"FIRST SLAUGHTER, THEN SCUTTLE."

Oamaru Mail, Volume IX, Issue 2869, 6 April 1885, Page 3

"FIRST SLAUGHTER, THEN SCUTTLE."

(Pall Mall Gazette.) Hopeful and encouraging as a sign of Erglish brotherhood all round the world s the offer that New South Wales has nade to despatch two batteries of artillery nd one regiment of infantry, both fully quipped, from Sydney to Suakin, in 30 lays from the receipt of the reply of the mperial Government. That is a generous ffer, nobly conceived and admirably iraed. Not all the talk that there has ieen concerning federation useful and icccsaary as much of that has been—can ompare in solid value to this spontaneous ffsr of colonial help. The great mother f three nations, still mourning for her est and bravest son, is encouraged in the jidst of her sorrow by a cheery metsago cross the seas from the most English nd moßt thriving of the Btateß that have prucg from her loins. No sooner does he colony learn than ths wire that irought the telegram of death even on hreshold of victory, throbs once more rith tbo message of sympathy and help, s Gordon dead?—then New South Wales rill hasten to despatch both men and gang o aid the old country in discharging the laties which she owes to civilisation and aankiod. More welcome message seldom eached us at a darker time, and " porentous " indeed must be the " degeneacy " which permits such loyalty to cool, .nd alienates the sympathy and affection ■f these stout Englishmen beyond the sea. 3ut, paradoxical though it may seem, t is not less true that if we were to accept generous offer, wo might inflict a damagng blow upon the loyalty of the Austraians. It would never do to allow the nen of New South Wales to. c cross the rorld only to send them packing back as re sent Sir Frederick Roberts back after tTajuba. We must not make fools of our :o!onial forces as we have so often made ools of our own soldiers. Still less must ve atain the hands of our Australian iolonists with the mere revengeful laughter of the Arabs of the Soudan. The Ministerial policy of massacre and etire, which, in all its naked hideousiess, finds support this morning frofe the Scotsman and sundry other other horough-going organs of the party, *i3 not i policy in support of which we cin cik iur fellow-subjects at the An.ipodcs to ire a shot. Just imagine the revulsion >f feeling that would be produced in the :olony when the survivors of the cam)aign returned to tell how the whole night of the Empire had heeu employed, lot as Mr Bosworth Smith says, "to itanch at the junction of the two Niles irhat Livingstone used to call the ' open sore of the world,' to stop the slave trade it its source, to bring order out of anarchy, ind civilisation out of barbarism, among those magnificent races " a noble purpose, for which the English both at home md beyond the sea might well be proud :o fight but merely to slaughter, to •avage, and to burn, and then, having ipread desolation, to scuttle back to our ships. If we must commit murder wholesale, as we committed it in the opinion >£ every man under General Graham's :ommand when we fought at Teb and . Tamaßi without opening the road to , Berber, let us at least do our butcher's ■ Tork without besmirching the fair es- . satcheon of young Australia with in- , locent blood. If we are going to Berber, , :o Khartoum, to Senaar, to raise the only . xibute worth talking of to the memory of 3eneral Gordon in the shape of a strong , ind civilised Government, where now j slave-traders reign supreme, by all means . let us welcome colonial help. But if we , ire only going to slaughter and to scuttle, j 'or Heaven's sake let us not associate the . :olonists in our crime. ,

The issue is plain and unmistakeable. We hare three coaraea before us in the Soudan. The first and the only policy worthy of England is to accept resolutely onoe for all the responsibility of establishing a settled Government at Khartoum. Oar garrison might be composed of Turks, whom we could recruit by an arrangement with the Sultan, to whom the Soudan belongs. They are the best soldiera in the world, and none are better behaved when under English officers.' The control of the new state, which should be limited as closely as possible to the river and railway route from Suakin to Senaar, should be rested in English hands. Under that scheme Dongola would be the most southerly Egyptian province. Below that we should hold the Nile for the Sultan, as we hold Cyprus, suppressing the slare trade, developing commerce, and proteottecting the populations whom Gordon died to savet The second policy is that of immediate retirement. Apart from other objections, we doubt whether such a policy is possible from a military point of view. If we are to cut and run, the fatal flight from Cabul may be repeated, first, in the Bayuda Desert, and than in the toilsome descent of the Nile. We can, of course, allow the Soudan to be evacuated by massacre once more ; that is possible. But as the garrisons to be Bpeared this time would be English, the decision to leave them to their fate would hardly be pronounced with fs light a heart as in the case of those poor Egyptians whom tho Government now bo bitterly regret having tried to help. If, however, it were possible to retreat at ones without massacre or without handing over our allies to the enemy, this plan is infinitely to be preferred to the third and worst echeme of all, which Ministers have unanimously adopted, for, according to the Birmingham Post, Mr Chamberlain has resolved to make to make Mr Morley a present of the Radical lead, and to stick to his programme of smashing the Mahdi at Khartoum and then leaving the country. To that policy we are resolutely and unalterably opposed, la that crime we refuse to have either part or lot, and we do not believe that the Ministers will be able to induce the country to perpetrate it, be they never so unanimous. Of course we are well aware that some Ministers say that it is premature to talk about the future. All that has been decided as yet is to smash the Mahdi to vindicate the British power at Khartoum. As for what follows after, they will leave that to circumitaoces, relying upon the the ohapter of accidents and believing that in all probability we shall npt be able to | get out, no matter what we say. We cannot arccept the argument. We re.fuse to plunge blindly on to Khartoum as we plunged blindly on to Cairo. We decline to sacrifice 10,000 men and L 10,000,000 to heap up a hecatomb of victims over the grave of General Gordon. To execute the mission to which Gordon dedicated the bast years of his life—yes—for that England will go to Khartoum. But merely for vengeance, merely to slaughter so many thousand Arabs to reassert British authority, and . then to scuttle out of the country, leaving all those who have helped as to be massacred by their enemies—for that England will neither send man nor gun to Khartoum, or even to Suakin, except solely to protect the retreat of Lord Wolseley's force.