The New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1922. ANOTHER FAILURE

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIX, Issue 11292, 18 August 1922, Page 4

The New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1922. ANOTHER FAILURE

The failure of the .London Conference brings up the rear of the vast procession of failures which has perplexed the world since the signing of the Versailles Treaty. They have also alarmed the world with the fear that war is again on the cards. There should be comfort in the fact that the procession of failures—which were failures of attempts at adjustment—was also a procession of failures of prediction. Each attempt at adjustment was preceded by a prediction of dire consequences, amongst them the breach of the Entente between Britain and France. The end of the procession gives the predictions the chance to make good at last. Naturally, the question arises of the Value of that chance. Are the oftenpredicted dire consequences now at last inevitable? The failures of the Conferences were duo to the perplexities into which the negotiators were plunged by the complications of the situation they had to adjust. But the predictions of consequences also failed on account of perplexity—the perplexity incidental to the consequences. If it was impossible to adjust, it was as impossible to go on without adjusting. That is why all the attempts at adjustments and the predictions attending the attempts before the London Conference equally failed. What reason is there for believing that the London failure to adjust will net be followed by the failure of the predictions of consequences? The only possible answer is that the difficulty presented by the consequences predicted for the London failure is just as great as the difficulties presented by the pre-viously-predicted consequences. If. s» true that the French Press, and, it is suggested, without much supporting evidence, the hulk of French opinion, has lost patience. The Press, certainly “if we can judge by the extracts cabled out to this side of the world—has fallen foul of the British Prime Minister. Many newspapers have fallen on Mr Lloyd George like the familiar thousand of bricks. But this outburst is against one man; certainly not against the nation represented by him. A proportion of these comments—bricks, slings, arrows, what you like—must necessarily hit whatever strength of the nation stands behind Mr Lloyd George. For the moment, however, the French Press diatribes are more likely to he of use to the enemies of Mr Lloyd George's political household than to the prophets of European disaster. It must be considered further that these critics, who foam at the mouth, are not altogether in agreement. For instance, some of them put the weight of their ewe upon the tentative proposal of Earl Balfour for an adjustment of the public debts, whereas others throw the whole weight of their hostility against what they consider Mr Lloyd George’s contempt of the undoubted rights of Franco. Mr Lloyd George’s attitude doeß certainly not deserve these strictures. He may bo wrong, or he may be right; but it is idle to ascribe his attitude to pure malevolence against his nation’s Ally of Franc. Obviously, the condemnatory criticisms are in their nature exaggerated, and as such are sure to miss their mark. Thai can, of course, only become apparent when the smoke of the battle of words clearing away shows the main targe to untouched. French public opinion is, of course, very sore. Naturally so, for it feels the injustice of having to pay the greater part of the damage suffered by

France, while Germany stands a chance of getting off, if not scot-free, at any rate, with considerably diminished responsibility for the war for which Germany is entirely responsible. But the French people are exceptionally intelligent and reasonable. They will see, when ,the outburst of wrath has exhausted itself, that the Lloyd George attitude, so far from being simply malevolent towards France, represents a quite arguable case. That ca6e is put by Sir Arthur Steel-Mait-land, one of this Dominion’s representatives at Geneva, the other two being Sir Francis Bell and Sir James Allen, in the “Evening Standard.” The cable does not join Sir Francis or Sir James in the responsibility for the statement of Sir Arthur. But it is not an unfair deduction from the style of the narrative of the compiler that Sir Arthur’s two colleagues, having heard with him at Geneva ail the evidence necessary, agree with his opinion of tke outcome. The statement is that the reparations cannot be paid by Germany, except ok a basis of worthless paper—looo marks to the pound sterling is the latest quotation—with the alternative of ruinously undercutting British manufacturers in oversea and neutral markets—a process which, as a matter of fact, has already set in. For which reason not indeed of impossibility, but of undesirability, it is, Sir Arthur concludes, imperative that the amount of the German reparations must be quickly reduced. This, Sir Arthur says, is the result of his own experience as Minister of the Department of Oversea Trade. This places, of course, the sole responsibility for this allegation of fact upon the shoulders of Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, leaving out the other two New Zealand Geneva Commissioners. At all events, his statement represents the fundamental point of Mr Lloyd George’s case. This is outlined in Mr Massey’s Budget with: “The inevitable conclusion has been forced upon the various Governments that the reparations question could no longer be satisfactorily dealt with apart from the general economic position of the world, and that international action ie necessary for reconstruction in Russia and Central Europe.’’ The question has been, it is evident, very fully discussed, with all its perplexities. That point is touched on by Mr Massey’s statement of the conclusion forced upon the various Governments. To that the recognition by the French Government of the necessity for some sort of moratorium gives some strength—enough, indeed, to sup- | port the hope and belief that French public opinion will recognise that there is another side to the question in which France is so strongly interested, a side which, however it may affect the general conclusion, very certainly removes the necessity for imputing malevolence to anyone aoting upon it. That France has just grounds for insisting on the main portion of her claims only adds to the general perplexity, which is the reason for the prolonged discussion of the matter by the diplomats, and i 3, wo may add, also the reason for further prolongation of the same. It is idle to pretend to see daylight in such darkness; but, at lqast, it is possible to see that there is sufficient goodwill on the French side to avoid the extreme consequences so glibly predicted for failure. To emphasise this point seems to have been M. Poincare’s care before he left London after the failure of the Conference; for he visited, with all his suite, the tomb of the British Unknown Soldier in Westminster Abbey, and placed a wreath thereon tied with the Tricolour of his country. This recalls his saying at the Verdun celebration, when he concluded an impassioned reference to the friendship of the two nations cemented by their comradeship in battle, by the shedding of their blood, and by the repose side by side of their fallen eons, by declaring impossible "the sacrilege of forgetfulness.” His placing of that wreath at this particular moment of the Conference failure, in that tomb in Westminster Abbey, seems to say that, whatever may be the differences of opinion between them, the two nations will remain for ever united by the fear of “the sacrilege of forgetfulness.” It is sentiment against-practical business; hut if the war was not fought in vain sentiment will prevail.