THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.

Oamaru Mail, Volume I, Issue 321, 3 May 1877, Page 2

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.

A recent article in the Army and Navy Gazette says :-" Colonel Evelyn Wood considers that a careful review of the circumstances tends to create a belief that the Russians will meet with no insuperable difficulties in their march to the neighbourhood of Constantinople, but that there they will be brought to a standstill by the lines planned for the defence of the capital-that is to say, if these lines are constructed in time. He asserts, however, that as yet not a spadeful of earth has been removed. In our opinion, his views of the probable success of the invaders are somewhat too sanguine. But let us examine his facts and speculations. He asserts that the Russian army at Kiscbeneff numbers 274,600 infantry, 15,330 cavalrv, and 245 guns. This may be the authorised establishment of the corps assembled; but from the information which we have gathered from various sources, we are disposed to believe that, though such a force exists on paper, its efficient strength did not, up to a week ago, exceed 200,000 of all ranks, including non-combatants. We do not, however, deny that, though large bodies of troops must be left in the Caucasus, in Poland, and as garrisons of the Black Sea fortresses, it would be quite possible to .mass on the Pruth an army as strong as that which Colonel Vincent asserts is there assembled. Enormous deductions must be made. In the first place, in the march to the Danube a large number will be removed by sickness, for the waste of a Russian army is notoriously great. In the second place, the left flank, at all

events, must be guarded, for the Rod manian army would have quite enough t| do to protect the right flank. The Doll rudschen forms a salient point from whicl a small body of men could inflict considetl able damage on the Russian communicj tions, and especially that portion of l)i| railway which runs from Galatz for several miles parallel and close to the Danube! Mr. Vincent says that the Turks have nj pontoons or other means of crossing th| river ; but it is inconceivable that thet| should not be fishing boats, and mateiiul| for making rafts, or flying bridges. It i| very possible that the Turks would re un| able to pass over a large army. But J large army would not be needed to cuj the communications. Even half-a-dozri men could, during a few hours of tli night, temporarily interrupt the railwa traffic, and a hundred horsemen won' hamper the passage of pro vision trait moving by road. Besides there are seve Turkish gunboats in the Danube, an there is no reason to doubt that an entti prising naval officer could, in spite of tot pedoes and batteries, run up with a flotill of other gunboats and small steameri Colonel Vincent says that the gunbou now in the river would be soon destroye by the Russian artillery, since there at absolutely no creeks in which vessel could be sheltered from guns placed c the northern banks. It is not, ho? ever, to be imagined that the gunboai would remain stationary to be fire at, and the northern bank is in man places so marshy that guns could m be placed in position, even if we wet to grant that the Russians could spare sufficient number of batteries to line tli entire of the river. If the Turkish gm boats be properly handled, we believe tli; they will play an important part, botli i obstructing the passage of the Danube \ the Russians, and in facilitating the cros ing of small bodies of Turks destined | operate against the invaders' communic tions. Everything, indeed, will be again the Russians when tliey suck to pass int Bulgaria, for the southern is higher tin the northern bank, and there is an utti lack of lateral communications on tl latter. Nevertheless, we should ignores the teachings of history if we believi that the Russians would not eventual cross the river. Before, however, tli, operation can be attempted, it will bo m cessary first to move a large army_throii( Roumania, and this process, we imagim will be more difficult than Mr. Vincei anticipates. He says that the railwa which runs from Odessa via Kischend Jaiiy, and Bucharest, to Giurgevo, m be able to move the invading army, kei it supplied with fo.id, stores, and r inforcements, and carry back the sick an wounded. He considers that the narroi ing of the gauge at J assay is a fact of i importance, for the Roumanian rollin stock is abundant, good, and special constructed for the transport of troop moreover, the space between the whet of the Russian carriages could,, be bo< and easily narrowed. This i^ratit would, however, diminish grca\/y t means of moving men and stores as far Jassy. We have read that the Ronmatiii rolling-stock, too, is by no means abuu ant and good. Making, however, evei concession to Mr. Vincent, we feel co vincedfrom the experience of the Prussia) in 1870-71, that a single railway would I taxed beyond its capabilities, were iti quired to transport fighting men as \vi as stores and sick. We agree with M Vincent in thinking that the direction the railway indicates the points of passnj and that probably the latter will attempted at points opposite to Rui clink, Turkestan, and Silistria. These ft tresses are, we are told by Mr. Vincßi in a very inefficient state, and weal garrisoned, but it is probable that durii the last few weeks these defects have bei partially remedied. It must be also bori in mind that in Turkish fortresses 11 only is there a numerous artillery militi but that every adult male may be vicwi as a fighting man. The towns in questiu would, no doubt, be ultimately takei but the sieges of Turkish fortresses ai generally costly and slow, and their r sistance would not only delay an advanc but help to diminish the strength of tl invaders. As to the subsequent opefl tions, it is obvious that the passage of tl Balkan could not 1 e attempted till hot Varna and Schumla had been either take or blockaded. We shall, therefore, 1 astonished if the Russians find themsclvt in a position to cross the Balkan before tl e mimencement of the second campnigi As to the passes, they are, some of then traversed by indifferent roads, are csu to defend, and would undoubtedty b strongly fortified. But here, again, * believe that the Russians, if victorious i the open field, would eventually succee in accomplishing a passage. We, howevci ground our belief on the prolonged, if no eventually successful, resistance of tli Turks, of the difficulties of supplying an finding transport for even 100,000 menil the Balkan peninsula, and the fact tli« the Turks possess, and are likely to retain the mastery of the Black Sea. As lonj as they are superior in naval power, an] chance of a coup de main against, or eve! a rapid advance to. Constantinople, is, i! our opinion, out of the question. Aft<| all, however, the chief reliance of thl Sultan must be on his army, and if tW is badly handled, it is tolerably certau that Adrianople will once a«ain be oCCt* pied by the legions of the Czar.