Truth TWO CHAMBERS OR ONE ?

NZ Truth, Issue 73, 10 November 1906, Page 4

Truth

TWO CHAMBERS OR

Published eveey Saturday Morning at Luke's Lane (off mannersstreet), Wellington, n.Z. SUBSORD?TION (IN ADVANCE), 13S. PER ANNUM.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1906

The approaching State election m South Australia is of more than local interest. It is the first time m the history of British colonial politics that an election is to be fought on the single issue of whether government shall be by means of -two Houses or one.

The bi-cameral system, or government by two Houses of Parliament, is modelled on British procedure, Britain being the first country to grant representative institutions. It is this system which is now being attacked m South Australia, where a determined effort is being made to secure its abolition and the substitution of the uni-cameral, or government by one House. It is somewhat novel to find the old party cries discarded m favor of an issue which some people think strikes at the very root of good government. Certainly it involves a radical departure from British conceptions of what is necessary to secure stability and good government. To those good people who regard Britain as the only safe guide to follow m matters of government, for this reason, if for no other, the fact that such an issue should be raised even, is an omen of impending disaster.

While, it true the advocates of both systems belong, m the majority of cases, to . politically | different camps, , yet- the question is not between Biator and' i.ts; opponents, m the ordinary sense, except m s 0 far as the uni-cameral system is regarded as being a Labor doctrine by those opposed to Labor m politics. As a matter of fact, the line of demarcation is not so clear as the opponents of Labor desire. There are many prominent men, m addition to the rank and flic, who are prepared to vote against the bi-cameral system, but who do not belong to the Labor section of politics. It is because a large number of Liberals are prepared to vote on certain broad issues, with Labor, while not pledging themselves to the party, that a Labor Government was possible m South Australia. The pledged Labor members cannot command a majority m either House.; It remains to be seen whether the large number who favor one House, but who are opposed to Labor, .will sink their antipathy for the nonce, and vote for the innovation, and, incidentally, assist the return /of a Labor Government stronger than ever.

It must be admitted by impartial judges, .that the advocates of the ne<w order have something to say m their defence worth considering., There is nothing particularly sacro-sanct about the idea of dual representative institutions. There is nothing particularly un-English for that matter. Ontario, the most populous of the provinces m the Canadian Dominion, has managed to get along somehow with only one House, and nothing very dreadful has happened to date. The adherents of the bi-cameral system claim, among other things of' less importance, that a second chamber js necessary as being some sortjpf.a guarantee against hasty' or unwise legislation. On the surface the contention 'seems logical enough, though those who make the allegation never enter into details m its support. Even among the strongest advocates of the present system, there seema to be a reluctance to produce proof m support of their contention. When pushed for reasons, they usually evade the question, and take refuge m bald assertion. Dogmatic assertion is no proof of anyting, least of all is it a wise weapon. tp use against those who are prepared to support their cause by an appeal to logic and reason. It is quite understandable how there came to be two Houses m Great Britain. When representative institutions were first granted, the mass of the people were naturally ignorant of the proper use of the power given them for the first time. Some extraneous authority had to be created possessing the right of veto over those whose ignorance might lead to fatal mistakes being made m the government of the country. The second chamber was, m the case of Great Britain— possessing an hereditary nobility— a concession to those whose prerogatives had been curtailed by any granting of political power to the people. But that state of things, product of feudal conditions, does not exist now, and we have the extraordinary spectacle of an English court appointing someone to administer the affairs of a Peer of the

Realm, on the ground of mental incompetence, while silent on his right to exercise his hereditary privilege of legislating for the people. Apparently. • a man may be incompetent . to manage his own affairs, and yet be allowed a vote m the management of the nations. Surely a curious condition of affairs for an allegedly democratic and progressive country m the twentieth century ! .

In this question the colonies have nothing to learn from the Motherland. This is not said m any offensive way, but simply as a plain statement of fact. Let us critically examine the claim put forward by advocates of the present system, that a second chamber is a guarantee against unwise and hasty legislation. Unfortunately, perhaps, for some of us, who have a natural leaning toward established custom, examination serves to weaken the contention, if, indeed, it does not expose a total fallacy. If the contention is sound, it presupposes a greater degree of wisdom resident m the Upper House than m the Lower. Can this be proved ? As a matter 1 of hard and unsympathetic fact, it would be a brave man who essayed to prove either House necessarily Dossessed a monopoly of wisdom. If the sum total of intelligence be not necessarily greater m the Upper House than m the Lower, what guarantee is it against the unwisdom of the latter ? What guarantee is it against anything ? Neither House possesses immunity from error, and the average of intelligence is much about the same m both. Certainly, m the case of the Lower House, where the members are obliged to face the ordeal of a triennial election, there is some sort of a guarantee that those returned, are up to a certain standard, a guarantee which is absent m the case of a nominee House.

Even m Great Britain supreme power is actually, though not nominally, vested m a single chamber. The Lords may refuse, indefinitely, some measure which has passed the Commons, perhaps unanimously, and there exists no legislative machinery to compel acceptance. Yet, possessing the power of the purse, the Commons may withhold Supply, and thus precipitate a crisis. The very exi&tance of a second chamber, possessing the right of veto, whether hereditary, nominee, or elected on a restricted franchise, is an anomaly m a democratic community. Whether the result was foreseen or not, the granting of the franchise to the people meant the death-Knell of privilege. It was an admission of the right of the people to have some say, at lea,st, m the management of their own affairs, and it was only a matter of time when they would demand, as a right, a whole way. . The people are slowly recognising that possession of the franchise is valueless, if an extraneous and independent power exists which may nullify the popular mandate. Possessing a weapon m the franchise, which is capable of securing for, them real "power, they naturally would not rest satisfied with a mere semblance of it. _ As regards the hereditary principle, it" is doubtful if it would be seriously considered today m the formation of a new government m a democratic community. It possesses a merely academic interest to us who enjoy democratic rule m British colonies. The case of Japan does not apply- It has never been contended a second chamber is unnecessary where the bulk of the populace are ignorant and unaccustomed to political power and its proper use. To have refused to recognise the nobility as a class apart, entitled to special privileges, would, have been too great a 'break with established custom, even for inconoclastic Japan ti and would probably have resulted m chaos. This is an instance where a second chamber was a necessity. But no pne suggests that the conditions which made it a necessity for Japan exist m British communities. This is the crux of the whole question. Under conditions of the past a second chamber was a necessity, and a bulwark against popular ignorance, but these conditions do not now exist, and with their passing has gone also the neoessity for something which was a product of those special conditions.

.In the case of a nominee House, it is manifest that the real source of power is not the people who may possess a valueless franchise, but, the authority m which the right to nominate is vested. In an Upper House elected under a restricted franchise, usually a property qualification, though considering the claim advanced, some sort of an educational, or ability test, would quite naturally have been expected, ultimate political power rests with those possessing such qualification. To be quite logical, those who claim that the second chamber is a guarantee against unwise legislation, must claim as a corollary that property somehow confers wisdom on its possessor. What becomes of this wisdom if a man loses his property ? Does the wisdom vanish at the same time? Seeing that the Upper House is to be a repository of the highest wisdom of the race, those who possess the qualification of electing the members must also possess greater wisdom than the rest of the people, otherwise what ground is there for assuming they will elect better men than those who are not qualified to exercise the privilege. The position is' absurd. The wonder is, not that those who hold such ideas rarely care to defend them, taking refuge m dogmatic assertion, but that they ever attempt to do so. The doctrine that ten acres and a cow confers m some undefined, mysterious way, wisdom on the owner, is not likely to find its exponents appealing to the logic of reason. This is a very simple definition of the doctrine of infallibility which miprht i je commended to theologians.

It may be said that the difficulty would be met by electing both Houses on a similar franchise. But, if the members of both were elected by the same people, would they not represent exactly the same political ideas? Does anyone seriously contend that the same people would be invested with superior wisdom the moment they came to elect members to the Upper House? Representing exactly the same ideas, product of exactly the same forces which created the

Lower House, the function of the Upper would be merely to say "ditto" to its proposals. "Ditto" is not much return for the expenditure of public money, and is not likely to find favor with those who pay the piper.

The truth is, originally the Upper House was merely representation of class distinctions and privileges. Tempered by the rise of popular power, it is more or less the same to-day. This is proved by restricting the franchise to a propertied minority. This too, is the explanation of the friction extant throughout the democratic world. The people feel they are insulted by the existence of a power which stands for privilege to a propertied minority, feel also that their reason is insulted by being told they possess the franchise while a power exists which, possessing the veto, renders the franohise non-effect-ive. No orie class, m the interests oE good government; ought to be entrusted with the reins of political power. It is too much to expect any body to resist the temptation to plaoe their own interests first. When it becomes a matter of maintenance of.' class privileges, those who possess suoh will fight for their retention, thouah history affords a few 'examples of voluntary renunciation. Nietzsche tells us it is all very 1 well to say we should love our neighbor as ourself, but we ought first be one of those who love themselves. With due respect to the erratic genius of Nietzsche, it seems to the ordinary observer that men do love themselves—very much so m fact. Selfishness plays a large part m human affaix's, larger than the moralists will admit. Of course it is all very saddening, but it is all very true. Trust any one section of the people with supreme, dower and they will inevitably use it for their own advancement. Give one party absolute control of the machinery of government, and the interests, of the whole people will suffer.

The decision of South Australia will be anxiously watched by outsiders. In Victoria the Council is threatened by Mr Bent on account of its repeated refusal to pass, for example, the Women's Franchise Bill, m New South Wales, where, until recently, the Labor Party held the balance of power, Upper House reform, m the direction of abolition, "is a plank of the Labor platform. Reform, m the -direction of curtailment of its privileges, of the Council is also contemplated by the Labor-cum^ Liberal Government m power m Queensland. In Western Australia the question of amending or ending the Upi>er House has only . received a set back by the defeat of the Labor G-overnment after its recent short term of office. Even conservative little Tasmania has caught the infection, and begins to talk back when the Upper House is not as humble as it should be. -.-All of which shows the way the wind blows, and is of interest to New Zealand as baing: more or less affected by the trend of political events m Australia. /