THE GREAT WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLVI, Issue 10507, 7 February 1920, Page 11

THE GREAT WAR

AND THE GERMAN NAVY (By Von Tirpitz.) Wo hare dealt -with th© general effect of tho von Tirpitz Memoirs, and the light they throw upon tho system which wrecked the Hohcnzollerns while it was being itself wrecked by them. Vo picture of the collapse of medioccrity playing with tho weapons made only for tho hand of greatness has aa yet come out of tho war equal to this. Formless and void in general, it is lighted up with points of massive brilliance which give deadly comprehension to the tragic whole. As a hook disjointed, as a treatise convincing by its sheer white heat, it stands up out of tho literature of the war in strong contrast to the ■ mild contempt with which Ludcndorif , speaks in his protracted story . about the miserable creature that loyalty to the system forbids him to criticise further beyond tho bounds of indicative reserve. The' two together form the completesb condemnatory epitaph yet given to us for the tomlb <'/ tire most notorious of all tho Imperial charlatans of history. ' Before passing to tho von Tirpitz story of tho German Navy, it is neces. sary to examine the author’s attitude towards tho British Empire. That stands out from first to last as a foregone conclusion. Pronounced from the very beginning, it is animated by a bias that persists in seeing calculating preparation in spite of masses of forbidding fact. Tho unimpeded progress of German industry and commerce, the easy penetration of Germans and German interests everywhere, tho endurance of tho systems of subsidy and dumping, the Undiluted freedom of trade on the fAiifiC the North Sea, all these pass him by as if they never were. He sees only • tho great' might ofi tho British Navy, and the far-off time when the German Navy was little more than a discounted blot on the ocean. He is as a young officer on his first cruise sensible only of the arrogance of the British naval officer to whom, he even denies the virtueof politeness. In his eyes Britain is not only the enemy of Germany—of Prussia first and Germany later on—hut the most powerful, the most unscrupulous enemy, the most determined, and the only one really prepared for war. Ho makes the British Empire an impossible monster, never loses sight of its sinister face, keeps it prominent to the very opening of the great war, and after that date pursues it with vigorous blasts of hate. As a contribution to th© history of the relations between’ the two countries this abuse and . writing of the Admiral is pitiful, childish, like the writing of German apologists for the war crimes, and glaringly against the truth as that writing always is ■ Germany has developed ' after the great Bismarck nation into a great commercial power. Her. trade expansion requires the retention of her fast-grow-ing papulation at home, in productive industry, and the scouring of the worlo for the raw . material to employ that industry. Naturally on both the export and the import side the trade oomes-into contact at many points with the trad© of the only enemy who is also a great commercial power. It is the new condition the Biamarokian developmeat has to face. It cannont face it without sea-power. Tho new school of naval writers, following the discoverer Mahan, has demonstrated the tremendous importance of sea-power. In short, without the backing of sea-power diplomacy is unable to guard those interests which use the sea. The diplomacy of Germany protests when her trade clashes at Hie afore-mentioned points of contact. Gorman, diplomacy protests; British diplomacy replies by flourishing the Trident; the German voice wails off into impotence. Germany must have a great navy. That, according to the oareful_presentment of von .Tirpitz, was tho genesis of the German Navy. That it ie evident was also the genesis of tho "von Tirpitz attitude to the British Empire. Having determined on a German fleet, he required the oil of vitriol to give motive power tjc the machinery fox its building. . He used the oil with discretion. No conquest was intended; conquest was impossible and unthinkable, except by madmen; so far as Britain was concerned. The only' object was to attain such sea-power as would force Britain, not to fight, but to make her diplomacy reasonable. In the beginning of tho fleet building, Britain was not mentioned. outside of Germany. Admiral and Kaiser took, care to confine themselves to generalities. But, aa we all remember now. when askqd why it should ho thought necessary to build battleships to prevent African savages and effete Asiatics from maltreating peaceful German traders, the question broke through, th© camouflage; dots began to' appear on tho i’s of the German programme and the t’a of the same began to he crossed, Britain took warning from the progress of the programme, and tho British Fleet felt the benefit of various ‘’scares,” of which the two most famous were centred by the late Mr W. T. Stead and Admiral Fisher. Nor was King Edward in the background, as von Tirpitz declares in occasional restive references to the diplomacy of alliances, of which, ho declares the King to have been the unscrupulous Instigator. But all this is matter of history. We have said enough to show that von Tirpdtz admits practically that the building of the German Fleet was aim. ed at Great Britain. Ho. pleads in extenuation that it was aimed only at making diplomacy reasonable. But that plea was demolished in advance by the Kaiser’s famous assumption, when his fleet had grown to formidable dimensions, of tho title of ‘‘Admiral of tho Atlantic.” THE BUILDING OF THE FLEET. ’

Leaving the preliminaries, we come to the Admiral’s story of his great work. Hero he speaks with the assurance of ‘ the man who, ’ knowing hia work from A to Z, did it with a thoroughness at which we stand amazed. Whatever the motive covering its origin, the work was a great work. From tho inception to the completion it was marvellous. The leading spirit, von Tirpitz, had, when this work began, risen to the topmost height in the German Navy. An admiral well versed' in the work of the sea, ho had risen to that great eminence by sheer merit. Removed to the Secretaryship of tho Navy, he developed a combination of qualities, as politician,, administrator, organiser, expert and judge of men, which brought him phenomenal success in the face of hosts of difficulties. Ho bad to secure tho driving force of pubMo opinion. He secured it on patriotic lines by the use of a tremendous effort of propaganda, which brought the factions of Germany behind his Creation of tho Gorman Navy League.

He was faced with the prejudices of tho Reichstag, hard set on preserving its power of the purse, a power fixed in constitutional principle. Ho tackled the problem, divided the Reichstag against itself, secured the majority in favour of his programme, and the Reichstag surrendered its controlling power. It was a phenomenal success, hut it was not won in a day. Nor was it won in a decisive moment governing future development. Tho success ' was gradual, beginning with small l things, and developing step by stop to greater, until the supremo control of tho building came into his hands. The story of those steps is one of the most fascinating stones of political history. Programme succeeded programme, until in the end tho Reichstag faced the “fait accompli,” ships laid down in lino ahead, and the building committed to lines beyond tho power of all experts to alter. When the fleet reached that stage, it was like a great hull, to bo stepped by no force, and having all the forces of the country driving it to its destined home on die water.'

Builders were few, plants were scarce, experts were divided from the fighting experts; tho Admiral’s best friends fought bitterly over the naval nolicies on tho one hand of placing battle forces in every sea, and on the Other of concentrating strength for battle in the-waters near home. It was a battle of typos, the one type requiring vast range of coal capacity, tho other short range relying on war harbours, with its bottom dollar invested on tho battle capacity. Tho keynote was missed by all hut the Admiral, who calmly insisted on tho folly of sending fighting ships about a world which contained no single naval station for their comfort, shelter or repair. With that argument ruthlessly enforced ho won out. Tho German Navy abandoning the spectacular role of Sweeper of the Seas, fixed upon the immediate destiny of fighting battles in the North Sea. Von Tirpitz had tho satisfaction of seeing tho Englisri Fleet conform by concentrating its strength in the North Sea. Not the least of the difficulties came from tho Kaiser, so anxious to grasp the Trident of the Atlantic. He developed expert familiarities, adopted theories of type and construction, listened to every sub-lieutenant vapouring with limited intelligence, even where tho higher officers. were kept in the dark by the Admiral. The Kaiser, after these communingß, would insist on alterations in type; tho high officer® not understanding the merits of - tho programme which depended for its I success on much reticence, made their comments, which, getting out to the public, strengthened the Kaiser’s unreasonableness—formidable as being the unreasonableness of the AllHighest—in a fashion quite unwarrantable. It was sometimes more difficult to deal with these moods in the Kaiser than with the. Reichstag parties arid public opinion combined. In spit© of nil, tho building of the float proceeded. A great school of construction was founded and developed; great plants' were established, up to the latest idea in construction ana speed; the public by means of holiday trips arranged for all parts of the Empire was brought to Kiel, and reioiccd patriotically ,in the eight of great ships flying tho German flag, looking fit for the conquest of the whole world.

In the Reichstag, the idea of sweeping the distant seas with ships representing tho power., of the Fatherland had its obstinate advocates. To them was offered the plea of postponement. ‘‘One at a time” was tho plea. Later on, when tho battle fleet for Home waters was constructed, it ■ would bo time to take the big sea-going aide in hand. In the meantime, diplomacy might, in spite of the vigilant, persistent enemy, get a chance to secure the necessary naval stations. Besides, it was a matter of money, and all the money—not too much was available — was' required for the first fighting division. Tho plea, used with • great delicacy and discretion, prevailed, not without the occasional, sending away Of a great squadron; us once to Buenos Ayres on a mexnorable occasion, which provided a sop to keep sweet the advocates of the far-ranging policy. The fleet-building went on with meticulous care. Kothdng was left to theory. Every theory was subjected to the most drastic test. Every detail of construction had to undergo the ordeal of shot and torpedo under ©very conceivable condition. Every variety of shell, of armour plate, of gun, of rango-findcr, of submarine engine was tried under battle conditions. There is nothing in the world’s history so complete and so thorough as this preliminary preparation which guided tho German Navy to its completion as it faced the fateful days of August, 1914. '

Yon Tirpitz was the man who built that great fleet, and took thought for tho training of its personnel. Proud he was of it. Nothing would have pleased him so well as to load it forth to battle. He said of it that it was good enough to fight tho British Fleet, not to beat it, but to considerably qualify ite mastery. Whatever ho roally thought, wo cannot fail to acknowledge that his achievement in building that fleet for a nation that is not a sea-going nation, in spite of the .enormous difficulties that faced him, is one of the greatest achievements in history. Wo cannot believe him about the machinations, against which he says he got his people to sanction the building. But wo must see that his account of the building carries the irresistible accent’of truth. THE PATE OF THE FLEET.

At tho first declaration of war, von Tirpitz backed his opinion of has creation by urging its dispatch to bring the enemy to immediate battle. Every consideration helped him. The seas were being swept of German commerce, the few raiders out were in jeopardy; the only German squad rob, yon Spec’s, was in danger of destruction. Moreover; the sea communications with England were vital to tho enemy, and not to increase his power daily. Von Tirpitz alone among the Germans appreciated tho dogged character, the obstinate bravery and tho determined patriotism of Great Britain. Ho urged Lis view on his countrymen, his sovereign, his colleagues, his people. Why build a fleet, ho urged, if you are not prepared to use it P The first days of the war found the archenemy at his weakest. Practically ho only’had his fleet ready. Every rule of war called on them to send all the Gorman ships to attack that fleet, on which the future hope of the Allies was based. That he urged feverishly, day in and day out. He bored the Emperor to death, he mad© the life of tho Chancellor a burden, he worked j the men of tho float to death, he urged tho Admiral to take tho first opportunity to force a great battle. To his amazement and sorrow no one listened to him. Tho Kaiser ordered tho fleet to bo bottled up because tho Chancellor and tho crowd of futile departmental heads so advised him. Tho I

fleet was furious, and the Highest” admonished tho fleet. He was the commander, his the responsibility. He had decided to bottle. The fleet settled down in its bottle, cursed under its breath, deplored “Der Tag indefinitely postponed, began to lose moral. . ■ By the way, von Tirpitz declares that the fleet never at any time before tho war toasted “Der Tag ’ in tho officers’ messes. Ho says they were too sensible. What that means ho loaves us to puzzle out. Von Tirpitz deplores that >tho next naval squabble was as to whether the licet ought to fight in the North Sea or the Baltic; that half the fleet proceeded to the Baltic; that the squabble ended in doing nothing anywhere. He never gavo up his urging to battle, never coated deploring the preference for bottle. And the mismanagement! When tho North Sea raid oamo what a chance, tho German Admiral Wad! Ho ought to have had his whole fleet out in support. Ho failed in this oven though he had been warned that the British Fleet was behind the cruisers which fell on the raiders and destroyed the Bhicher. Had the Germans only been posted what aright they not have done! liven if Beatty had got away they would have had a groat practice in the art of getting their fleet out of ■ their estuaries,- a thing which always tried them most sorely. But no one listened. At last he offered 1 to lead tho fleet out Mmself, and put in pi-acitice all Iris art of conspiracy which had 1 succeeded in the fleet building. But this support only brought the mortifying answer that having been eighteen years out of active sea work ho- was thought unfit. The Kaiser sought to soften the blow by promising that he should in future he consulted in everything. But as he was never consulted in anytliing, and was never informed of what ■ was 1 going on tlie softening did not come to- much. Ho resigned over and over again, only to be refused, and the Kaiser rated him as an officer who should .obey orders without murmuring. Imagine tho humiliation of the man who had built the fleet and lived for tho one purpose of seeing it strike. Ho vents his rage on the Chancellor, the incompetent B ettim an n-Ho Uweg, tho creature who, unable to bend tho bow of Ulysses, bent everybody and everything to the gradual inevitable destruction of Germany. He sees tho end coming; he sees it early in the war; he sees it on land as on the sea; ho weeps scalding tears, he relieves his soul in endless protests. Forced to Jive at Headquarters, he rages at the optimism of tho .triflers around him, who live gaily on, reckless arid blind. He makes that journey to Hindenburg’s camp in Silesia, intriguing for tho dictatorship of that Germanic idol. The intrigue comes to nothing, of course, and no one is surprised to learn that tho onco again recurring resignation of von Tirpitz is accepted, and th© official life knows him no more. Some , English paper wrote a jeering article with, tho caption “Exit Tirpitz,”- and the bid man gritted his teeth with a bravo smile at the irony of fate, ' THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN.

These jeers were, of course, for the man whose name, was associated with tho submarine policy of Germany. He admits ho was, hut not ■ in the way popularly believed. He had constructed the submarines with the same meticiilous care and previous experiment as he had bestowed on the surface ships. The result was that,at the beginning of the war Germany stood first with tho submarine. When the German Fleet was bottled, the idea of rising the submarines on the merchant shipping of Britain camo uppermost.. Von Tirpitz recommended such use, not seeing any difference, as he says, in point »f morality between the British blockade which killed tens of thousands by starvation and a submarine policy which would kill thousands,' or perhaps only hundreds, lor he anticipated that the merchant marine would stay in harbour for the most part after tho first few losses.

But on account of difficulties from international law he proposed 'to proceed by blockade, and advised a beginning with- the port of London. Ho was over-ruled, and without his knowledge the first submarine zone was. proclaimed. To avoid the appearance of divided counsel ho assented. Ho did more: he advised the most strenuous pursuit of tho -campaign. Tho losses mounted, and things looked well for Germany. The submarine commander© had the easy task of wolves raiding flocks of defenceless sho.ep. A lull followed, out of deference to tho American complaints, and eventually for several months the submarining stopped. Eventually, this is v6n Tinpitz’s story, the campaign was renewed, bringing America into the war. But by that time tho British had gone ahead with defensive measures, with the result that the submarines, instead of playing the part of a wolf among sheep, had to fight battles against . enemies armed, well equipped, and alert. To all this defence, von Tirpitz does ample justice, enumerating, with appreciation, the various items, the arming, of the merchant fleet with 12,000 guns—-a tremendous feat, ho calls it—tho traps, the chasers, the depth bomba, tho hydroplanes, the destroyers, and all the rest of the things the world is now hearing about. By quotation of losses and of tho logs of submarine voyages, he shows that the losses inflicted on the merchant ships were very much loss after the renewal than during the first campaign, Ho also admits that the now measures of defence enabled the convoy system to take tho American armies across tho Atlantic. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND. ' Of this great fight -von Tirpitz has much to say in a rnos/t suggestive chapter. Tho official reason fpr the bottling of tho Gorman Fleet was that tho fleet preserved, would .bo a good asset in tho day of peace making. It is a curious echo of von Tirpitz s own reason for . building flic fleet at all—to make British diplomacy more reasonable. The reason tho High Sea Fleet was allowed eventually to seek battle was that tho bottling h&d become unpopular with tho German public) which as the war was not going too Well, was calling for some result for the great expenditure on tho ships. Von Schoer waa given _ tho command and l wont out, foil in with Beatty, and the groat battle followed. Yon Tirpitz’s account agrees in tho main with those with which the world has been long familiar. His main point is that tho trial of battle proved tho claim ho had always made for th© material superiority in some important points of tho fleet ho had built. These arc the' superior penetrating power of the Gorman drolls, the comparative unsinlaahiility by torpedo explosion of the German ships, and their thicker and larger armour bolts, their better range finders and tho superior protection of their secondary batteries. For tho first of those ho relies on tho blowing np of tho shore barfitlo-oniisors, a. thing which speaks for- itself. For tho rest his claim is substantiated by Admiral Jcl-

liooe, in his book, by Archibald Hurd in ono of his writings, and by the American admiral who testified to a Congress Comm it Leo before the war. Von Tirpitz says that many officers after the battle wrote to personally thank him for these superiorities of equipment, and for the generally firstclass character of the material, to which they attributed their, safety in tho battle. H© makes a great point of that, because one of the reasons for bottling the fleet given in the German newspapers on authority was the alleged deficiency of the material in tho German Fleet. The allegation von Tirpitz denies as a gross calumny, and refers to it in furious terms many times in tho course of his book. Ho, of course, declares that if the Battle of Jutland had been fought to a finish the' High Sea Fleet would not have been defeated. But ho does not try to explain why, if that was, as he says it was, the opinion of tho officers and men, the fleet took refuge in harbour, did not come out to renew the action, and never ventured again into contact. His reference to the ultimate surrender of the fleet is one of the most pathetic records ever penned. Think of it—<tlio man who built tho fleet for battle, urged its despatch for battle, Saw it flee from battle, saw its discipline destroyed,by mutiny when ordered out for a final attempt to save tho situation, and read of its ignominious surrender. ; “Tho Navy,” '.says he, “was twice In a position to bring a tolerable peace within grasp—in the autumn of 1914 with the fleet, and still more probably in the spring of 1916 with tho submarine. Terrible is the realisation that our present position- could have been avoided not only by political means, but also by naval action.”