THE PRESENT POSITION OF ENGLAND IN EUROPE.

Oamaru Mail, Volume X, Issue 3809, 5 January 1887, Page 4

THE PRESENT POSITION OF ENGLAND IN EUROPE.

(From the Economist.) The more sensible English Jingoes may content thenneives. Tb«y aro always fancying that England Is despised became of her reluctance to use- threats on unimportaot occasions, bot the military State* of Europe ate now dreading serious war, and their 6rat preoccupation is to secum"the alliance, or at lease the trustworthy neutrality, of this country. Every Power, fncludinsj even Rossis, is «fLring Tii some temptation ; and we believe these offers, though, of coarse, never made in writing,| occasionally take, in a way well known W diplornatiala, the most definite form. Thus, if we will join Austria, the Russian advance towards Constantinople will be resisted in tbe most decided manner, and Prince Alexander of Baltcnburjf may even be restored to Safia, with permission to arrange an alliance of all the Balkan States, and thus bar the adranee of Raiaia to the Sooth. That is the policy foreshadowed in the speech of the Prime Sfinister of Hungary. If England will join Germany, sho may bayo at once, and a predominant voice in the ultimate distribution of the remaining Turkish dominions. If England, on tbe okhcr hand, will join Russia, she may hare Egypt and peace in India for half a century; while, if she will join Francp, she may have almost anything she pleases, excluding Egypt. Oa the other hand, if Eoghnd, " wrapping horseif in haoehty isolation," refuses to interfere on tbe Cnntiqent, she is to be worried on tbe lodian frontier, in the South Pacific, 'and in ooiii &* '• Bt ,ast dr,vcn » fc y ex " temal pressure, to choose finally among the allies who so eagerly solicit her. Neglect is certainly not tho English portion jost now, the truth being that tho intermittent outbursts of scorn for this country which have always from time to lima appeared in the Continental Press are doe to three causes—one, annoyance that England should occupy Egypt without fighting for it; another, irritation that England should keep so tranqnilly aloof from the htrrfy-borly, yet pretume to have a voice In all decisions ; and the third, a genuine iosipacity to understand why a Power with i comparatively so small an army should claim to bo treated as a great State. These wriiere count heads, and as regards Great Britain, count them wrongly, and believing that this country could not send 60,000 men anywhere, declare that ber opposition, however earnest, is matter of small importance. How cau she invade with a mere corps cFannie. The statesmen of tbe continent make no such mistake as their journalists do. They understand fairly well in what the Strength of Eogland consists. They know, to begin with, that war with her, so far beyond invasion as ahe is might mean a struggle of years, during which the attacking State would suffer greatly in finance, in social misery, and in budmisaion to to the demands of other and more military States than Eogland, which would be certain to take advantage of her embarrassment, and either, satiate old grudges or vindicate old claims. No State on the Corilitent is without greedy enemies, or can, under the system of arming whole populations, look forward to protracted campaigns without internal trepidation. A seven weeks' war may be pleasant, and a seven monthV war endurable, though costly ; bnt a war of years is not an undertaking to be faced except for reasons of honor, or of interests apparently vital to all future prosperity. The social ruin consequent on a long war wohld be too complete. Moreover, though the English army is small, it is not easily destructible; recruiting becoming more instead of less rapid with the interruption ' of.commercial and the partial suspension of manufacture, and no Earopean State is so far beyond all competition as not to dread an enemy when assisted by a second enemy like Eogland. Tbe aid of Eoglony with her money makes tho- first* enemy and persevering ; tbe English corns <Tarmee of 60,000 men is renewable in spite :of'all losses, and if too hardly pressed Eogland has the means of formojslitioos. There are no means of terminating her antagonism by one tremeodons blow. Above all Europe is a small place deeply indented by seas, and dependent for freedom of movement on transportation by sea. There is no state, not even Germany, which would, not feel , most keenly the loss of sca-borno commerce, the'closing of all her ports, and the harassing sense of inability to cross the smallest piece of open water. Germany for instance might, if defeated at sea, lose her trade, France her African and Asiatic colonies, Austria her control of the Adriatic, Russia her liberty of movement and action both in the Biltic and Black Seas, and Turkey her capacity of feeding oreicn holding Constantinople, which, as a power seated on two continents, is to ber of vital importance. No single state will run the risk of a great conflict with England as a possible addition to her enemy's resources, and that position of itself makes) of EogUnd a great influence of peace.

This is probably the sironget reason at tba present moment tending towards poan. The atate of affiira in Eastern 'Europe is decidedly,bad, and .if Russia were qtiilefree to march to Constantinople might even lead to-war. France, the Russian statesman would calculate is a foil counterpoise to Germany, and Austria might bo encountered alone, bat then the sctioiTof England is so uncertain. Sho might not interefere, bat aha also might if the success ef Russia became too great, and then (ho struggle might be tool serines, and last too long even for Russian endurance and readiness to make sacrifices. The gnat pnzi, too, would be. ■ore to escape, for Constantinople could not be taken in the face of a British flset, and without Constantinople aa a reward, a Russian Caar woold not demand too heavy a sacrifice from his people. They are perfectly ready to follow op the traditional policy of their country, but, aa the Crimean War showed, they grow restless * under heavy loss, uncompensated by the victories they think their due. Tho Government of St.' Petersburg, therefore, .hesitates, and although their agent in Sofia is inclined to play tho part of a dictator, and threaten occupation if he is not obeyed, it is possible that at the latest moment Russia may recoil, and endeavor to master the next prince whom Bulgaria may eiect. If her rulers can induce the Assembly to elect the Russian nominee, the ptwsiige of St. Potersburgh may be sufficiently saved, and the Czar may await a more propitious moment for actually occupying South Bulgaria. This is at present the hope of peace, and if it is realised it will be doe to the fact that even uncertainty in England's plans deters Russia from commencing tho long foreseen conflict with her Austrian rival. She does not fear Austria, but Austria with England behind her becomes a much weightier and more enduring power.