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PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Tho war news is again electric. This time wo have a strong British attack on the left of tho 80-mile front, described yesterday as more or less engaged. General Byng, after following tho German withdrawal for a day or two, suddenly attacked on a nine-mile front from Ayette to the Ancre, at Beaucourt, covering nine miles, and penetrating in places three. He attacked on the new plan which, omitting tho preliminary bombardment, sends the infantry forward with tanks in tho lead, the whole under a smoko barrage. A surprise was secured, and we are told it was only a tactical surpisc. Now if the surprise was not a strategic surprise how can we account for the enemy’s very feeble resistance on the left of tho attack? About that there can be no doubt, all tho reports agreeing, and the facts concurring, for the enemy’s artillery was nothing; tho prisoners taken were'few; in less than 50 minutes his lines were past and many of hie strong positions lost.

These conditions justify tho conclusion that the surprise was strategic, because they seem to show that tho enemy had not troops to moot the shock. But things aro not always necessarily what they seem, in war. If tho enemy had arranged his retreat and left only covering troops, tho conditions would equally account for what happened. In that case there would be no surprise on the part of tho enemy, who has only been interrupted in his ordained operation by the hustle of an assault to meet which ho had left a screen of covering troops, which got away swiftly when the shock came. The surprise would ho the British surprise at having to fight shadows, as one of the correspondents calls it. Tho right conclusion seems to bo that Byng s left blow was really delivered in the air, tho enemy’s main strength having retreated before it fell.

On the right the blow struck, the enemy resisting hard. This struggle took place at Miraumont and Beau-court-sur-Ancre, for the Albert-Ba-paume-Arras railway and the crossing of the Ancro. The railway follows the right bank of the Ancre from Albert round the bond, which begins at Beaucourt, and from there goes through Miraumont to Bapaumo. Beaucourt is eight miles from Bapaumo (which bears something north of oast), and Miraumont is three miles nearer. The enemy holds Miraumont, but Beaucourt has been captured, with the railway and the river crossing. The enemy has his reasons for the stand ho made at those places. They are evidently in the plan of his retreat, and what they arc the development of. the operations will ro-

veal. The impression in tho mind of tlie writer of one of the reports is that, whatever these reasons may be, our people will very shortly bo in Bapaumo once more. The idea is natural enough, for the crossing of tho Ancre, and tho advance of Byng’s line—held only at Miraumont —is beginning to outflank all the old historic positions of the Somme battlefield of 1910.

The enemy’s stand at Miraumont and Beaucourt is evidence, probably, of his intention to retreat from that old, devastated ground, for to carry out that intention lie must hold Bapamne until the retreat reaches that place. As his attempt to prevent the advance against Bapaume failed, we may look speedy abandonment of the old battlefield. If the onemy is withdrawing to the old Hindenburg lino, ho will begin bis retreat through tho Somme positions at once. If ho holds where he is it will bo a sign that these positions aro a part of some new line he has selected to defend rather than withdraw immediately to tho Hindcnbnrg line- However tins may be, Byng’s strong attack lias evidently interfered with his plans. As this attack shows every sign of being pressed with determination, we shall probably see some very hard fighting presently.

The determined character and organised power of this attack is the thing made most prominent by the reports. These show the line moving forward in considerable strength with elaborate preparation of tanks and airmen, and artillery concentrations opening masses of fire at given times, while strong forces moving lip in support, filling the roads behind with their bands, aro at hand to ; Biaintainj the pressure without ceasing for a moment.

It is rather a surprise to read that General Byng is making this assault with tlie Third Army. The last wa heard of that army was in the battle of Arras and tho Vimy Ridge when the enemy, checked on his advance against Amiens, attacked the hinge of tho British line at Arras and was so badly beaten by this general and the Third Army. Tho second account of this advance against Bapaumo describes it. Reading tho two accounts together, we can onlv conclude that Byng’a Third Army has been transferred to this sector for the purpose of delivering a powerful attack. As tho enemy is withdrawing in the Scar pc valley—eight or nine miles north of Moyonne, which is tho left point of this attack—from the front of the important hinge position of Arras, we may perhaps conclude that Martha! Foch has perceived tho enemy’s determination of a general retreat, and is taking measures for increasing the extent and vigour of his own attack.

On the southern sector General Mangin’s attack has made further progress. His line between the Oise and the Aisne has advanced on tho centre to within four miles of the Ailette, and his left has taken Sompigny, on the Oise, and is within a milo of Noyon. Tlie mouth of tho Ailette (its junction with the Oise) is distant four miles on the Oiso front. It is obvious, therefore that Mangin’s line is rapidly outflanking Noyon. The report declares that Noyon must fall. That is not quite evident on the information wo have. Because from Noyon to La Fere, on the Oise, there is a formidable range of heights on the right bank, held by tho enemy. That and the broad, marshy valley of the Oise will bo 'a serious obstacle for Mangin to faoo. As the enemy depends on these heights and the marshy bed of the Oise to cover his retreat from the Las-signy-Noyon pocket, ho will probably make a desperate defence of this flank line, on which-he has a very decided advantage. General Humbert, on the west of tho Oise, has pressed closer to Lassigny and 'Noyon. Tho impression tho French report gives ns is that this operation, in conjunction with Mangin’s on the east of the river, will bring on a most desperate battle. The resistance to Mangin so far has been feeble, in great contrast to the resistance encountered by his colleague Humbert on tho other side of the river. But that only shows that the onemy is reserving his strength for the fight for Noyon and the ridge, river, amd marshes which Mangin is approaching.

On tho Lys sector, in the far north, the enemy’s withdrawal towards Armentieros continues. It has been accentuated by another advance of Haig’s troops on its flank, between; Fostubert (near La Bassee) and the Lawe river, at some point near Estaires, on tho nys, where the Lawe joins that stream. Further north Haig has started another thrust Close to Kemniel. advancing on a milo front from Jxicro, and threatening tho enemy’s hold on Dranoutre, a long three miles north-east of Bailleul, and his lino of retreat by Ploegstreet wood. One begins to wonder if the enemy will make a stand in duo course on* the Wytschaete and Messines ridges, which aro close on the rear of the line which has received that broad hint between Locro and Dranoutre. At all events, the enemy’s whole front is now on the defensive, with the exception of the section between Lens and tho Scarpe. Ho is beginning to move out of tho awkward salients in which his four great failures left him, and Marshal Foch is pressing him close with great strength and vigour, with plans lor his undoing before ho can get to a safer line.

Tho Now Zealanders, who have been following the enemy’s withdrawal, as we learn from tho official corrospop'dent, are evidently taking part in General Byng’s thrust at the Bapaumo sector of the enemy’s positions. Keen and lit as they aro, they are, wo may ho sure, giving a very good account of themselves. Prussian. Guards and tho Seventh Bavarian division are m front of thorn, if wo read the reports correctly. Boing in the left section or tho attack they cannot have been, engaged in tho hard fighting for Mirau. mont and Boaucourt and the railway hue.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZTIM19180823.2.23

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10057, 23 August 1918, Page 4

Word Count
1,446

PROGRESS OF THE WAR New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10057, 23 August 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10057, 23 August 1918, Page 4

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