff. I twould be easy to prove from history that it has been so with everyone of the great advancements in the military domain;' it is a law. From the point of view of- tactics, the aerial crafts will complete the work of

cavalrv in its mission of discovery, but without taking its place, for the services which-aerial craft renders are too often nullified bi ad.-cr-e .ltmo-phei ie conditions. As icgards mfantiy. it will haie moic and iii-mc to use woods as a cover when on tli - man h. and also when statio.uu\. In the ease oi aitiller\ emplacements oi long lines ot artillery will be mo'-e easiU disclosed, so that masked aitiller fire under high cover will be made less profitable. , . I foresee no greater -revolutions m tactics— at least for the present. Military aeiostation has entered upon the period of realisation, botli -at the German and French manoeuvres. At -the-latter dirigiblqs and aeroplaoes have fulfilled, to the satisfaction--of' all,. al-most-every one of the missions I have just, assigned"to-'them':' The aeroplanes supplied {information .to- both, sides, iind connected ..one'of "-tliem. with "Rouen. A diiigible sent' to Paris by -the direc'fopo'f the manoeuvres-remained during the wholevof-.itsio'urney connected with its, -starting point and with Paris by wireless 'telegraphy. These results, which were not even anticipated 1 until - quite-. recently; are most 'encouraging. It is true that atmospherical ".Gonditibnsr.were .most favorable, and. that th"e airships did not rise to a safe altitude, and, of, course, an. aerial battle did not take place. Our, aviators will now have to consider such a battle and to prepare themselves for it". -,