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NZ Truth, Issue 217, 21 August 1909, Page 6

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i joe : t thlafc said yo,Ui j Ito cijtsa some, ciaos. ' ! *oa : \es,. your iaaitoujj,, I j ito do that 'hot?'." i jur. : Thsroi Me. two, vesy re- ' Jyhich will, probably sum up tetter fior, 3fo.uprCha.i>t«Jj v,. >r and |*ra,©d; V., feajJaWfl,. Ok,, yes^ 1 bjive tbp^e,, ' aud a seose of ojkws. rf^jbnpur : lam sorrj; to kei^r that. KSwrt-pn.: B-at I sh^li b#, ufi^g^r f ' ieceire. an J2itnna,fciipn at, $&©, ■ ft pp*sibie. 'stage bh^tt. - you, aija | sdL i Honour: Yee, no doiijbt. When, s^isfied, I w.ili Jlet ypu, know. \No;rI}DU : Thank, you,, son?- Jftonr. r Now,, iii regard, to, the lyijiair peg which, I 'ka.ve-j bgeu, pointing j^n^L with, a view >to ivakijig the apppsitt-, I shaiif.^how th.al» ooupr j out o5 bis, wn^ ill, this- case, i^li| v. "Daily Mas," to make.' a^ mded' attack on; btie. patter, and. % EciaJ wa^ grau-fced;., (See. Odgt^rs, #b©l, 4th ediiiion, 'jpagci 655).), I 1 that case is not cm all ioyxr^ i\jith ; bu.t the spirit is kh<s same. j find; cases, that "tiifr' ionna; hfi4 yoji E<?t better them? r. : Perhaps you -^LH pesime.to quote them all? is, HojCLOur : Yes, bui; I ciyi oul^g ©x--6 tl .« opLujjon.- ijhaji thae lia:t«r casea. fd-SLgi up. the Bjattei. StUlv tliaij. or-'soa tft deeid^: 1 am q,uito pre.id|i?> consider all the eases, whisk i;^feyaa(i, th,at soa, cite. l^'lfolrtfl^i: 1 I}hi?ik it is very dery«ur Poj^ou^ shoujd have. ver&a °^ some; o$ the. '^i s^tbiisorijties it* th^e Eip.pj,re,, paat toinßiftbed *H* I ifcin ppjepapfed tos p',BBAEI> Y. &RAHA3sI. hj/ "Norton i The, next case I will, [is t&is : Praed y. Qi^ah^^i 24 yp w 1,890, p. 53. ' I^e \ &wje sihijxw? that wli^re tb<? pl^aiu- \ tnas. gbitaimed a verdict m an action V -f^l tiie C^uit wiU not grant 'a | trial on the gEoqnd o^ excessiveiag^s unl,es.s. it th'in,k'a' the damages Jgt?% that no jury could reasonably £- given them ;' and the conduct of } libeller may b© considered between «thne of making the libel down to of the triaK (Extracts read.) ' >*vi reference to. that case, I inj^BT- ttesoT.H?'-* atit-ention to this: jttating that the' Court, though !»not have given the verdict itwld 1 not presume for tKat reason flisay that it was a verdict that men would not have fad the matter could no,t be d|rs- ; ; , J^n that ground, it goes on to , fttiis remark; '-If the jtiry i,n damages have been guilty of" . |nuscondu,ct or misled by the j es of the counsel, those are xai--1 gjf«un,d;3 foj. interfering \vith. ) irdict." Now, I say it cannot BfiWy be contended tb,at the re- " Jrin^jde by Mr. Skerrett had no ace with the jury. Th« jury must pbly have been influencedj "have ftriisled by the speeches of coiui/as the Master of the puts Mie case cit-ed — and that is a very j^ay^ pitting it. I cite this y> show that one of the grounds Jf the Court will interfere with of the jury, is the possihr of the jury having been misled ftqe remarks of counsel; and where vj is even a possibility of such v,nVufluence the Court will interfere fapset the verdict or order a new J^AJqqBT.T. V. "DAILY MAIL." lenf inuing, Mr. No^rton said that the 4 % caso ho would cita was that of jltieli v. the " £>aily ftUjP* Jia / [jea Law Report, p. 165) ; the action / i one of libel, olaiia £1000, jury /t\{ irded £25QQ—£loOQ more than sued j.foi r 'Phis outrageous yerctict was really t bright about by the outrageous oori.fduot of counsel m tW case-r-similar to Mm misconduct of counsel m, his owii %<?• It was a case m which an actress id beon libelled as to her chastity Kto her age, m boing accused of being S| mother of a grown-up daughterHonour said ho was perfectly frmiliar with the oa«ej the point was mat counsel had imputed a most improper course for a delay which was leally right and proper. I Mr. Norton said thia was BOj it had men, said thtitthe drlay of three weeks |bS to~onablfi the ctefondanis to search |1 over t3i« country m the hope of findjng somethirg derogatory to this lady, itill, to refresli his own mind, he would prefer to read the case. (Case read.) 'hat .case showed clearly that the 'burt took a very sever© view of the lisconduct of counsel, and accordingly bey upset the verdict: allowed appeal i gainst it. Yet the words of counsel iii iat case wore not m any sense so outageoiis as the language used by the sarned counsel for the plaintiff (Mr. lerrett) m his own case, m '"holding m up to opprobrium and infamy. Rerdless of the laws of Court etiqueite, •fngtVee, Mr. Skerrett had referred to ; vrton and his paper as infamous, as ; •, moral, and had appealed for a yin- ■ i ctive vordict for the sole purpose of linina Norton and destroying his aper. Counsel did this wrongly, alsel.v> «* n< l y^t he was unchecked from Jenfh or opposing counsel; counsel's PFords were allowed to go to the jury vfthbut any safeguards of cautionary vords from the Cowrt. The next c^so be would refer to was that of POOLB i f WHITCOMBE (Fo«fce(r and FiiilayEon's Report, Vol. 111, 1862-3, p. 72.) Mbam ix*d.) Th© cftix of this upsetItiug °f * v^rflict was that counsel had Iguggaeted that tn« defendant would be Ipw'f&ftfo *at}«fied if the jury gave a p7erdfc%tqr l^fts thajfi 5 guine>a«, to de%rive Plaintiff of opftta. During th« ••mriaJUfloo judge promptly intervened, "l^feanot oven wait till his summing-up, VAtd r-toW the jury that if they took •1 ,Ty cctwe of this remark it woujd be *^>uhd for a new trial, md he again ' th#n m v his s||ni|nfa^-jip. ■srAhelete >!)<» faf? 9?d ming m f. i■ * •

granted. Assuming not the probability, : but the possibility, of the jury having i been- influenced 1 by these words of coun--1 soli m assessing damages, he had an even greater right to a- new trial. It was, not suggested that learned judges could not dive into the minds of jury- • men. and find out what h,ad! really influenced theon to, eoijae. to their decision; but so long as the judges were sajjisfiedc ty*s $pi e w > as cv W a B oss^" ' bility of the jury having been infiu.- --' enced by wrongful suggestions or words ©I counsel,, that was reason for upstfifc- ; ting their verdict. ; (1.5, p..m., Couri adjourned till, 2: p.m..) I Mu. Norton,, on resuming, said that ! he woujrfd. fi#st ask leave to, make a, per--'sojftaj; e^pl^nflttuon wifth j^ega,^ w>. th-a ! application, he., had; m,ade for ; the apr poiptment of ajo, official sJjiprtljiAJ%<i i writer: he ha,di taken the course a,© did : contrary to th,e advice of those who 1 weo?e. advising binij a,nd he s'hpul.d' not ' like them, to. b© prejudiced m any way. • Continuing, Mr. Norton again re-: : ferred a,t liength, to. the case ofi POOLS Y. \VHITCOJVIB#, : and; emjphasijsed the fact that the. mere. ■ incidental) mention of the fact that Igss ; th.a,n, 5. guineas, danxages would no*' 1 capxs* cp^ijSj.'practfeaJsy.'a req.ues.t to, th.9, ; j,ujjy tpi in^«j the. djamageS" that amount,? ' had been sufficient to. upset the vei-diet.; If the Bngligb. Coiuivb of Appeal saw fit* ■ to. u^se-ij a" v»rdi<?fi pn, suck cc-mpara-tiv ely ( trivia gcouinfe, how much more readily., on 'how much stronger grounds,' ! would his Honour be able to' grant a ; u©w tria^l m th)©, ppeseiiit ca,se. TJhi©: cas« was- not aliogeth,er analagp.us, but ' tthe principl© w-a®. the same : ihat tho '■ juijy must not be influenced by extra-* . Oieous, inj^tter, by irrelevant matter, to ' db: anytking they would' not othe-rwise j have done. Mr. Skerrett's violent a-ld i exciting words had! undoubtedly raised I irrefevapat prejjudiees ; m the mind: of the, ' jury, and' bod that very reason, he. rejpeated, he was entitled, to a new.-triaj. ' Another case, he wbidd refer to was tha;t of 1 ' MACASSEY Y. BELI/, I (.Yol.' 11, N.Z. JSui-isD, p. 59-71;):. , ! tiis Honour said he thought; that ; ea*se; wajs; neven- decidjed). In tthM ca>?e., 'Mr. Barnes Smith, m addressing titei jury, told them that if they found' a i v,e-i?d|pti thifr piaiinti;^, wh.o. wa& 0. '■ soljci^qi, Ho. "tih> legal et-ir ictuette, Ike would] not he oharged 1 WV? \iees, and' that, was made ground 1 by plaiaitiffi- for. motion' for; 'new trial 1 ; but tfhe; maiftej} was- sub&Bq;iLWitty co-nipro-Biised ; and' so! f-ir as h© knew- there waa ; !no jjudicial opinion on the ca.se. . i Mr. Norton ssaid tliat a refeTence to. !■ -fehe " N-Z. ' Jjni-ist as' cited, wo;uld ; > show that .the. qase did go to t»h,e iaclgea. (Extract rea,d.) i '0m Hjonpui; said; evidjentb; t»hat, was so. ;i thei}s was no new ta;ial : , he was--1 subo' of tha,i!. ty.y,' Norton, s.aid tha»t he m^jrely. qu^bedi the ca,se t<>, show that counsel werei not alJjOAjred ix). direct tjje jiiry asj ; to,tn<2, q,mo,unti su%ieo;t to.; carry, 9/?s,l^,j, ; and; ajga^u, he' co.nien.died'th.a r t. th» mfe. ! conduct of counsel thjere was com.para-; tiVely- trivial conipared with, th^t o£ ', Mr. Ske.rre.tt m the present co,s.e. ' The ■ cas& showed that thq (Ek),upts revise: the verdict of . the. jury,, if pfe-r j sumalifcy, U 9t dewpnstijablj', but T^xe- : sumablj; th^ej was even ihfk kpxp. siis- ! picion of the jury having been wrongfully i#sucn.ced. The. ne^t case, he ' wOiuljd. refer to w%s th^.t of | "' W^'V.fOTi •' ' ' | lj?05 Appeai Ca^s.. p.. W, wbftcli H ( cQjnisMer^i a very ii£p#rianjt c%Sie an<t TOi-y, " germ.am to^ his o.\xn- argument.; Tn,e' wrongfu;! action, of counsel m, tdia.t i ca,se comsijsted in ' th> pro/duction, of a ! let-ber, m the. course of his address, tp, ■ the, jupry '; and the Loocd Hig]&L Chajncet : lor s«id that the jury had been influenced) by co."",s€'l|,, that the %p^ wa^ 1 therefore unsaii'sijactoxy., and. the^efoTe' th ; 8 verdict ought not to stand;- (Keiiport. r«ad.), Hea,-e,i,ak^m> coajtended, the misconduct of opun^l ,A\'as, not i nearly so seifio-^s %? Mr. Skerratt's, mJscondu,ct, "and yet ' the verdict was upset. He would also, m regard to the. practice and. con.du.et of barristers • m 1 Court, quote • * THE \Y ORBS OF HALSJ&WvY m Lord Halsbury/s Laws of England/ ;V&. 11, "v- ' 4,}Q, Note (g) (exfoaaH rea<3), where- rfc was. distinctly stated, in,ier ai^a, thai neither m the opej^ijag, %t' any s^tage'of t^e tmal A n>a^ CQunsel giveJiis own perfiwal o.pjmoiii of the case"; and, tyv. Norton cont©E,df4, far less wonW counsel be allowed to. make the. outrageously afeusi,ve charges jMfr. Sfcerwti Had m^d,^to hawl Balsfeury counsel should never mention f*?* s which require proof;, or whicK it is not intended to. prove, ox which aje, iirafeievant .to, tho issue. There, then, it was distinctly laid down that counsel could not . do what Mr. SkeiT&tt had done, a^id laid most emphatically and m the' most precise terms. Mr. Skerrett had attacked him, his paper, and done it when there was no chaaice pf his replying, no chance of calling evidence. CONCERNING CALLING,EVIDENCE. His Honour said that that was hardly correct ; at any stage of the pror ceedings, if objection was made to 'the judge j' evidence could bo called. The Court, if satisfied that the evidence ir necessary i could, permit the evidencto be called at any time. If counsel had opened up something which was cftntrary to fac> or alleged to be con? trary, evidence could be called at any stage, at ihe clo^e of the case 'pi; at any other stage, that is evidence which, m the opinion of the judge, it is proper to call. Mr. Norton said he did not know that before. However, this part of his application was based on the fact of the misconduct of counsels and the further fa,ct that he was m no way checked and no objection was taken. Surely it was npi to be argued that be-, cause his Honpur was perhaps deeply engaged m taking notes, or for some other reason, the precise nature and bearing of counsel's remarks escaped his Honour's attention, and perhaps whilst his own counsel was too busy or too romiss to object, that he, as a litigant, was to be deprived of any remedy. His Honour said that his observation had been .entirely confined to the aoouracy of Mr. Norton's statement, that it was impossible for him to have reply. Continuing, Mr. Norton said he would contend that counsel's misconduct m thus case did infringe the clear principle luid down by Lord If irrelevant matter which might influence the mind of the jury — not necessarily influence them, but might do so — were introduced by counsel, that was ground for a new trial. What were the assumed facts behind Mr. Skerrett's diatribes? Thoy were that HE (MR. NORTON) WAS A DISREPUTABLE CHARACTER. Generally speaking, that he was publishing a paper deliberately demoralising the community for moneygain ; all this was treated as fact, and placed before the jury m inflammatory language; and how could it be preBurned that listening to such words of suoh counsel the jury were not influenood, and that the words did not therefore flagrantly transgress the rule cited? It Would be absurd to contend that theso words were merely flowers of rhetorio, intended to have no influence; that would be absurd m view of the position and standing of the learned counsel. The words must have had a^mfluenco. j . .the words assumed, falsely and wrongly, that (Mr. Norton) was y A SCOUNDREL,; AN IMMORAIi ..'-■ ''' A^ v MON^IiVR, [ .. :. \

for the alleged libel on Stringer be- . causo he was the owner of a paper working sv.ch immoral havoc upon the vitals of the community, but destroy the payer as well, then he : learned counsel of this standing and eminence : was there to tell thorn, that this horrid monitor would be the complete moral ruin of the community. And the learned, counsel deliberately invited the jury U\ stamp the paper out by bringing m vindictive damages, damages inflicted not solely for the piirposp of punishing the legal off puce of the particular libel, but fpr the purpose of ruining this inpial monster, destroying the paper which was an engine fqr ttye desfcruptipn of t-Jie inorf>.l tone aiid character of the community, and iniis£ therefore be crushed out with vindictive damages. And learned counsel invites the jury po undertake the high aud hply and splemn task of wiping Joim Nprton and lijs paper from off th,e face of the land. Now, however serious the libel was, and for the sake of argument he would assume tha,t it" was a serious libel, he contended that he was only liable to a penalty, imposed by the jury arriving at tkheir verdict by proper process of law clearly laid down m the books cited. Tliere was punishment for that. Blut. counsel was not to seek to have ih,ai punishment made more severe, to be. made vindictive, on some plea of the interests pf spciety, based on FALSE 'ASSUMPTIONS OF ' . D^RAVITY 1 i and wrong-dping on the part of hiroijelf (Aifc\ .Nortpn) and the paper of which lie had the honour to be the. ' props-ie.tpi-. It wpujd be just ap re.a§pnable to term the proprietors of a trade newspaper, seeking to defen-J honest tradesmen against fraudulent bankrupts and ''bad marks" by the exposure of their' character, immoral j and money-grabbing monsters as to apply -that term to himself. "His Honour pointed out that Mr. Norton seemed to be following the yery irrelevancy he objected to m pounsel, when going into the character of tlie paper "of wKiclj he h^d the ribnou,r to be the proprietor." "If the character of the paper was irrelevant to oominent upftn by cpun-sel, it was equally irr^lsvant for 3str. Norton to jntrodTice it. " Mv- Norton said this was perhaps so,, but if the learned cpuns&} \y^s uej Imitted t<> enter into diatribes against him dnd his paper, there was 310 eefrtainty of his being tried by an iin-psvssi-pnate jury. Counsel had no right t«> travel beyond the legitimate" scope "of the proceedings, I 'a-nd set up a pane of raoral mlacondupt. ' That was wh-dt he was proceeding to saj' \yben he was ;iH : t©r2uptec}His Honour : You will not be m any 'sense int-eyrupted, Mr. Nprton, when ; dealing vfith' relevant matter, {>ut 1 when -ycii cuter jnto the discussipn of the paper, its bearing on the com- , ijflunity, and' its value to the ocinir : m.uniijy, you are entering upon irrelevant ground. Mr. Nekton : I admit that, perhaps I lqst m.y anohorage for the nionient. your Honour. His Honpur : Then perhaps you will ba good enough to get a fresh ano}iprag«- ' ... ' Mr. Norton: I will try all four anchors, jsqur Honqur, and try not to ab-ose your iiidujg-e-nce.. Now I want tp. know w.hat right has any counsel tp I assru^ne,' aj^inst any snit-or before a |ury> tb« is^ue wihipfi is stated fpr ar]™^ica.tion ? And wiiiat right has he tp, bring m ei'^aaieous mattjer about my moral character and general occupation, th,e way I conduct my paper. That is "not releyah't' ho t]ic issue. Tlie on© plain specific iss,ue ig thus: Is this a, libel? Has the plaintiff been libelled? To what' extent has he -been damaged thereby m" the unbia(&sd, unprejudiced opinion of the jury ? The jury must come to its conclusion upon those lissues une^cited, unprejudiced ; it is expressly fortidden to coansel to bring m ex^ranepug matter and irrelevant matter to influence their mind ; and if counsel does that, he is unanimously ;" cp'n--1 demixed and punisied, made to suffer for his misconduct— or his client is. I contemd that there is no case \yhich I have cited or shall cite which is on all-foxirs with mine m tihis respect; \ha,t th^re is no case wheire words so oiitragepus, so unoa-Hed-forj' have hee-n \isod ; where the irrelevant matter and ths inflammatory appeals and the delamatory attacks have been so LIIGG.ED IN BY THE EARS fpr no Qth,e.r possible .or presumable purpose than for diverting the ininds pf the jury from the reai issues, for endeavouring to increase the damages by an,creasing the jury's idea of the serip^^ness of the offence. If it can hb reasonably . assume! as ; possible, then I urge, again tb^t that rais-es a very serious doubt, a very very seriouu doubt, as to whether the verdict has been properly obtained ; and I say that the-reioro I, as the aggrieved party, am entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and that your Honour will be serving ! the ends -of justice and ttbe due and ' j regular administration of the law by granting my application. WALLACE V. COOK. Continuing hjs pitations, Mr. Norton said li4> would now nefer to the case of Wallace v. Cook, reported m the "Times'* newspaper, 15th June ? 1903, seen m Parliament House, Wellington, and verified copy submitted to his Hcaiour and opposing counsel. This Yf-As an action brought to recover reniurLesraticm for services rendered and damages for libel. The trial was upset because at the end of tjie case, when np evidence a-s to blackmail had been called, an accusation was made that one of the parties knew from previous experience WHAT WAS MEANT BY BLACKMAIL. (Report read.) Mr. Nprton: Now, your Honour, I will apply these facts to my own oaoe. Here was merely one definite allegation made against a party to the siiit, the bare insinuation that the lady knew something about blackmail, this being a nasty imputation. I may mention that this lady was the wife of Sir Francis Cook, and she was the celebrated Victoria C. Chaflin, the great American rights pioneer, a very beautiful woman, but rather eccentric. His Honour: Really, Mr. Norton, this is quite irrelevant. The question of THE LAD.Y'S BEAUTY AND ECCENTRICITY are not relevant facts — if they are facts at all. Mr. Norton: Well, your Honour, there was here an insinuation conveying a vile imputation of blackmail; it was made m the opening and persisted m m the reply, and nothing m the proceedings oi* evidence justified it, and there was no attempt to justify it ; and the fact that it might have been rebutted by putting Lady Cook into the box, and that that course was not taken, did not seem to affect m the least the Court of Appeal. The fact that the Lord Chief Justice, who tried the case, had endeavoured to mitigate the possible or probable damage pf the statement — the result likely to be effected by such an allegation — did not affect the judgment qf the higher Court, the Court of Appeal, and the appeal was allowed. Now, no one can contend, your Honour, that the allegations conveyed by this insinuation were proper. Insinuation by counsel may be even more deadly than an open statement of fact. A man may be able to deal with that more easily than with an insinuation, especially an insinuation conveying m flamboyant language that the speaker is dialling it ostensibly on behalf of the nWal tono and character of the community —-the nKuntenance of which iivfei^jitially m tho exercise oi'. Jijs dutj^aS a citizen is binding upon all men If&pdes

to defend the honour of the community against my paper Thcro was NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THK COURT that my paper was a menace to the community, and your Honour would not have allowed any such evidence to be called (supposing it to be m existence) ; your Honour would have ruled such evidence inadmissible, and that makes the conduct of counsel even the more flagrant. Counsel knew as well as your Honour knows that he was doing wrong, that he was prejudicing lny case, anc| I submit that it was his intention to prejudice my case. I now come to American cases. Altiljough, your Honour, I am a»are th§t the decision^ of fan State Court*! of Ajnerica, are not accepted as binding ph liritish courts, the letter and spirit of English precedent and practice, nevertheless if they can be cited as analogous and shown tq be sustain? ing, I think they will be valuable for the purposes of my argument. VALUE OF AMERICAN DECISIONS. His Honour: The decisions of the American courts are not binding. The decisions of American courts are valued vaiyingly according to the status. A relevant American depision upon points of practice is always treated with respect and quoted m the English courts, although certainly the respect varies to some extent according to the St^te. The judgment m the Dakota cpurt is, not accepted as qf the game value as the judgment pf some of fhe Eastern State courts,, for iristy^ce.. 'Mr. Norton': Quite so, yp.ur Honour, Lynch' Law, for example, p.rer vails m spine of the Statee. "His Hp'npur: That is 'not the pqint; I have never heard any authority quoted m regard to Lynch Law. Go on with yqur argument, Mr. Norton, please. Mr. Norton : Then I would direct your Honour's attention to the Amerir can Encyolop. of Pleading, Vol. 11., page 727. His Honqur: Is this available m the Library ? Mr. Norton: No, your Honqur, not m this Library. Mr. Skerrett: fy is m the Wellington Library. His Honqur: Then you had better leave your cqpy here, Isr.' JjortQn. Mr. Norton : • Very well, " your Hqnpur. This Enclop. states that m general it is § well established rule that jt is an ©.l'rqr sufficient tp reverse a [ judgment tp suffer counsel to state ! fatrte not m evidence, Ijis Horiqur pointed put th£it this wa? not ground f° r new trial ; m the Rugeiey pqigoning c»§e thq cpunsel for the accused, m addressing the jiiry ? said that he believed m the innpopnee of the accused j counsel wa§ renroved, but' that was not made ground fpr a new trial. '' Mr. Norton : Yes, your Honqur, I have read that case. But counsel h^d iio light, according to thig Anjerican work, to bring m facts npt ' ,jn 'evidence ; and that is preeisply what 1 couiisel has dqne m •this cgs'e. The practice of the American courts is TO FROWN DOWN, TO DISCOURAGE, not to permit such outrageous conduct. If it is to be permitted the whole machinery qf . the law will be dislocatedThe cool, dispassionate administratiqn of justice and court procedure will be lifted from the realm qf judicial dispussion a.nd c|epision and thrown into the heated prejudiced itnip.sph«rß of presumption and personal animue. Even party politics may bp introduced. I might have been a murderer—perhaps it is only by $he Grraoe qf God that I am not— but neyertheless I niight have thqse murderou« ipstihets, put I was being tried for doing a specifip wrcng tq an individual ; and it is not to be tolerated that because learned counsel might honestly ;n his own mind presume rae to be- capable of murder, that should therefore be an apical to the jury to put me down as Such. I should be tried simply ancl solely fpr the alleged libelling of his client. "According to th© authority I havp cited, unwarrantable COMMENTS OF THIS NATURE ARE FATAL. ;'■••. That is m accordance with the ru|ing m the. Ejiglish cases I havp cited, even though the judge has promptly iutorveped to try and mitigate the ©Vil effects on the mind of the jury pf thp uijwiarrantablq cpmrnent. But my pase was not so protected or partially guarded by the judge, if I may bo permitted tp men tipn this again to your Honour. " . ' , His Hpnqur: You are at perfect liberty to make any comments you like, so long as they are couched m respectful language; that is, to assert that the judge was wrong m law, though not m intention. I have not the least objection tp any , critjpjsm of the land. NORTON'S PARLOUS PLIGHT^ Mr. Norton: Very well, your Honour. The Court may then and there repair the injury by properly admonishing the jury. But, as your Honour knows, there was no exclusion of these comments of Mr. Wilford. There was no admonition of the jury ; and I have left, so to speak, to go practically undefended, with all thp calumnious darts of this expert legal marksman quivering m my legal flesh, I metaphorically, not one of them kihd--Ily withdrawn by your Honour, and not even a lotion applied 1 to the wounds of my own counsel, who was j supposed to be here to apply that relief. I was m a nipst parlous state. Never did poor wretch go to the jury m such a plight. GOOD WORDS FOR WILFORD. His Honour : I cannot see that you are justified m reproaching your counsel. Speaking for myself, I think that considering the circumstances, the action of counsel for the defence was far from injudicious; but certainly there is nothing before me to justify you m making comments derogatory upon his conduct. Mr. Norton : I did not wish to make any derogatory comments. His Honour: But you have made derogatory comments. I do not wish any discussion of the point ; I say that you have made derogatory and disparaging references to your counsel. Mr. Norton: I had no intention of disparaging my counsel. His Honour: But you said that no one ever went to the jury m such a plight, etc. If that is not disparaging your counsel, then you did not disparage your counsel. We will leave it at that. Mr. Norton : You are very magnanimous to me> your Honour. His Honour : It is not a question of magnanimity at all. Mr. Norton : Well, I will say you are very kind, your Honour, and express the hope that I am not too obtuse. His Honour : I have formed no opinion — at least I have expressed none— on that. Continuing, Mr. Norton claimed that the authorities he had cited were all respectable AUTHORITIES OF WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE. » In some cases it had been held that where unwarrantable comments were made, the proceedings became so fatally infected that a withdrawal of the obnoxious remarks could not be held to nullify their pernicious effect ; as well try to brush off with the hand a stain of ink from a |)ieoe of white linen, was the simile used (123 Vol. Reports, Illinois, p. 33, also p. 750 referred to and road). Excessive vituperation was also condemned by this American authority, and a case cited (prosecution for keeping disorderly house?) where the picturesque language of counsel, as m the present case, had been eojfleiunedCOMPAIRISONros^CASES CITED.

as the language used by the counsel to me. In support of that opinion, your Honour, perhaps I may be permitted to briefly compare them. The defendant m that case was menace j to a very limited section, if any, of the community. I, as a newspaper proprietor and a journalist, having a much greater capacity than a private individual who is merely accused of consorting with prostitutes, I have a much greater capacity for doing evil to the community than that man. I AM HELD UP AS A MONSTER. Why? Becaiise I am the proprietor of an immoral and infamous paper. Why is that paper infamous and jmm.qValF pecaueo jt is sapping ibs inpiality, outraging the laws pf der cency, gping to the very foundations, of moral order mid rigiit-living m the community, disseminating faith (this is what I am represented to the jury as doing), deliberately going about to debauch the minds of the community for the purpose of making money: that is what I and my paper are represented as doing. I was not being tried for that.' I was being tried for one specific act and .no other: for no other offence, real or supposed, could I be tried and adjudged and punished; for no other ca,use or offence, real or supposed, could any evidence have been adduced. ; on that charge of libel alone could evidence have been adduced. I am not gping to say whether there was nrupfr or little evidence, or any at all, putsifje this charge ; I 3111 merely qonfining myself to the efie.pt of tl}e wpyds of counsel xip,o,n the jury, THEIR, POSSIBLE, NOT PROBABLE EFFECT. Language applied to a private individual, operating m a much more circumscribed, sphere than that jn which a journalist and M.P. operates, and therefore less capable of doing wrong, the American Courts consider ground for promptly granting a new trial. If the American cases are to have any weight at all, any influence, not as establishing precedents, but m so far as they follow the spirit and practice pf the E,hglfsh Courts, they will have weight and influence here as cited by me, andi therefore, their quotation is not supjerfluQus" here. (Extracts read, P'ages/7^(>T-51.) Now, your Hqnqur, I cpfltpncj $$1* W *>iqrsl sajiity waj not m issues here ; %c learned counsel put it m issue, made my ajleged immorality, ray moral insanitary state, a real issue before the. jury, that under the guise of punishing me for alleged libel I should be doiiply punished, s.evfirelj' pijnis.lled, c^st m piniitiye vin T djctjye d^nVages, my ijnm.prality being vouched fQr" by the learned counsel 5 and if t|}P jury did^ not obey the excited adniqnitions of counsel and proceed at qnce with the proces.s of wiping my paper" out by casting me m heavy damages, the moral state of this community, under the depraving influence whicli the jury was invited not to alIqw to ' exist, wpuld be ruined, would be unclean. Surely this is DEPLORABLE MISCONDUCT IN . THE EXTREME. If that is not evidence ef grqss misconduct on the part of counsel I do not Know what is. It is not contended that there is any evidence of immorality. And supposing counsel were permitted tq dp these things, things of this character, could he have chosen ,my more repulsive, real or imaginary character, m which to present me before the jury than the character m '■iVhich hf. d;d" present me? I, the proprietor of a paper, a member of Parliament, to be guilty — His Honqtir: There is nothing m Court to that effect. Mr. Nqrtbn: I am the proprietor of a paper, at any rate, before the Court. His Honour : I am not supposed to know whether or not you are a member pf Parliament. Mr. Norton : It does not matter whether yo-ur Honour knows it or not ; it is a fact. His Honour : I dp not want observations of the character qf the last you have made, Mr. Norton. Proceed, please. Mr. Norton : Then I will proceed to say this : What more monstrous picture could be placed before the jury than that qf a man 'disseminating filth to the 'community? There is. nothing m tfye^e ci^es cited qf the misconduct of counsel so flagrant as that pf the learned counsel m this particular case. All these pases serve- to show that, m the. language of the American textbqpk, not on jy is this course of conduct to be put dpwn with "a> strong hand by- the Ccurts, bnt if the judges, are hot strong enough to put it down, PARLIAMENT WILL HAVE TQ ■■■•" TAKE STEPS, to put the- mischief down ; otherwise counsel becomes a menace to the regular and judicial administration of the law. The whole spirit of the law is against it — the law which, btiilt up from precedent to . precedent, is our most precious heritage. I am no believer m popular institutions as such ; but I regard the Courts of Law— l don't know whether I am entitled to give my opinion — as THE REAL PALLADIUM OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, and of public opiiikm. We can do without'public meetings and newspapers, and even without juries (if we have upright; judges, because ultimately to them lies the appeal m the last resort), we can tip without them all ; but let us have tiie administration of the law free from these caluminous attacks on suitors, free from this turbulent, pbstreperqus conduct, on the part of cqunsei m their attempt to win verdicts. Supposing you put yourself m Mr. Stringer's place, and imagine that I am opposing counsel, and I begin launching out against Mr. Stringer m my address to the jury, m reference to this Bruges case, and attacking Mr. Stringer m the profession which he has adopted for the sole purpose of moneygrubbing, just as rtiuch as I have adopted my profession of journalist, and for no higher motive — what would be thought if I said : Look at him, he is an immoral man, a menace to society, the practice of his profession is a menace, to the community, and I stand here and solemnly tell you (this is no exaggeration of learned counsel's attitude) that if you do not put him down, punish him as much as ever you can, because he is what I represented him to be, I stand here to-day, 1, even I, to tell you that society is menaced to its foundations, that you will have a bad system of legal administration if you permit this Crown Prosecutor to go on as he is doing. If I undertook SUCH UNHEARD-OF LICENSE m attacking Mr. Stringer, I should not be indulging m a larger or more outrageous license than the learned counsel did when he attacked me. The general tone of my paper, my profession as a journalist, my moral character, was nothing to do with the matter. The alleged libel on Stringer was the sole issue. The facts were plain and simple. Did the jury find that under a legal definition or libel | the article was a libel, was it likely to injure Mr. Skinner ? MR. STRINGER AND MR. SKINNER ! His Honour: I am afraid you are mixing up Stringer and Mr. Skinner ; it is a natural mistake, but I think it will be better for you to differentiate. Mr. Norton : It is difficult to do so, your Honour; one skins them and the other strings them up ; that is how the mistake arises m my mind. His Honour : Very well ; go on, please. INFJ/UENCB OP STATUS OF v COUNSEL.\ Mr< Norton : Well, yqu.r (Honour, even if 'l.uilad.'beon pcr.r&Siter'l lo.make such

rett with all his prestige and status at tire Bar (I shall not get fulsome again) cannot have unlimited latitude; outside the limits for conducting cases he has no more rights and privileges than the commonest solicitoria! representative of the law or than any layman who may fortunately or unrortunatoly have to come into the Courts. Indeed, I shall quote cases to sj-,o\v that the higher the status of the-. counsel the more grievous becomes the misconduct that he may indulge m. Now, I think, I ought to support the general principles laid down m the American Encyclopedia by 0110 or two reports. from the State Courts, showing that the practice of those Courts Is m oqhsqnancr with the principles hid dqwn m the Gppyplppftedia. for the guiding of barristorial conduct. Continuing, Mr. Norton quoted Brown v. Swinform, Vol. 23, American Reports. Pago 587, a ca.se > f the abuse of privileges of counsel; ;.nd Coble v. Coble, do., Page 338. (Reports read.) "THE IMAGINATION OF THE JUDGE." His Honour, at the close of the reading : I am very reluctant to interrupt a person conducting his .v.vri case, Mr. Norton, but can you not leave something to the judge? I should long ago have expressed my opinion to counsel". I have m mind the case you quote ; a reference of it to me will be sufficient. Can \.ui i.ot leave something to the imagination of the judge? Mr. Norton : No, your Honoiu-, I prefei nq£ to do so. His Honour : Very well. But if you take certain cases, cite, them, aid then proceed to apply all the f^icts of tlu several cases to your own, surely it is a most unnecessary waste of time. Mr. Norton: I think, your Honouv, His Honour : I wish no comment upon it. I leave it there as an observation ; I don't want any further comment. Mr. Norton : I qnly wish tq say, — — His Honour: I do not want any discussion of the matter. Mr. Norton: Very well; your Honour is very kind. (Mr. Norton finished reading the reppft.) Now; the sing's issu.ed §übm,itte.d Wss. the alleged libe.l : wa,s' it a libel ? Did it affec| cl^trimgntr ally M r ; Strjnge.r? anc],' if sqj to. whjjfc extent m the jury's opmiqn? But the jury wero not perriiitted tp cqme to, an unbiased conclusion qn that issue alene, and qn t|ie evidence adduced ~vs-. levant to that issue.. £t'a_s an aggravation of the offence that there wa£ not the slightest ground fpr making the statements : co'uns,el went out of his way. to present me to the jury as" a moral mqnster, and thus inflame their minds, with the object of carrying the verdict, and by these tactics the verdict was so carried. As the judge says, m the case I have just cited, "To us it seems to be an aggravation of the offence . . . ." etc. ALLEGED WASTING TIME OF COURT. His Honour: That is the second time you have read that passage. Is it necessary that you should read and re-read the cases? ' Mr. Norton: I think it is. His Honour:, I say it is not. I am perfectly satisfied that you are very largely wasting . the time of the Court I m this repetitlqn, and I oannot help thinking tha.t you are doing so pur-ppsely—-that your address ib not so much to me, as that you are having it recorded for qth^r purposes. I think your address is a great waste of the time of the Court, and I can only draw the conclusion that you are not addressing me, but taking the opportunity* of addressing other persons! It is difficult for me to stop it; but I think it is so. : Your case would. have been better set forth by discontinuing this course. You have read twice if not thrice various cases, and m that you have merely wasted the time of the Court, and I must draw my own conclusions as tq your reasons for do-' ing this. Mr. Nqrton : The next case to which I inyitqyour Honoxir's attention is- — : — His Honour : Wait a mordent. I shall be obliged if yoii persist m quoting and re-qXtoting these cases to say that I shall not permit it. Mr. Norton : Very well, your Honour. The nest case I have tqcite — I suppose your Honour Will permit me to quote it? CITATION^ QF AMERICAN CASEJ3. His Honqur: While I am willing tq hear English c^ses quoted m full, and to hear. American cases referred tq, but I shall decline to listen to American cases quoted m full, and have them rerquqted and relucted. If you cite shortly American cases I shall not object ; but I object to your quoting American cases m full. Mr. Norton : I am m your Honour's hands, of course. His Honour : Very good, proceed. Mr. Norton : The next case is on page 335 of the American Court Reports, Vol. 48, Nebraska, and His Honour: Please with American cases cite briefly what are the facts, and leave any comment. Mr. Norton : I have only four mqro American cases. His Honour : I shall be satisfied if you quqte briefly the headnqtie, and I say that the amount is excessive, citing cases as you are citing them would make it inipossible to conduct the business of the Court. Air. Norton : I will comply with your Honour's ruling, qf ccurse. His Honour : Then just quote the cases shortly and leave me to apply the facts as I think justified. Mr. Norton : This was an action of THE CLEVELAND PAPER COMPANY V: BANKS, m which a charge was treated as proved and ccmmented upon by counsel. I think I may leave it at that, because it is really en all-fqurs with the last case I quoted. His Honour : Very well, then leave it. Mr. Norton : It was a case of commenting on facts to the jury of which there was no evidence. His Honour : Exactly. Mr. Norton : There is a note to the same case on page 338 — a note by the reporter, that it was held an error on the part of counsel to discuss the wealth of parties. My alleged wealth was held out as an inducement to the jury for punishment, because I was represented as pursuing a monstrously immoral avocation for the mere purpose of gain, and the error it was held was not cured by the opposing counsel's objections at the. time. (Note read.) I .would ask your Honour 'to give special attention to that case, and I think you will absolve me qf any irrelevancy or needless repetition. The next case I shall briefly bring to your Honour's attention is that of THE UNION CENTRAL COMPANY V. CHEEVES 3S American Reports, p. 573, and note on p. 578 (Ohio). This shows that counsel may not read and comment on matter not m evidence, or irrelevant and prejudicial. (Portion of headnote read.) A new trial was given 011 the ground that a certain pamphlet re>ad had no- right to bo read. This was a case m which insanity was alleged. Well, insanity is not alleged against me, but gross immorality is — an allegation most likely to strongly prepossess the jury against me, and to present me to the- jury as an immoral man, going about dissominati broadcast immoral Ijtoraturo for tho purpose of gain, reprssents me m a much more tlan^orous light than this pounsel represented the party hero, as being insane. A ;sane immoral man deliberately gqingV-i q.b_mit' spreading filth and immorality is much wo'Hp

I trial, where the language is not violent or defamatory, and is less calculated to influence the jury m coming j to an unbiased conclusion. I repeat ! that there is no record of any case so flagrant as that of mine. Then, your Honour, there is the case of DUNCOMBE V. DANIEL (8 Carrington and Payne's reports, p. 227). This is an English report; j and, however much I raay have unduly cited these cases, I hope your Honour won't consider any o; them irrelevant. THE QUESTION OF RELEVANCY . His Honour : They are all relevant m the sense of covering the same ground ; but, as with m any other judges,, I tiiink pnp or twp strong oase.s are at leas^ a^ valuablp $s a dozen others. There is one observation I make to you now, and I should Have made, it long ago ta counsel : Is it a fact that the observation of counsel we are considering hod referojic:o to more than the paper which was before the jury? That is to say. this particular number, and this particular libol that he was telling the jury of the existence of — asking them to believe (I am not saying, rightly or wrongly]) that the particular libel m question' was of a character which showed the character of the paper, showed it as he alleges it to be a paper without a high mission, without respectable ideals, sordid, money-grub-bing, and so on. Is not his comment so ambiguous as to require attention to bo drawn to it? Is" tjip counsel inferring to the paper m general, or to the particular issue? If he had referred to the paper generally, I mipbt have said it was irrelevant. . Taking the view that the counsel took, of the libel,that it. was unwarrg little, and " improper and vulgar, fran the point of view of counsel an attack upon a public man such as was inadmissible to a paper of any high mission and respectable, ideals, that it was made for an improper purpose, that this • article showed sordid money-grubbing — well, I should have found it necessary to find out whether the counsel was referring to the paper m general or to, the particular issue concerned, had I been conducting this case. I think it is a view you will have to oonsider. Mr. Norton : Very well, your Honour. Referring a^ain tp. $he casj? pf Diincomhe y. IJaniej : -tills, js. a "pase qf ]itiel, a^d the^ cru'^ of, |t ajT ajppli^l tq lny cas,e maiy gtate^J. m ft& flgcjsjfln corns tq, ajs sfit f«rtli §\ the en^ pf the headTnpW (c^se irpad), it Fas held her.p that ooiinsej fiught np|. to state, what tj^ey dig nflf tw proyis. Continuing, Mp. N^Prton saic} i\e considered th^t a very irnporttint cat^e fpr his argument, and also thfi ca^e'of PONTING v. HUDDART, PARKER AND CO./ Vie. Law Reports, Vol. 22, p. 644, application for new trial on the grounds of undue influence of jury through impropriety of solicitor and counsel; the impropriety consisting m one of the jurymen at the conclusion of counsel's address handing counsel a communication, which was afterwards returned, and subseauently the counsel and this juryman and two other jurymen were seen m a hote.l- partaking " of refreshments, and thereby wafS established ihe presumptipn pf the. possibility of collusion and undue influence. A n 4on this ground, flimsy compared with the grounds m fyis qwn cage, a new trial was granted. §urelyp if a suitor m such cas^ cpt^d get tfte benefit of tfre dipiibt g,n4 have a" "new tf^J, )\$ himself was,' not to h^ de.barre^ fjo^i similar rer dress. He wquld cite Australian g,ncl New Zealand cases, but he could only cite one, because more did not. exist — the case ho was now citing was a "V\fe.st Australian °*ier~~ HIOKS V. GREGORY, MINISTER ' OP LANDS, (6 West Australian Law Reports, p. 100; loj6, 107). 'This' was a case, where excessive damages were said to have been, given m a case of libel, and that the jury were .influenced by . speeches of counsel m "mentioning the fact that Hicks had been dismissed from his position of raining warden by Gregory some time previously. The verdict was £2750, and subsequently it was, hp understood, reduced t : o £750, and tho case wgs settled on the basis suggested by the Court. $ES. HOURS ON A SINGLE POINT. His Honour, at this stage, pointed out to Mr. Norton that he would, within a short time, have occupied six hpurs with a fcingje branch of/, his case. "I have," said his Honour, <*ta git oil criminal proceedings on D^onday raprnijig • a^d if I w«re n^t engaged to-night, I would sit %is evening. You . have oi|ly dealt with one single point so far. If each point is to occupy 6£ hours, I really dp not know, when" the case will end. After the criminal sittings, I begin the civil sittings ; and therefore if this case is not finished to-morrow, I would have to adjourn it till Monday' week at the earliest. If Mr. Skerrett takes the same time as you have done, it is difficult to know when the case will end. I am not questioning your right to occupy time : I am merely stating facts. You have occupied 6h hours on this one point, and there are three other points, and one of them has seven subdivisions. So that, at that rate, it is important, that we should not waste any time. You seem to have read mps.t of your books." "■ "THE TIME OF THE COUNTRY." Mr. Norton: Oh, no, your Honour, I have all these on the table yet, and many others besides. His Honour: Oh, I am eorry I was mistaken. Mr. Norton: 1 shall try to conform somewhat with the regular practice, and— His Honour: You are trying to deal with eaoh case as if it were the only case, starting afresh, and illustrating ypur own case by it. It is only a question of time — not my time, but the time of the country. Mr. Norton: I am not much concerned about the country just now ; I am more concerned about my own case and the £2000 and costs., His Honour: Quite so; but I think bj r the method j r ou are adopting you are not strengthening your case. If you would quote these cases merely, and put them before the Court, the Court has before it the language you complain of ; but if you go through each case and illustrate your own case with each separate case cited, it is difficult to know when these proceedings will end. However, of course I do not > wish to interfere with you m any way. I merely point out that if this oase goes over to-morrow it will necessarily involve an adjournment till Monday Week — most probably for ten days. It really is not necessary for you to go into each case so fully. You assert that the language was unnecessarily strong, that it put to the jury as facts something which is not true, and which was irrelevant. Over that simple point you have taken 6£ hours to impress your views upon the Court. Mr. Norton : I have seen much longer time occupied upon much simpler points, your Honour. His Honour: Not m courts of law. Mr. Norton : Yes, your Honour. His Honour: Where? Not m New Zealand. Mr. Norton : Well, my experience of courts m New Zealand fortunately has not been very large. A PROSPECTIVE PERORATION. His Honour: I may say that I have never seen even tho youngest counsel occupy so much timo over one point as you have done. I merely point out those facts for your own benefit. Have you finished with that point now? Mr. Norton : I have. His Honour: Very well, that is one milestone passed., Mr. Norton : Btit I Would like to re-

Mr. Norton: Surely, your Honour does not wan^ to deprive me of my i peroration ? That seems to be the only compensation I ehall have. His Honour: Oh, way — ? EXCESSIVE DAMAGES. Mr. Norton : It seems so to me. Well, 1 nov come to the question of excessive chiTa^es. rlu ilui;. ur: 'i'iiat is laid down m principle: m Praod v. Graham! You I have cited that. Mr. IScwion: I have not read it all, youi- Honour. 1 now refor to Vol. 24, (J.IJ.D., p. 23. (Part of report read.) | ft :h claimed that tht> damages were excessive, and there is not a tittle of eyidonee, your Honour, that the- plaintiff was d»m4geil at all. OJjie fagt ' is iip evidence w.gis 'rapfpj&l th.gt he auitained any damages. His Honour: No evidence could bo offered because no special damage* wore claimed. ° Mr. iNfortxm: Nq, your Honour, btit the only reference m th<e evidence, if I may be. permitted to refer to it — His Honour: A copy of the evidence ought to have been filed, but I will take it as oart of the case. Mr. Norton: Who ought to have filed that evidence, youcr Hqnour? His, Honour: You. Well/ perhaps, I should not say that; it should Have been filed, at any rate. Bui you can fet it now. A copy of my notes will c filed now, at any rate. Mr. Norton : The only inkling of evidenqe o| any sort was. from Mr. Stringer- himself, trhe£ he admitted that he Had been spoken -to about the matter. But he treated it lightly m the bos, and said m a smiling way that one gentleman had said something to him. His; Honour : How do you propose thai this gniile sfhtjajd, have been recorded ? ■■■■..:'.• •Mr. Norton: By photograph, I presume. His Honour: I think, perhaps, you should not have made that retort. \ Mr. Norton: Very well, I withdraw it. However, Mr. Stringer said that a friend referred to the matter m a jocular way m a tram: "I suppose yon are not respectable enough to travel with." As ycrnr Honour says, there was no need to give evidence as to damage, inasmuch as no special damages were claimed; but I submit that the defendant though^ so little .of. %c lit>©l that he could go away and allovjr 'ite"bligTatirig, blasting influence ip be Working against Kirn m his pfrpf egsipna} anil POTfti* status fm n$M RF «m m l>ftifcfi Vsm tiftpk a trip, fa JSurqße ; Wb shows, that he did not consider himself seriously damaged. ' Tp that jt may "be retorted that' he left a letter behind him pn #ie eve frf departing, leaying it pnm .to. th§ R9P?r,tfl apjrtogis£; bu> that is assuming the. whole page. He says: "You will app'lqgjge ; '.ft' is a libel.]' If we the ' article ! itself > : the jury could »bt come to the conclusion that the plaintiif had been damaged to the extent, of £2QOQ by that article. ' And what is relied upon as a libel? I presume I may be permitted to refer tq the article m detail. ...""■■ His Honour : But it must be considered, a libel, because the jury found it a libel, and. you do not ask for a new trial on the ground t^at it is not a libel. Mr. Norton: Yes, but I don't con-r tend that it was not a libel, but that it was of a character th^,t could npt Pfts.sib,l.y ' ■ fipnsidpred by, any twelve reasons i ni<gn, foft to, jpdge tb.e merits c. ..ic "page on the hbej itseS alone, and assisted by the legitimate pominents of oprunse.l, warrantable for *X WsHpa t4 J?oofi flf '4%ffiftgfiß— that it had dqne that much damage foi the plaintiff. In the §TSt place, your Honour, there were innuendoes attributed to the libel by plaintiff through his counsel which really cannot he legitimately deduced. from, the, word^i used. His |lo.no.ur : If it is ppgsible tp. dpr duce these' inferences you must" agsujne that, the; jury did soj . ..',,/ . Mr. Norton :' lt is always possible to do things, although with' a gr§ve element of doubt, and—" His Honour : It must be assumed ... that the jury has found everything against you" that ' can '"be found; tlje innuendo must be included m the finping of the verdict : that m^ist be assumed, unless you appeal upon it. You have not asked for a now trial on any point except m regard to 'damages. . Mr. Norton: I presume I can point put that the jury were not justified* in finding as to the innuendoes?' His; Honour: "§o{ jou laVe. bound to assume that the jury hq,y'e foyrjd that the libel . is a" libel, ap^l a libel as. chargect— that is, with the innuendoe^. Mr. Norton: hrit the, '3^m^ge« wh^ch I allege' to be Qxceigiyei epq ! iias^ , upon the finding of the % innuendoes, ancl I pontend. £hat the imyueniloes wpre wrongly found", and, therefore THE DAMAGES EXPENSIVE. His Honour : This is point of law, and yon must take ray ruling. The jury's finding is not objected to by you, but the excessive damages. Here is the finding. (Finding read.) That finding for the plaintiff carries the finding for the innuendoes. Myself, I think there was evidence that the jury should so find ; but, even if not, you cannot call them intp question now. Mr. Norton: Then, if your Honour's argument— — , His Honour: It is not an argument: it is a ruling. Mr. Norton : A ruling, I beg your Honour's pardon. If that ruling is correct, I cannot show that the damages, are. excessive. . His Honour : Oh, yes ; that the damages are excessive on the basis of the finding of libel. You cannot ask now to set aside the jury's finding except m regard to the excessive- damages. It is on the basis of the findings that you must deal with the case, and deal merely with the damages themselves. Mr. Norton: Well, your Honour, with regard to the damages themselves, can it be contended that these alleged imputations, the ,finding of these innuendoes, justified £2000 damages ? That the learned gentleman has been damaged to that extent? In what way could the plaintiff have been damaged to that extent? Did he suffer any pain of mind that he should be compensated to that extent ? . Was it likely to hurt him professionally? There is no evidence of that. Of course, I am ready to admit that there are many things that are insulting, but all insults are not libellous; all libels are not damaging : and it is not because a, man may feel personally, aggrieved that he is to assume that his personal feeling of grievance entitles a jury to find excessive damages. By no assumption except an outrageous one, can a conclusion be arrived at that Mr. Stringer, K.C., was damaged to that extent. Frankly 2 though my own opinion goes for nothing m this argument, I don't believe he was damaged at all. We know, ycrar Honour, theio is such a thing as certain abuse or insults being accepted as compliments rather than injuries, and unless thtrro was prima f£cie evide/ico that Mr. Stringer m some specified rcann«r-r I suppose I may be allowed to go that far? His Honour:! cannot tell till you I have finished your sontoneo. Mr. Norton : — cap show thai he has been damaged m sonu> way. for instance, that his practice has fallen off, his friends, professional and private, have shunned him as a lrjwr, that during his this Im* occurred, and when ho rol.nrti'^l h« fnund that nobody would have niivtliing to do with him — then, p. tliaps. the damages would not have buen oxcossive But we don't find thr- jjiintloinan hae turned any greyer than h* was, oi pined away m flesh. Not to lie. frivolous: it is pr«post»^n<u«. on the faoe of it, though perhaps Mr. Stringer and the jury may not agree, but tt dooa seem to the impartial mind tb*t £9000 damages for an article of th^t- ch&tae-? ter to which suah

IHonour : And found. By the finding of the J the mere finding of the does not find all the excessive &ges. Honour : No, it makes the basis p»-'*t>i the damages. Mr. Norton : That confines me to the pure question of damages. His Honour : That the damages are excessive relatively to the finding of the jury ; that is your contention. I »am not expressing an opinion. 1 am ruling. Mr. Norton : In view, of your Honour's ruling, I am not prppared tp gp into \ such length m the. citing of authorities, especially m view of the limited at the Court's disposal, as. I intended; but 1 thinly I mighi; remind your Honour as to what is the nature of a libel, tp show whether the damages are excessive or not. A libel, roughly stated, and it was stated by the couusel for the plaintiff to the jury I think m his opening, was anything that was calculated to bring one into ridicule, contempt, or hatred. Now, as a matter of fact, the manifest object of the libel (I refer to this only incidentally, bearing m mind that the jury found the innuendoes, and based their verdict on the innuendoes being found was inquiry. It was an i article dealing with a public question which invited comment and called for •\ inquiry, and ajl the v.ay. through it is. «t made apparent that the otijectof ''th'e »»/ article is to get ah' inquiry into a pub- *' lie question of great moment" that had, moved this community pf Ghristchurch to its moral foundations— * His Honour : I beg' your pardpn, but where is the evidence of that? Mr. Norton : Where is t^ie evidence of that? The eyidpnee i^ here. Here is what the magistrate, Mr. J)ay, s^id. His Honour: "Did he. v\,bgl that lan : guageP Mr. Nortpn': J am gping to p.rpye that he usec] T^ords wh*ic!h "Justify me m this language. ' ' "" " "'• '• Hia'' Honour:" But where is the evidente of tKat? ' ,' Mr. Norfx>n: I thin^ it is on the file." Being" a' layman," of course, youv Honour's interrupiiions naturally confuse me." '' ' His, "Honpur: I think that is not a proper comment,' considering that' you nay^. hid P,ver si? houfs " ptgctjc jlly , w^pu't iht^rrjipupn- laV r #ly flying vpu tp "git© me, th,e ( uu.qs f°,f certain * statetnents yqu n^kel Yo'\i have ' been allowed a' very/ very full latitude. Mr. N. orton : I am qupting thp rer pp^(> of Mi.' Bay's qecisipUj referred tp ill the article on which the libel is said- to b^p founded. I djd not anticipate $ie Cpnrt prpceeding to 6 o'clo.ck, or X should much' profer ::; -- HisiKonoar rT'mity say that I should feel it'" my duty t<j y sit till 1Q p-mV, were I not otherwise engaged to-night. Hpweyer, if you' tell me that s,o long a sittingj has embarrassed you," I shall now. Mr. Nprto'n : 1 WOU W prefer to adjpura now, your Honour. His Honour: Very welL. I will adjoufii now till' 10 a.m. to-piprrow.. At O2 : the Court" adjourned till 10 s.m, ne.x^ d.ay.