PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 9954, 25 April 1918, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The naval raid on Zeebruggo and Ostend, the two principal German submarine bases oh. the Belgian coast, is in some respects the most remarkable operation of the war. The Admiralty has in one respect shown a vast improvement on its performance after the battlo of Jutland. On that occasion tho First Lord opened by, telling the public that tho Fleet had lost three great ships in a fight, leaving the public to conclude that a vast disaster had occurred, and tho public, with its usual alacrity in such matters, so concluded. Sir Erio Gcddes, ignoring that bad precedent, told the whole 'story of this raid from beginning to end in tho House of Commons. If we may judge by tho cabled summary, his language might have been warmer, might have had more of tho blood of appreciation. But a summary is a summary. Wo cannot judge the quality of tho narrative by it, even if we suspect that the summary contains no bright phrases (as i summaries often do) because there were none to tako hold of.

But so long as we havo the brains we need mot cry over the want of blood. And in this story there is no lack of brains. Tho First Lord certainly told bis story in a manner which does justice to tho facts. Wo can form our own conclusions about it, filling in all the shading which tho excellent sketch wo havo is able to carry. Wo can eeo that tho operation was ono of tho most remarkable in naval annals. It is in every way worthy to stand besido Drake's famous feat of running into Cadiz to "singe the King of Spain's board" ; that it stands comparison with Hawkc's swift pursuit without pilots through tho intricate Quiberon channel of tho French fleet, before a galo of wind, ■ headed for a rocky Ico shore; that it compares''well with Cochrane's exploit in Basque Roads.

But tlioro is a difference, the great difference of tho fighting conditions. The minefields and the gunnery of our day aro added to tho formidable character'of tho undertaking .incalculably. It ia true that Hawko at Quiberon

ran through an unknown channel, but, on the other hand, ho was piloted by the fleet ho was pursuing. Tho attacking squadron of to-day having no such pilot, had to find their way through as best they could. It is startling to know that they faced the job at all, and that they went in ajid out seems almost too wonderful to beliove. Tho gunnery makes approach most difficult, it' not wo lia-ve been assured that the groat guns were euro to sink anything tho [moment they got tho range; henco tho difficulty of keeping up long bombardments, except by _ vessels of great power. But the skilful use of smoke 'with a favouring wind can do much, land the attacking squadron, having a favouring wind, got home. I Tho idea .was to block the entrances of tho two submarine bases, of ZeeIbruggo and Osteiid. Tho method was to sink ships filled with concrete in these entrances, and blow them up. At Ostoud the business was comparatively simple—just to run into the right place, sink and explode the boats, and get the crews away somehow. There was mist, and it is not certain whether, the object was attained. The two block ships reached the coast and were disposed of somewhere near the spot intended. But as yet it is not known lit' they got to the right spot.

At.Zeebrugge it was otherwise. Hero the difficulty was enormous. 'Die three blockships detailed had to go into the harbour to block the entrance to' the caiml (Bruges Canal), through which tho submarines came from their shelters to tho harbour before going out. The mole at the harbour entrance Was a formidable obstacle, having a battery which could not fail to sink anything trying to got in. The squadron overcame that difficulty by attacking the mole. Three cruisers went at the molchead, landing partie s to engage tho garrisoni and the battery, and destroy the work as well as tho shipping alongside—destroying chiefly—incidentally diverting attention from the blockships running in and making for the canal. At the same time two old submarines made for the shore end, bent on blowing up themselves and the pile-work joining tho mole to tho shore. .The daring of this combined operation was equalled by the brilliancy and success of its execution. While one of the old submarines reached its objective snd blew.-, up the pier and its own self, tho three cruisers got to the head, landed partioa, which worked, havoc, r aking a- stout fight, with the support of their ships' guns, for an hour. At the same timo the three blockships raced in. One grounded, and two, reaching their objective, were sunk and exploded in • the right spot, blocking the canal effectively. Tho work thus completed, tho three cruisers and the swarm of small craft that went in to help the blockships got away, with somo loss of the smaller' craft. We are not told that tho orews of tho blockships gob back safe after their exploit, but as a. swarm of small craft went with them, wo.-may bo sure that nobody was left behind. Some of these craft were sunk—all were' no doubt under tremendous firo and, doubtless, their crews were not all left in the water. But there must have been considerable 1055,,. How th© .attack found its waythrough the minefield we are. not told. But wo can realise without any prompting what a difficult and ticklish operation it'ihust have been. .There, was no clement of surprise. ... The monitors bombarded the riaco for an. hour, and the enemy must have beers on tho alert for possibilities; and at tho last there must have been a great rusTV for the harbour and the mole, under the heaviest firo.

Imagine the dash of that squadron at top speed, the roar and fury of the guns of all calibres, the scream of tho shellp, tho pillars of foam hurled everywhere about the speeding hulls. Then imagine tho 0001, methodical, carrying out of the whole plan. Then picture tho return through the leaping foam. Add the frantic cheers of victory, and the dirge in every heart for those who will see the sun no more!

It was a great exploit, which well deserved the appreciation the King lias so promptly given. With full understanding of the difficulties, and of the wonderful courage and skill displayed. Tho attack on the mole takes us back to the old days when ships grappled their onomy and crews raced over the side to tho cry of "Boarders away," and tho landing, in tho face of machine, guns and quick artillery fire of the resolute garrison must have been homeric. The work of the large supporting force—large enough to bo commanded by an admiral, with a special force under a commodore and French force co-operating—is not detailed for us. It must, of courso, have been considerable, and as everything had.to bo done exactly to a time-table its skill must have been extraordinary. One feels tempted almost to say that the Navy has achieved the impossible. One cannot help wondering why such a thing was not tried long iygo. Neither can one help hoping that it inay prove the first of many. It lias not realised the old promiso of Winston Churchill to dig tho enemy's fleet out. But it has proved that it is possible to go in and hit him hard enough to greatly hinder his U-boat work.

The land fighting has not developed according to yesterday's promises. The enemy is no doubt in strength in bis lines, as reported yesterday, but beyond artillery work of no particular importance ho has attempted nothing. Tho British General reports slight improvements of his positions here and there. There is, of course, no sign of tho much-predicted counter-offensivo. Naturally, for the reports wore that the Allies wore biding their time. That is waiting for tho enemy to d'o something more before striking him hnrd: ami he has done nothing. It is curious that prisoners captured declare that leave will'be given in May, and M. Clemenceau synchronises by declaring on his return from the front that leave i« now being Riven to Frenr.h soldiers. What dnes this mean? The question is strengthened by the resemblanco to the old trench warfare which is creeping into tho renorts from the f ron t—bombarrt'monts of no particular strength, snwill roids, and small takes of prisoners. Is this reference on both sides to leave a sort of camouflnn'e? Or is Jt a sign that tho onomy ha* rlmnirod his iViind. and determined to dig in, to hold the territory he bas won, iin4 throw the onus of hnttV n" the Allies while ho prepares his positions to greatly increase the difficulty of throwing him out of France and Belgium, when,, the American strength arrives? On tho one hnnd. we haye had a German naval authority admitting that it is impossible to stop the transport of tho growing American forces across the Atlantic. On tho other, wo havo tho report (what it is

[worth, we cannot say) that von, Ludendorff has given up tho system of massed attacks as altogether too costly ngainst tho resolute and powerful resistance of tlie Allies. If that is true, it is • an .admission of the utter failure of his great offensive. The talk of subjstituting machine power for man-power as tho great smasher only emphasises tho admission, for the machine-power lof tho Allies has proved quite equal to tho machino-nott'er of tile enemy. That is a lesson of tho great battle, quite as much as the power of the Allies to smash tho great waves of atI tack with indomitable resistance.

This is but conjecture. But the continuation of ihe lull in the battle supports it to ;ome extent. li tho enemy does not itzaenr it, will tho Allies? If they do so, they will strike with their counter. They havo delayed that because they expected the enemy to weaken himself by repetition) of his desperate stroke for victory. But if he refrains it will be because he is strengthening himself, and that is an incentive tc- attack him at once. There is another incentive in the fact that his position is not good., as ho is everywhere congested, with communications liable to extensive harassment by guns and by bombs from the air: and in the north he holds a, particularly disadvantageous salient. The conditions for attacking him may not be- so favourable ns the Allies expected him to make them; But there does seem reason to regard them as favourable enough.

| ... i Sir Douglas Haig continues his gene[ral reports of the great battle. It is noteworthy that in his reference to the Armentieres section he repeats his first statement "that the evacuation of Armentieree was brought about not by direct attack, but by the growing menace of the enemy's advance, and was carried out "deliberately and in good order," by the division holding the sector. This contradicts the enemy's claim to have compelled the surrender of 3000 mon, which Mr Massingham treats as correct.