PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 9953, 24 April 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Two 'messages' meeting here, one from Paris, the other from New York give food for thought. The latter is a statement on. the j authority of an American officer returned from France, that General. Foch's reserve—the mass of manoeuvre, as we have been calling it recently—totals one million 'men. The Paris message is'a statement, ; that the German High Command finds the business of supplying its armies arrested on their way to the coast. Putting the two together, it is possible to realise the mass of manoeuvre waiting its time, i.e., until the*enemy's congestion and starvation are'at "the highest, and then striking the wearied, congested masses into a tremendous disastw. The Paris message suggests the vision of the reserves with weapon, high poised'j in its declaration that the Allies are content to bide their time.

As to the truth, of these messages it is hard to speak exactly. We certainly saw reason yesterday for believing that Foch's reserve'• was more than 400,000. The statemont that its strength is one million is subject to subtraction, because, the message represents the reserve, as having taken part in the repulse of the enemy rushing between the two British amies. What deduction must be made on this account it is impossible to say. But if the original statement of one million is correct, then the mass of manoeuvre must he substantially less than a million. It is probable, however, that the enumeration was made, before the arrival of the Italian . reinforcements, which took place after the returning officer sailed from France. ,In that case the strength of the mass of manoeuvre would certainly he at least a million. . • • •

The Paris .message,Bays that the German general has a million men in the triangle formed by the two attacks. It is a. loose way, of, describing the situation, quite -unsafe to rely upon for any idea of the numbers of the enemy engaged. But in such a"'situation as is hero described, the main point is not of numbers but of situation. The numbers are certainly large, and, according to this report, they are too large for their position. They are, therefore, jammed up, unable to deploy, imperfectly supplied, and subject to great difficulties of distribution and communications. The emphasising remark is that these forces were thrown into the fight with six days', provisions, unexpectedly brought to a standstill in a country. ..as sterile as the face of the moon, and as difficult to reach.

Now ~we • knpw ; frpm -,the reports of prisoners how hungry the troops of the attack are in the north; and the tremendous assault they made to push back tho defence botwoen Givencliy and Robccq shows how hndly (are their masses, in that psvt, at all events. Weeks ago tho hammering they get when they were stopped on tho Anore abovo and below Albert, took awful toll of thoir congested masses thera. These forces, in spite of

tlie 1 * horrible 'conditions of iho terrain 'tin * which" they were forced to halt, tlayo never been able since to make any sort of attempt to get out. Neither have the attacking lines been able to gain an inch of ground further south.. Tho reports of the Allies show that all the time their air forces have been playing havoc With the enemy's communications and his troops, both marching and entrained. The Allied artillery has also been doing considerable damage in the same way. In this connection it is well to remember that our troops ! aro not left to tnemseives, with very imperfect and inadequate artillery support. They have great artillery strength of all calibres, and the new gunners, of the new armies can shoot as accurately as the veteran gunners <of Germany.**! It is clear from all these things that the attack that failed is in a very uncomfortable position. ~

We cannot gauge the report, however, sufficiently, though it is supported generally by the volume of the cable messages as above detailed. We canlnot tell, we mean, whether the enemy's undoubtedly -uncomfortable situation will prevemt him from throwing in another great attack before the Allies barring his road to the sea get stronger. If the statement of congestion and discomfort is really correct, it will soon be time to hear the rush of the. masses of manoeuvre on the congested, weary, ill-supplied troops of the arrested attack. That will be the best test of accuracy.

: The enemy has not renewed his assault anywhere, but he has begun to bombard everywhere. Infantry have made' demonstrations and put forward feelers at points, but there is ae yet nothing to indicate what is coming. Whatever happens, shall we hold? The only possible answer is' that, having held before, we shall hold again. We can see from the cable of the New Zealand official war correspondent how the country behind the lines was swept for reinforcements to throw into the battle-line. But that need not discourage us, even if it be proved that in groat numbers. In the first place, his congestions hamper his movement, and, in the second, wo can be 6ure that, with tho very large reserve now known to be at General Foch's disposal, there will be plenty of men to reinforce the line at any point where help may.bo required without weakening the force of the counter-a.ttock.

Of "the spirit of the resistance to these ! attacks '■' of the enemy -we. may judge by' the description tliia correspondent Rives of the keenness of the New Zealanders. Our men, by the way, it noft- is" clear, are in both sections of the battle. They are not all in the forces parring the road to Amien6. They are also in the battle of Flanders. It was in the Aletereni sector they particularly distinguished themselves, a- mile or two west of Eailleul. They were up in time to help stop the rush just ae it was getting'dangerous. The behaviour of sojpe artillery reinforcements was conspicuous." Tirst they volunteered to serve as infantry, then they got their guns, and fought them in the most spirited' and reckless manner in the 9Pi?n," destroyed them, fought their way out when surrounded, and. getting fresh guns,, '■\venfc- into the fight again with" wondferfiil ardour. AH ranks, however, did great work, and the coriim&nder'under whom they fought spoke of them in the highest terms as fighters .and trench-diggers. But those gunners who went into action after a few .instructions in musketry and bayonet work take the palm. '.'

No doubt this spirit is everywhere in the British and French armies. They will hold. We shall see directly, for as we write Mr Phillip Gibbs's Message oomes in reporting that the enemy has his . troops in position and is threatening to renew the storm at once, and it appears to be his intention to force the fighting on both sections at once. In fact, his first attack ha s heen already delivered at the Aveluy Wood, north of Albert, where ho got such a hammering when he attempted to free the congestion in the valley of the Ancre. This tirne ho fares no better, but no doubt* we, shall hear more of him in this place; and it will not he the only place of fighting.

It has been said that if the enemy's first great attack had succeeded the sequel would have been war in the open. There has been a good deal of open fighting, nevertheless. What that is like may be seen in, a letter from the front in Palestine, whbh describes the business in a few masterly phrases: "The most interesting fighting," the writer calls it. "No mere trenoh offensive, but > a campaign of manoeuvre, demanding instant decisions, which had far-reaching rppults, and very rapid execution." That is the sort of thing which won AHenby's battles, and is bound to take the p'lace of trench war before long in the West, where the fighting is gravitating in that direction. It will be a new experience for the British, armies. The enemy hag always hoped for it for that reason', as his men were exercised In such operations regularly before the .war. As indeed were the French, who developed great generals in the process, capable of handling large nasses of men with the quick decision and rapidity of movement described an the.above letter. The British troops are getting gradually accustomed,, cmd will be fit, wo may be sure, when their x-shole" work "will'bo manoeuvering in the open.

This officerj writing in January, made a prediction about the present German offensive in the West, whioh is worth quoting as showing that the British commanders andi staff knew well what was before them. "Their initiative" he said "regained in consequence of the collapse of the Russians, "who will never fight again," "will, without douM ' '.

produce an offensive surpassing in weight, intensity, and determination any offensive yet launched on either side, backed by an enormous concentration .of artillery. Where it will come, God knows. Some indi- "' cations point to it near St. Quontin; others to a blow at the Channel ports via Flanders. Very likely one will be launched first to attract our reserves, and then the main blow will be launched later. How--ever, though'forced to stand on the defensive for 'the "moment we are mot' idle, and fully prepared. Wo and the French can stand the strain. We shall lose ground in soma ■ places, and may lose some guns and prisoners, but the losses wo ehall . inflict, will ~be enormous and the front will stand firm. It will be the last bid of the Boche for a deoiMon. It will fail. It must fail. And then he will have no alternativn lji't fa nr-rcnt the poace for which we are fighting." So far this prediction ha-s been veri-

fied. The blows have fallen on the very spots pointed out as likely, one before the other, as predicted. The losses have followed 1 , but the line has stood firm, and British and French are standing the strain. It is one of the most remarkable predictions of the ■whole war. Its sucoess so far is a guarantee that the rest will be fulfilled'. As the writer says, the enemy knows that we only have to hold him till the summer, "when America will bo able to deploy 1,000,000 men." Compare with Dr' Fitchett's estimate of 1,500,000 Americans, by midsummer, and note that since the above prediction was made the American preparations have been greatly speeded up. We can accept the conclusion with the brightest hope. TThis is the Tear of Victory." The fight is largely a question of nerves, and it is the traditional spirit ol our race wihicb. will enable us to endure to the end. That spirit is as we have observed everv day since the opening of this offensive, which proved as great as this writer said it would be, manifest in every place and every hour of the battle. • • ■

The sensational report from Melbourne published by the Sydney ' Daily Telegraph" makes one wonder. The Government here has no'information, and has too much responsibility to permit it to guess. The Commonwealth Defence Minister, who admits he has information (appears to do so), says that there is nothing alarming,, and dismisses the matter as something concerning shipping. But the Wolf and the Seeadlor concerned shipping, did a good deal of damage, and might have done a good deal more. One of them almost bagged the Niagara, if we read the story of the Wolf aright. It is, therefore, not at all pleasant to read that there is some danger to shipping interests. There was a report yesterday that Germany is forcing Holland into the war. Our armies being engaged pretty fully in Flanders and France and Italy, Germany may be said, if that report is true, to have chosen the psychological moment. Suppose the choice turns out too much for Holland. What then? We do not, therefore, imagine that Holland has an army in the Dutch Indies which can be landed in Australia, where there is great scarcity of troops. A lively imagination might even go so far as a regular series of shipments of German troops in Dutch vessels, ar-; ranged and carried out with a. view to the invasion of Australia- from the Dutch East, in preparation for a declaration of war by Holland on the side of the (Central Powers. But it is not necessary for any imagination to be quite so lively. In fact, it requires no imagination at all to realise,that there are many fine German steamers Refuging in the harbours of the Dutch East Indies since the outbreak of the war. Then,. still without calling on the imagination, we can suppcße how Holland, being forced 1 to figgt, all these interned ships are armed 1 and sent forth raiding. There, are difficulties of coal and munitionment,, but the latter Jmay have been provided for, and coal and other supplies can be captured on tie high seas. The German Admiralty might very well think the adventure worth trying, especially if the European Dutch harbours' are made available as naval bases for Germany. There may be no cause for alarm, in this report. " There certainly is mucij food for thought.