PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10063, 30 August 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The enemy’s intention is now clear, so far as his southern armies are concerned. Hard pressed, with increasing insistence, from Roye to the Oise, and from the Oise to the head of the Ailette, he manoeuvred to disentangle his divisions. To that end ho held hard on the Roye quadrilateral, bringing up troops, and offering stubborn battle. Lassigny fell, Noyon passed under increasing menace. The Chemin-des-Dames positions, and the right flank of the army on tho Yesle got into increasing difficulty. Still the enemy held on to tho Roye quadrilateral, and, keeping hold on the heights on tho right bank , of f the Oise above Noyon, managed to check the French advance; at any rate, preventing it from causing disaster.

Such was the situation till yesterday’s messages gave us the general advance of the Allies along the whole line. The surges of the attack hammered away vigorously at the yielding Gorman lino, until one speculated about what would happen next. In the southern sector the enemy has not loft much time for speculation, for the first of ’ the day’s news represents him as swiftly • retreating from Chaulnos to tho Lassigny massif, moving eastwards towards tho great bond of tho Somme. The conclusion is inevitable —the enemy’s stand upon the quadrilateral and the Oise heights has served its purpose. Under cover of that strong defence, he arranged his retreat from the awkward pocket, got the bulk of his troops out of it, and when tho Allies, advancing in their groat waves of attack, assailed the quadrilateral with the final assault, they found his rearguards rapidly and comfortably marching out. One thing is apparently quite certain. The retreating divisions will not come to grief in tho marshy riverbed —for the great bulk of them is by this time probably on the other side of the river.

Between Peronne and Chaulnes the enemy holds some formidable positions, with a vast artillery at command. These he will probably hold until his hardpressed forces in the old Somme battlefield have made good their retreat . towards St. Quentin. It will then be possible to see what his further intention is. At present he holds on like grim death to the ten miles between Bapaume and tho'Scarpc. Not necessarily because he intends to make a stand on the Hindenburg line to which he has retreated • for a good section of that ten miles, but because, if ho were driven from these positions, the rest of his long line to the south would ho brought down in disaster. When his retreat roaahos the whole Hindenburg line, the lino ho left five months ago to strike at the Channel through Amiens, ho will make his intention known clearly enough. We believe it will bo Hobson’s choice for him, for the signs are that ho is unable to hold the line against the superior personnel, the superior artillery, and the superior aviation of the Allies.

Those signs are very marked. For example, there is the jumble of guna that he loaves behind him in his retreat. There are many of obsolete pattern. and many clumsy and unfit for the rapid movement of modern war. Then us to his transport. He is leaving behind both his own ammunition and the vast quantities left by the British in their (lumps during their retreat. It it probable that ho lias not the transport to move the vast weights of battle requirement. Moreover, the abandonment is proof of the inferiority of his personnel. It cannot hold long onongli against determined attack to enable the transport to take away the stores. There was a statement the other day that there is a very groat scarcity of horses in Germany, and that may partly account for the trouble. The new tanks add to the enemy’s difficulties, for ho is quite unable to cope with

them. It is always dangerous to gamble on an enemy’s supposed disabilities, and when ho is retreating strategically it is dangerous to ascribe his conduct to lack of fighting quality. But those signs are very real, and the fact that the enemy is retreating because ho is driven cannot ho doubted.

Ho was getting ready for another forward movement when tho counteroffensive struck him. That groat stroke crumpled up all liis plans, forced him to the defensive, and compelled him to retreat. It is not a strategic retreat. It is a drive. Tho enemy retreats because after six weeks’ hammering he finds he cannot stand before tho Allied troops. He has received his orders to quit.

What else does his retreat from the Flanders ridges signify ? Ho is nearing Estairos, on the Lys. on his way back and presently he will ho at Armentiores, still marching. The retreat is a sign that ho lias abandoned, tho offensive. Ho went to the ridges to strafe his way through Flanders to the French coast. He fought desperately to get through. Ho was beaten. He said he was going to fight again. Today he is retreating from the positions that cost him such a tremendous price in blood, and treasure. He talks of a defensive war on the West, while he makes good in Russia. It i& well to talk. But ho is not his own master. Ho talked of another fight for the coast, but ho is fighting for his life and he is retreating at that. Prudent men tell us not to expect too much, for the enemy is still strong and well equipped. We take leave to doubt the real strength—whatever the numbers of his men —and tho equipment. Moreover. tho harassment of bis lines and communications bv oiir air forces has told on him. and it is increasing every day The analysis of all the methods of‘attack to which he is subjected by fJie superior tactics of tho French Marshal is supported by the eccentric movements of his military machine, in great contrast tp its perfection in the early days of tho war.

The enemy is now subjected to a general advance of the Allied line, and ho acknowledges its superiority by retreating before it. Ho lias, of course, some fighting power left, hut it is not the fighting power that went over his parapets on March 21st. _ He has used tha most of his speciallytrained storm troops. These will not bo seen again in this war, which he must finish with the inferior classes. In this connection nothing is more instructive than his inability to hold the strong positions out of which he is every day driven, in spite of his best resistance. The comments of the German press are enough to make us realise the situation. When the “Cologne Gazette” tells tho German public that it is no longer any question of Belgium or the French Provinces, it is clear enough that the High Command doubts its power of holding any line in Franco or Belgium. When the press, which is always obedient, speaks of falling back to the Rhine, the power of the German armies to hold their lines may well he doubted.

For the present the enemy has saved his retreat out of tho Oise pocket; and has apparently secured himself a fairly free passage over the Somme. What his situation is ■ further east will not bo seen until there are further developments.’ The ’ crossing by General Mangin of-the Ailette) and his capture of Ohauvigny, north of Soissons, are shrewd encroachments on the enemy’s positions in that quarter. There is a connection between these and the American advance on the Vesle, obviously. If the French commander gets hold of the whole Chemin-dos-Dames position, the Crown Prince, on the Vesle, will be in great straits. In this part of the field the French have .held their hand for a few' days. The advance on Royo explains why, and as that advance proceeds, the support to the Ailette and Soissons positions will enable decisive movements to he attempted.

It is noteworthy that while Sir Douglas Haig has taken up an advance against Estaires, on the Lys. troops of the Belgian army in the far north of the line have moved out to the attack of the Langomarck railway and established themselves in a twe-milo position, possibly the driest part of that region. It is a hint to the enemy to move out of Western Flanders, which the large British army east of Ypres, of which nothing has been hoard for many months, may probably repeat in treat strength. This army was withdrawn from the conquered positions in tho historic ridges when the enemy's groat assault was approachingKcmmcl. The menace, however, did not materialise, tho enemy’s assaults being' repulsed by tlie British and French, fighting with their backs to tho ridge. This army (as far as we can remember. commanded by General Plumorj was therefore not withdrawn west of Ypres. The Belgian activity reported to-day on its loft flank, may ho the second move in nn operation of which Haig’s advance on tho Lys was tho first, to sweep the enemy out of West Flanders. If it is, it may ho taken as certain that the enemy will not put up as great a fight for the ridges as he did last year.

Thera is a persistent reference in the French press to a possible French thrust in Alsace.' The French opened their canvgaign there, for political reasons, chiefly, though the operation greatly hampered the Gorman mobilisation on the Metz front, and was one of tho factors in tho victory of tfie Marne. A thrust there would not bo made with any political motive. The military situation is too strenuous for. political issues. But there is no military reason why a thrust should not bo made. If the French Marshal has a sufficient mass of manoeuvre ho can use it there as well as anywhere. If successful it would ho disastrous to the enemy’s eastern communications. It is beginning to bo fairly probable that the French Marshal is meditating a great thrust somewhere. Ho has now almost developed a general advance along tho whole line. Hia armies are pushing tho enemy back everywhere from the fruits of hia recant gaining. Ho has, there is reason to believe, a largo mass of manoeuvre. The enemy’s situation invites a. groat stroke at his forces, somewhat disorganised as they arc, and far below their former standard of efficiency. It is one of those situations which requires a prompt, hard stroke to end tho delays of manoeuvring before the enemy recovers his moral.

The notable event in the British sector is tho entry of General Horne’s army into tho battle. He struck from Arlnux. near Lens (about eight miles north-cast of Arras) as far as the Scarpe, and taking many important

positions, compelled tho enemy to frantic effort. Tho enemy did not want to see him racing over the eight miles between his lino and Donai. He therefore rushed up reinforcements by train and threw them into the battle. The British general, who had moved fast, was rumble to hold all his new positions, but he stuck to Arlenx, and the lino between Gavrelle and Plovain. Wc shall hoar more of him presently. Further south Byng’s men are at Vis-cn-Artois. on the Arras-Carahrai road, about two miles further forward than a British force has ever been since the Alons retreat. They are among the arteries of Hindonhurg’s line, and the enemy has not been able to shake their hold. We shall probably also hear more of this advance. The two armies are headed for Donai and Cambrai.

Further south tho British have got within a mile of Combles, and their capture of Peronne is only a matter of time. It must bo borne in mind, however, that the place is very difficult to attack, and will probably be pinched out by advance to the northward. To the south the British are at Dompierro, but between that place and the Somme bend tho enemy holds the strong positions of "the ridge between Peronne and Chaulnes. That place having fallen, the ridge is in process of being turned. The French advance has nearly reached the Somme on a six-mile front from Marchiplotte, east of Chaulnes, to Nesle. That line is from a milo to three miles distant from the river. French military writers anticipate that the advancing line will establish itself very shortly over the river as far east as Ham. It is an admission that the enemy has saved his retreat out of the pocket of the Oise with considerable skill. The enemy will have to retreat from Peronne and the ridge east of Dompierro.

General Maurice explains to us today with a disquisition of what might have been if the enemy had acted differently when his rush against Amiens was stopped. If he had brought his northern armies, the General says to the Amiens sector, instead of throwing them at Armentieros and the Lys, he must have reached jfche coast and attained his great objective of breaking the Allied line and rolling up the British to the north, which is all very well now'. But at the time the enemy know' what was before him. and was unable to sustain his advance, which, moreover, was stuck in a very bad place. Again, if ho had used his northern armies at Amiens, the British northern reserves would have had something to say to him. However, if the enemy mulled the business we can bo duly thankful, especially as he will not get another chance.