PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10001, 19 June 1918, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The Italian Premier's announcement that the enemy's force, which remained through tho night on the Italian side of the Piavo has been thrown backover the river, rounds off the first phase of the Austrian offensive. Tho battle, however, is not over. The Italians report that it has been renewed, and is proceeding from the Alps to the sea, with alternating fluctuations. Nevertheless, the whole of the original Italian line has been restored. Some details show that the enemy's plan was very ambitious. For example, his time-table assigned Bassano, where the Brenta debouches into the Venetian Plain, as the object of the first day's assault. Now, in the previous great assaults (May, 19161, and November and December, 1917) the enemy had 6pent laborious days in the attempt to hew his way down the Brenta valley and had never got so far as to capture the Frenzola valley, some miles above Valstagna. The fixing of the end of the first day at Bassano, in the-face of all those dismal failures, proclaims.: vast preparation, great forces, and a confidence based on improvements in tactical training. Probably the German instructors have been drilling tho infantry, and tho success of the drill on the West misled the Austrians to the overwhelming power of the new thing.

Certainly, after the experience of the Chemin-des-Dames, one can believe anything in the way of prognostication. The Chemin-des-Dames was a most formidable position; it had taken the French months of effort to oust the enemy from tho same; the enemy had exhausted his power time and again in vain attempts to retake it. Yet when tho enemy put forth his new effort he swept the defence out in less than a day. The French were surprised, disappointed, chagrined, and all the world wondered at tho suddenness of their defeat. Naturally the enemy made the most of his now tactics, and as naturally his ally fell in with his humour. Wo can imagine the confidence- of the Austrian onset after the long preparation, the many proofs of the efficacy of tho now tactics, the vast artillery concentrations. The onsot found defeat more rapid and extensive than under the. old conditions. We can imagine tho disappointment of his repulse. His bullotins claim considerably more success than appears on the faco of his first onset, and he opens the second day's battle with a claim to the capture of 15,000 prisoners.

The Italian newspapers on their side treat the onset as completely repulsed and done with. So much so that they turn their thoughts to the dire consequences of failure awaiting the enemy at the hajids of his own people. They divide their attention, in fact, between this and the declaration that the victory of their armies was due entirely to tho complete success of the counterattacks. As a matter of fact they practically proclaim that the Italians' handling of.the reserves has scored a uniquo success. And that may bo, for the railway facilities the Italians enjoy aro greatly superior to thoso of their Allies on the Western front.

1 This is very readable, and, -within limits, very encouraging. Nevertheless, this newspaper comment looks premature, in the face of the official bulletins, which represent the battle as still raging on the ■ whole front, with tho usual fluctuations. Wo may allow for tho fact that the second attempt is gnevor so brisk as the first, when the first has been very roughly bandied. That thus there is inclination to dilate on the reasons for tho enemy's defeat, and time to indulge the inclination.

It is evident from tho details that are coming forward that tho enemy never had much chance of breaking through in the mountain •couhtry, though his time-table .was planned to bring him in tho first day to Bassano on tho Brenta, and to the plain on either side below tho Astico, west of tho river, and at tho foot of the Grappa range- to the east. The details also make it evident that tho enemy's very ambitious design against tho Piavo crossing and tho main supply railway, wero also without hope. A small forco I got over the river by dodging among the islands, but tho larger elements wero destroyed by tho guns at ovory turn; -and the small units that got oyer were barred with hopeless promptitude. Tho next day tho remnants of those got back as best they could, and

very glad to bo able to do so. Tho river proved a true obstacle. The enemy's bulletin betrays his hope of success by tho elaborate emphasis it lays on tho operations against tho railway. That account was written as a foundation on which to build the development of tho attack on the railway lino.

At this point Washington quotes "official cables" from Rome, reporting that the Italian Premier has announced in a speech—whether in Parliament or outside is not stated—"that Italy had refused Germany's offer of an honourable peace." One wonders whether this accounts for the delay in the Aus'trian offensive. If so, then it is easy to imagine that the offer was backed by the threat of an assault likely to sweep tho Italian armies out of their positions as they were swept on the Isonzo lines; and that the offer, being ecorned the was .hurled forward, and failed. What the German idea of an "honourable peace" would be it is not difficult to conjecture from tho "infamous proposal" denounced by Mr Asquith at the declaration of war in 1914. Whether the story be true or false, no statement that the enemy tries to get Italy out of the struggle now can be surprising. Tho surprising thing would have been Italy s acceptance of any offer requir--1V S {% its acceptance the betrayal of the Allies of Italy. If the offer was reused before the great onslaught, it is not likely to be accepted after the repulse of the onslaught.

Tho weak point in this storv is that it has been announced from Washingn; / he > matter affects the whole lt.ntente Alliance. According to the story bignor Orlando made the refusal public in a speech, Tntended for the ™°le world. It is difficult to believe that_ the censor prevented the transn"ssaon of the speeoh far and wide to all tho Entente countries; and not less difficult to believe that the American Government got the only official information of the momentous statement of the Italian Premier.

M. Marcel Hutin, who always sticks to the military side, sees in the Austrian defeat not only "a reverberating check to the Emperor Charles, but tho chance of transforming that check 'into a colossal defeat." This means, that the Italians may take the psychological opportunity to launch a great counter-offensive for driving the enemy out of Italy. What can we say to that, except that tho readiness of the Italians at all points, revealed by the great Austrian attack, does not belie the idea that they were preparing for a great blow when the enemy launched his attack and failed with signal and unique promptitude. Moreover the Italians couM. maintain a greater offensive better than tho enemy, for their railway system would feed every part easily, no matter how large the scale, whereas half the Austrian armies would be dependent on the inferior and restricted railways of then- mountain systems. This is, of course, the merest conjecture. But conjecture is justifiable in the face of the fact that a great offensive victory over the Austrians now would reverberate through Austria with effects most inconvenient to the enemy's command. Whether the Allies can do it our information does not enable us to judge. That they ought to do it if it is in any degree possible goes without saying. The fitness.of the Italian troops and their Allies is patent, and their eagerness for a spring forward not less so. The offensive would have the moral effect of a reinforcement of forty per cent, of the present strength. J. here is not much danger of the detachment of large German forces for Italy. The Germans on the West there is reason to believe, require every man they can get to maintain their offensive, the relinquishment of which spells ruin.

Further details straighten out the apparent complications of the reports, by makig it clear that the fighting has ceased, that even the artillery firo has died down, and that the Austrians are reorganising their forces after their defeat.

One message gives details of tho attempt on the Piave. showing it to bo far more extensive than the first accounts enable us to realise. The enemy preceded his attack on the river with smoke shells, and under this cover small parties crossed the rivet in boats and on rafts, and getting over, hauled pontoons after. In this way threo bridgeheads were established, one opposite the lower shoulders of the Grappa ridge, where tho river enters tho Venetian plain, the other at Norvesa, on the railway line ten miles north of Treviso, the third somcwliero in between. The front factd by these bridgeheads would be apparently between ten and fifteen miles. This further reveals the magnitude of the enemy's design. His plan, it is now ovidont, was to cross the river and getting south to Treviso to start an offensive on a front of twenty to twenty-jfivo miles, maintaining it in force from the bridges ho was to throw over the river, and rolling up the railway lino. Afc the same time he countod on driving tho whole Italian line by his mountain flank attack, into tho plain from tho Astico to the Brenta. The result would have been a tremendous disaster with the Italians caught in retreat by the Austrian lines advancing south from the mountains and west from the Piave crossings. The mountain attack was held up by the! admirable handling of the Italian reserves and tho attack on tho plain failed chiefly, so far as appears from the last accounts, through tho failure of tho sinoko barrage, in consequence of which the Italian artillery and air squadrons had a clear field. Thus pontoons were knocked to pieces, whole battalions woro precipitated into tho river; eventually nothing was able too cross, and in due course those who did get over had to make their way back under fire, abandoning the bridgeheads they had for a moment established. Thus wo Tiavo the end of tho first chapter of tho Austrian offensive. Tho Austrian troops, according to tho reports, were not particularly good; war weary to a large extent. Tho elation of the Italians over their victory is shown by a dramatic scone in the Chamber of Deputies, the Socialist leader and a Minister embracing amid tho cheers of the House.

If wo could imagine Mr Massey reading out tho news of victory, and Mr Herriosand MrMcCombs embracing in the centre of tho floor with tho House singing "God Save the King," taking its time from Mr Speaker wa-ving a rhythmic arm, we could realise that scene. What wo can realise from the scene is tho colossal weight of the Austrian onset, and the greatness of tho Italian victorious relief.

» » . Tho state of Russia has inspired a-

Japanese newspaper to declare that only the intervention of a Japanese array can save civilisation from the German menace rapidly materialising iin Russia. The paper calls for the mobilisation of throe million Japanese soldiers, and the march of a great army far enough into Russia to meet and destroy the Gorman legions. The paper is quite right about the imperative need for Japanese intervention.