SECURITY FOR FRANCE

New Zealand Times, Volume LI, Issue 11786, 24 March 1924, Page 6

SECURITY FOR FRANCE

The problem of the security of France is one that lies at the root of very much of the difficulty of the present European situation. At the Versailles Peace Conference, the French, British, and American representatives sought to solve this problem by a tripartite treaty between their three countries, guaranteeing France (gainst unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany. Unfortunately, however, the Republican Senators “played politics” at the expense of the great work accomplished by the Peace Conference, and America failed to ratify both the tripartite treaty and the Peace Treaty, and refused to join the League of Nations.

That the tripartite treaty is the solution still most favoured by France is shown by the French Ambassador’s speech at the Pilgrim Club, New York, on the occasion of the dinner given to welcome the new British Ambassador, Sir Esme Howard. “My ideal, in the course of a long career (stated M. Jusserand) has been that of trust and friendship among the three foremost liberal nations of the world, namely, France, England, and America. I have never favoured an exclusive union between two, but always three. I persist in my belief in considering a three-legged seat safer than a two-legged one.” At the same time, he indicated how absurd and unwarranted are the fears that the. French air forces are aimed against Britain. “We do not fear an absolutely predominant British fleet (he declared). We trust it. It is our friend’s fleet. There is no more reason for Britain to fear French aeroplanes than for France to fear the British Navy.” Another solution of tjie problem of French 6eourity is that put forward by Mr Ramsay Macdonald, the new British Premier, who is stated to have made good progress with the shaping of a scheme for the final settlement of the problem of Anglo-French relations. It will probably soon be known, states “Political Observer” in the Lon don “Daily Telegraph,” that Mr Macdonald places the question of security above that of reparations, and considers the first step is to bring Germany into the League of Nations. The ideal solution, he holds, is that Britain should then bind herself unequivocally to defend the Covenant of the League, by land, sea, and air, against any State that would begin armed conflict without previous recourse to the League’s peace machinery. He recognises, however, that this at present is only an ideal, and is difficult of realisation.

For our part, we must confess that we should look with some disfavour and no little perturbation upon the admission of Germany to the League oF Nations, unless America had previously joined the League and was a party to the terms upon which Germany was admitted. To our mind, the ideal solution of the problem of France’s security would he that both America and Germany should join tho League, and that both America and Britain should bind themselves unequivocally to defend the Covenant on the lines suggested by Mr Macdonald. This would prac(ically amount to a merging of the solutions favoured, respectively, by M. Jusserand and the British Labour Premier. It is vSfy certain that before lasting peace can come to Europe one or other of these solutions—-preferably both of them—must be adopted.