EDITORIAL NOTES AND COMMENTS.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XXIII, Issue 7322, 24 September 1898, Page 1

EDITORIAL NOTES AND COMMENTS.

A cablegram from St. Petesbnrc which we published yesterday-goes a long way to confirm the opinion we expressed some days ago,. that there was an absence of sincerity about the ..Czar's proposal for international disarmament. - The. Russian Government are so disconcerted at the welcome accorded to the. Czar's proposal, that they have stopped the newspapers discussing the subject, and there Is evidence of a disposition to minimise the question. So runs the story, and there is reason to believe that it is true. Even though the proposal had been made in all sincerity by the Czar, a reason for the sudden change of front would be readily available The Russian zeal for peace, we have no doubt,, had its birth, in a desire to arrest the active naval construction of Great Britain. Russia had reached a condition of financial depletion . • for which no remedy save that of a prolonged peace and abstention from naval extension was likely to be of any avail. By the captivating proposal for a general disarmament it was hoped to induce others to adopt a policy which was absolutely imperative to herself. But the right fish have not swallowed the tempting bait. Great Britain not unnaturally looks askance at a proposal which, in itself admirable .and .in .accord with British sentiment, has been sprung as a surprise upon the world from the most aggressive of the Powers, and one, too, that never moves without a selfish motive or a ! deep design. For that reason it has failed to generate any material enthusiasm amongst the British people, or to enlist an encouraging response from the British Government. The work of naval construction goes on with all the vigor occasioned by impending danger, instead of being arrested by a sense of security begotten of assured peace. Therein lies the first reason for Russia being disconcerted at the reception given to the disarmament proposal. But it is not the chief reason. Of all the Powers, Russia was interested in the proposal meeting with the acceptance of France, her ally, but to that Power, and that Power alone, the proposal was a cause of irritation. Fraace had counted on Russian aid In some day regaining her lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and the disarmament proposal was viewed in the light of a crushing blow to that cherished hope. The French Press was not slow to make the fact plain that France would look for a settlement of the Alsace-Lorraine question as a preliminary to disarmament, which was pronounced to be impossible unless Germany re-ceded to France her lost provinces. The Russian reply to this plain declaration at once disclosed the duplicity which Russia had practised upon France in respect to the matter and the Inherent weakness of the whole proposal. France was warned .that Russian aid in regaining Alsace and Lorraine could not be expected, and an appeal was made to France to surrender her hopes of getting back her provinces. The German. Press, probably inspired thereto, at once took advantage of the opportunity to Intensify French irritation and cause a breach between the allies by hailing the disarmament proposal with approval, while the feeling in Germany was enthusiastically in favor of it because of the necessity it would force upon France of abandoning false hopes of Russian help. The next move in the game was the effort of Russia to placate France by putting forward the suggestion, that Alsace and Lorraine should be neutralised—made a sort of no man's land to be seized by one or other of theold enemies at the first favorable opportunity. But France gave no response, and has not made any sign of viewing the disarmament proposal as other than a blow at her darling desire. There was, however, no hesitancy over the question on the part of Germany. Supported by her allies, Austria and Italy, she promptly acquiesced in "the Czars proposal for convening a conference to consider the question of international dis-: armament," but to that acquiescence attached the condition that " the present possessions of the various nations shall be maintained." As it is a reasonable. assumption thab the first essential duty of a Peace Conference would be a recognition of existing rights, such a condition was unnecessary, and Germany, supported by her two allies, had a motive in attaching it to concurrence in the proposal tor an international disarmament conference. What was the object ? The. answer is plain. By making the stipulation Germany ab one stroke gave a thrust to her unfriendly neighbor and put Russian sin* cerity in respecb to the whole question to the test. It was an adroit manoeuvre by means of which the tactical German outwitted the crafty Russian. Assent to the condition imposed would, of course, be tantamount to confirming Germany in undisputed possession, of Alsace and Lorraine by international agreement, to which Russia, the ally of France, the aspirant for those provinces, would stand in the position of an endorsees refusal to assent to the condition would expose the fact thab Russia had some obher objecb than to place the peace of the world on a more secure footing when the Czar's proposal was issued. The German condition placed Russia upon the horns of a dilemma. She must either endorse the distinct thrust at France, and so alienate her only ally while leaving the Triple Alliance intact, or she mosb confess .that the proposed International disarmament, which M. Mnravieff averred to have sprung from the Czar's intense love of peace, was not altogether disinterested or suoh a bona fide thing as to justify the eulogiums bestowed upon ib by the; apostles of peace. The promptitude with which the Russian Government have inhibited the newspapers from discussing the subject ia evidence that the Triple Alliance have driven Russia into " a tight place," and that enthusiasm on the subject was more .seeming than real. This latesb develop: men? makes it very problematical if the proposed conference will ever meet, One thing is abundantly clear : France cannot consent to take parb in a conference bound by such a condition as that imposed by Germany. Austria, and Italy. To do so Tvonld be to abandon all hope of regaining Alsace and Lorraine, and sever the. bond of sympathy amongst the people which, has maintained the' stability of the Republic. Unless France consented to the proposal international disarmament would be an impossibility, for any attempt to coerce her Into acquiescence would be the signal for that general war which all the nations contemplate with a dread thab operates as a strong , force,on the side of peace.