GERMAN ANNEXATIONS

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 9869, 15 January 1918, Page 6

GERMAN ANNEXATIONS

That the object of the German people ’s the increase of territory ea-vt and west, the object for which the war was forced upon the world, the object which Germany will not abandon now is proved in the book of Herr Grumbach. Tho proof contains a vast quantity of evidence in the shape of quotations from speeches, writings and petitions. Of those wo publish to-day the petition to the German Chancellor of six great economic associations. commenting upon it in our leading article of to-day, on “Tho Truth about Germany.” It is as follows: “Berlin, "May 20th, 1313. "Your Excellency. "Together witn the whole German peocle the German men of business engaged in agriculture, the manufacturing industries. commerce and trade, are firmly determined to persevere in the struggle of life or death which has been forceu upon our country. *l'hev will persevere to the last, and at whatever cost, so that Germany may issue from the struggle externally stronger, and that it may possess the guarantee of a lasting peace and tho guarantee of an assured national economic and cultural development. "In view of this aim and tne readiness of tho whole nation to make the necessary sacrifices, it is only natural that the people hav f! been alarmed by rumours regarding peace negotiations, and particularly regarding the conclusion of a separate peace with England which was to be based upon certain English wishes and demands. "In these circumstances the declaration of tho ‘Xorddeutsohe Allgemeiue Zcitung* that nobody endowed with common sense could think of giving up tho advantages arising from the favourable military position bv a premature peace with any one of our enemies has been received everywhere with satisfaction. "That determination should not be affected by a less favourable or a less secure position of the war. Otherwise, the external and internal aims which have been indicated by His Majesty the Emperor would be lost sight of. These aims can ho obtained only by the military enforcement of a peace which gives us a- greater security for onr frontiers in tho West and the East, which broadens the basis of Germany’s naval power, and which gives us the possibility of a powerful and unhampered development of our economic forces. Briefly, peace must bring us such an increase of our political, military, maritime and economic power that it establishes our greater strength against tho nations without. "A peace which does not yield these results mokes inevitable the renewal of the struggle at an early date under materially less favourable conditions for Germany. Therefore, no premature peace must be concluded. From such a premature peace no adequate fruit? of victory can .be derived. “But there should also be no halfhearted peace, no peace which, through the defects indicated, does not lead to the full political exploitation of tho final military success for which we hopel "It must. not he overlooked that the full exploitation of tho favourable military position is necessary not only for securing Germany.’a future externally and for safeguarding ita future, but that the full exploitation of victory is equally necessary during the ensuing years of peace for reason® of internal policy. Only then the people will willingly mak 6 the necessary sacrifices. The German nation. does; of course, not expect the impossible. Notwithstanding its patriotism, it would consider reasonably the existence of insuperable military difficulties which would make impossible the conclusion of a satisfactory peace. However, the consequences upon the internal position' of Germany would be most ■ disastrous if. at the conclusion of peace. Germany should make concessions which are not made necessary by the military situation, if the country should prematurely end the struggle. The result would be that the returning German warriors would believe that the sole result of their bravery was an unbearable load of taxation. That would be fatal for our internal peace. Germany’s gains derived from its victories must correspond to' the sanguinary sacrifices made by hundreds of thousands 1 "The detailed demands which must be fulfilled in the oskuion of the signatories, should they he militarily obtainable, and which are necessary to strengthen Germany politically, militarily, and economically to such a degree that the country can with confidence look forward into the future, have been given in the petition adjoined which has been placed before your Excellency on March 10th of this year by the League of Agriculturalists, by the German Peasant League, by the Central Association of German Industrialists, , by the League of Industrialists. and by the German Middle-class Association. Since then the Christian German. Peasant Associations have joined the associations named. The Petition before mentioned was worded as follows: " "The undersigned associations have considered the question how to cam- out the demand which has so frequently been, made during th P last few months, that the present war should be followed b\u- an honourable peace, by a peace ifciiA corresponds with the sacrifices made, and which will be secure and lasting.

" 'lf we wish to answer this question we must hover forget that our enemies unceasingly proclaim that Germany must be annihilated and must disappear from among the Great Powers. Ab these ore their aims. Germany cannot find security in. treaties which would he trodden underfoot as soon as convenient. On the contrary, wb can find security only by weakening ,our_encmies economically and many’s, colonial policy and for her ouswill remain secure for an indefinite time-

" 'We demand the possession of a Colonial Empire which corresponds with the many-sided economic interests of Germany. We demand security for Ctermaouy’s colonial policy and for her customs policy in the future. We demand a sufficient war indemnity in a suitable form. , Wo believe that our principal atm should be to secure and improve the European basis of the German. Empire, in view of the war which has been forced upon us. Germany's position in Europe should be improved a« follows: " ‘Belgium must be placed under German law in order to secure Germany’s naval, military, and economic power in the future, especially as towards England. Besides, wo _must remember the close connection which exists between the economically so important Belgian territory and the principal industrial districts of Germany. For these reasons Belgium must be placed under the German Empire with regard to military affairs. Customs matters, the Mint, Bank, and Postal arrangements. The Belgian railways and waterways must become part of the German transport system. In the Government and the administration of Belgium the Walloon and Flemish districts must be kept apart. At tile same time, the industrial undertakings and landed properties which are so important for dominating the country must bo transferred from Belgian to German hands and arrangements must be made which ensure that the inhabitants of the country will obtain no political influence upon the German Elmpire. •' 'As regards France. For the reasons given above, with regard to Germany’s relations to England, the possession of. the French shore and coast districts up to the Somme must be considered s a question of life or death for Germany's future position on the sea, for we must have access to the Atlantic. The Hinterland, which, would have to be acquired at the same time, must secure the fullest economic and strategical exploitation of tie newly acquired Channel ports. All further acquisitions of French territory must be exclusively based upon military and strategical considerations. of the mining district of Brier will, however, form an exception to the principle indicated. In view of the experiences of the present

war, it may be considered a matter of course that we can never again* expose our frontiers to hostile invasion. I\ e can therefore, in particular, not allow our opponents to retain Verdun and Bcltort and the western slopes of the Vosges which lie between these two points. By acquiring the lino of the. Meuse and the French coast of the Channel. Germany would obtain not only the ore deposits of Bricy. which have already been mentioned, but also the coal districts of the Department du isord and of the Department Pas-de-Calais. “ ‘ln view of the experiences made in Alsace-Lorraine, it may be considered a matter of course that the population of the annexed drench territory will not be allowed to obtain political influence in Germany, and that here also the important economic factors, including large and medium-sized properties, will be placed into German hands, while France should undertake to receive and to indemnify tho original owners. , “ ‘As regards the East. In the first place, we should be guided bv the Principle that the vast increase of industrial power which we may expect to receive in tho West must be balanced by equivalent acquisitions of agricultural territory in the East. The present economic structure of Germany has prdved so fortunate in‘the course of the war that the necessity of preserving its happy balance for all time may be described as indispensable according to the general conviction of the German people. “ ‘ln view of the necessity, of strengthening not only the industrial, hut also tho agricultural basis of Germany, a com prehensive policy of colonisation with Gorman agricultural colonists, is indicated. The German peasants living abroadand particularly those domiciled outside Germany, and especially in Russia who have been deprived of their rights in consequence of the war, must ho enabled to return to Germany. Their return will great 1 v increase tho population and the‘military strength, of the country. In view of the requirements mentioned, a considerable expansion of German territory is needed towards the East. At least part of the Baltic Provinces and of the territories to the south of them must bo annexed. The aim to make tho Eastern frontier of Germany more easily, defensible must constantly bo kept “ ‘Recreated Eastern Prussia requires more secure frontiers. The provinces of Western, Prussia. Posen and Silesia also must no longer be allowed to■ remain in their present exposed position. The necessary protection can best »e created by acquiring large territories farther east. , “‘With regard to tho granting of political rights to the inhabitants ot the annexed territories and with regard «. securing within these new districts Germany’s economic supremacy, the principles laid down with vega rd to France should apply. The war indemnity to be demanded from Russia should largely consist of -land. , , , “ ‘Of com'se these demands depend on the assumption that military resuLs will enable us to carry them out. However, in view of the successes obtained so lar, w© are full of confidence that our armies and their leaders will obtain a "Y J-ctoTy which guarantees the fulfilment of these our wishes. The aims indicated must be striven for, not from love of conquest, but because a lasting peace can be secured only bv achieving them. In view ol the sacrifices made bv them, the German people expect such a peace. Besides. TTfa voluntary surrender of enemy lands which have been drenched with so much German blood, and which contain innumerable graves of the best Germans, would not correspond with the sentiments of the people, and with their ideas of what constitutes an honourable peace. “ ‘Each of harbours op. the Channel would strangle Germany’s oversea development, as it has done in the past. An. independent Belgium would continue to be an English tete do pent, a hostile base. It would mean .a constant threat on the part of. our enemies if the natural line of fortresses of’ Franco should .be allowed to remain in the hands of the French. Russia, on the other hand, would under-estimate Germany’s strength far action and power should* she .experience no loss of territory. Besides, if we should not acquire agricultural territorr on our Eastern frontier, we should diminish the possibility of strengthening Germany’s military power toy an adequate increase oi the national population in case of a war with Russia. “ ‘We have the honour of acquainting your Excellency with these our views, which are held toy vast numbers of Germans who do not belong to the undersigned Associations, although there may be differences of opinion with regard to certain details. At .the same time, wo would respectfully "point out that we have gout copies of the present document to the Ministries of the individual States of the German Empire.’— “It is necessary to supplement the petition given in tho foregoing. It should expressly be pointed out that-the political, military, and. economic aims which the German nation has in view in order to safeguard its future are closely interconnected, and cannot be treated separately. In. the first place, it is clear that success in obtaining our great political aims depends on the efficacy and success of the German armies. However. the experiences of the present war teach us that in the last resort Germany’s military successes and the exploitation. of our victories to the fullest extent depend on, tho economic strength and efficiency of tlie German nation. Had Germany’s agriculture not been able to feed the people despite all the efforts of our enemies to starve us, had not the German manufacturing industries. Ger-man-inventiveness. and German technical skill been able to maintain our independence from foreign countries, we should at last, be defeated, notwithstanding the glorious successes of our victorious troops, and possibly wo would by now have been vanquished. “It follows that oui demands which, at first sight, seem to be dictated by purely economic motives, must be considered from a larger point of view. They spring from the necessity of increasing Germany’s national and military power to (he utmost. Our demands must therefore. be considered from the military Point of view. This is particularly the caso with regard to the acquisition of agricultural territory upon which stress has been laid in the petition, and with regard to the seizure of the ore-bearing territories of the Mcurthe and Moselle, and of the French coal districts of the Departments du Kord and Fas-de-Calais, and the Belgian coal districts.

"The acquisition of adequate lands suitable for agricultural colonisation is indispensable not only with a view to broadening tthe basis pf Germany’s national economy. It is necessary not only in order to maintain the happy balance of Germany’s national economy, the importance of which the present war has plainly disclosed, but also in order to secure the powerful stream of national strength, and of man-power which is provided by a mighty agriculture. Thi s is particularly necessary if we wish, to increase the number of the people and thereby Germany's military strength. "Acquisitions in the ore,and iron districts mentioned are required not only by our economic interests, but also by military necessity. That will appear clearly from the following details: "Since August. 1914, Germany’s production of raw iron has increased again to nearly _1.000.C00 tons per month, or has doubled, and Germany’s steel production has increased to more than 1,(XX),000 tons per month. Nevertheless, iron and steel are not abundant, but are scarce in Germany, and are still more scarce in neutral countries. The German shell works require quantities of iron, and steel, which formerly would have been considered incredible. For cast grey shells alone, which are an inferior substitute for drawn shells and steel shells, at least 4.000 tons of raw iron have been used every day during the last few months. At the moment, the exact figures cannot be given. xiowevt... it is certain that the continuation of the war would have been impossible had the German iron and steel production not been doubled since August, 1914. ‘"The basis of the German iron and steel production is rainotte ore, the pre-

ponderant importance of which is con gtaiiH-r- --creasing. This ore alone can be obtained in rapidly increasing quantities within Germany's frontiers. The production of the other German -iron districto is very limited, and the importation of iron ore from overseas, even from Sweden, has become so difficult that at many works, even those outside the Luxemburg-Lorraine district, mmette ore furnisher from GO to SO per cent, of the iron and steel produced. It follows that' the war would be as good as lost, should the production of minetto ore be interfered with. ■ . “How does the production of minmte ore stand in the present war, and how would it stand in a future war? “If the fortress of Longwy and _the numerous French furnaces in the neighbourhood should be given back to the French, France would be able in a new war to destroy from Longwy, the following iron works in Germany and Luxemburg in a few hours by means of longdistance gup-lire i

Kilometres distance from Longwy. Eodingen 7 ILfferdingen 10 Each 16 to 17 , Oettingen 21 llumeliugen 21 Dudelingen 25 Thus, approximately 20 per cent, of the German raw iron and steel production could be eliminated by Franca acting from Longwy. “A glance at the map -shows further that Jarny, the minettp mine of the Phoenix Company, is situated at* a distance of from 13 to 15 kilometres from Verdun, and that the western ore concessions near Landres and Conflans are no farther than 26 kilometres from Verdun. To-dav we bombard Dunkirk from a distance of 33 kilometres. Can any one believe that the French would in the next war abstain from putting long-dis-tance guns into Longwy and Verdun, in order not to disturb Germany’s ore production and iron industry? “In passing, it should be said that onlv the vast production of steel from minetto ore enables Germany to provide agriculture with the necessary phosphoric acid since the importation of phosphates has come to an end. “Germany’s security in a future war urges us compellingly. to acquire the whole of the minette territories. inclmL ing the fortresses of Longwy and Verdun, for without their possession the district described cannot 'be held. “The possession of vast supplies of coal, and particularly of coal noj in bitumen, such as that which is found in Northern France, is at least as decisive for the issue of the war as is the possession of iron ore. Belgium and Northern France together produce more than 40,000.000 tons of coal per annum. Besides, coal is nowadays one of the determining political factors. That may be seen by the English coal export prohibition of Hay loth. The industrial neutral nations must act in accordance with the will of that <jombatant Power

which can guarantee to them the neces. sary supply of coal. Germany can at present not provide the coal required. Hence we are compelled to' make; use of Belgium’s' production, for our neutral neighbours would fall ■ entirely under England’s control. It is very probable that the_ deliberate expansion of the Belgian coal production has-been ot the greatest importance, that it has induced several of Germany's neighbour States to maintain their neutrality. “It Is generally known that our most important explosives are derived from coal, their constituents being obtained during the coking process, and that coal is important. also for the production of ammonia. Coal can provide'.us with benzol, the only product with which wa can replace the benzine which wo lack. Lastly, coal furnishes us with tar, which can bo converted into oil fuel, which is indispensable for naval purposes. _ and into lubricants. It should be pointed out that the large expansion of our torpedo ■ boat flotilla and of our submarine arm is impossible unless we have a vast supply of liquid fuel. The course ol the present ■ war has demonstrated the superiority of oil fuel over coal in the case of torpedo boats, and its advantages are so striking that it would bo criminal levity to disregard the lesson in the future. If _onr enemies secure for themselves oil-well abroad Germany must take care to obtain the necessary gas coal at home. In time of peace she must provide, an inexhaustible supply of oil. benzol, toluol,, ammonia, and naphthaline. not only In order to increase the national prosperity, but ' also because their possession is an indispensable part of Germany’s armament for war.

“In summing up. .we would say that the war aims indicated will secure per. manently Germany’s national economy, and at the same time guarantee her military strength and her political independence and pow-cr. In addition, they will expand Germany’s economic opportunities. ■ They will provide work for the workers, and will therefore be of advantage to labour-as a whole."