PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9824, 22 November 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The Italian armies continue to hold the enemy, who on his side is redoubling his efforts and bringing up fresh forces. The official Italian announce-

ment is that the Italian nation is preparing for a desperate struggle, and the King’s proclamation to the people announces that Italy has never faced such a danger since tho establishment of Italian unity. Tho gravity of this is increased by the .statement with which tbe King led up to this climax. He said that the enemy, who had been steadily beaten since the outbreak of the war, bad at last obtained the assistance he had been in want of throughout and had therefore prevailed, with the consequence that “our defence was obliged to retreat.” One immediately asks why, and the only answer which suggests itself is that there were no reserves in the Italian rear.

It is necessary to look back to tbe entry of Italy into tbe war to understand tb e situation fully. At the moment of joining the Entente Italy was confronted with the task of promptly securing her frontiers against Austria. On the whole line of frontier the lin'e had been cunningly drawn by Austria with a view to favouring the Austrian invasion of Italy. The frontier.-from the western boundary (on the French side) to the Lake of Garda hod offered her little difficulty at the end of the

• r or l&b-i. After Solferino both sides discussed the boundary question on equal terms. But seven years later when Austria was beaten hy Prussia In Germany, she found herself .obliged though she had defeated Italy on Italian sod at Custorzza, and at sea in the battle of Lbsa. to surrender tbe province of Venetia, whiob the Italians had attempted to conquer.- "The-aban-donment of Venetia had become necessary because of the shattering Austrian <viea-ts ,n Germany and Austria, of which the last, at Koniggratz, in Bohemia had, in the sixth week of tbe war, left Vienna at the mercy of tbe conqueror. Venetia was accordingly handed over to Louis Napoleon, who passed the title deeds promptly on to Italy, and Venetia became once more part of Italy, while Austria saved face.

But Austria, in surrendering the country, took good care to keep mo whip-hand on the frontier. On the Trentino salient she left a sword with its point planted in the Italian Hank, and its hilt in the hand of Austria, and between the Brenta and the Julian Alps, the head of every Italian valley, and, therefore, of course, every pass capable of accommodating a gun or a mule was left in Austrian hands. With the command of the great valleys of the Adige and the Brenta, the Austrians felt they had made the invasion of Italy certain by the old, historic route from the Austrian side, by direct advance in those valleys, and by subsidiary advances from the Brave Valley over the passes (all in their hands) and down the valleys of the Piave and the Tagliamento; to say nothing of the gap between Gorizia and the sea, dominated by the heights about Gorizia, and the difficulties of the Carso below.

Had the war been limited to Austria and Italy, the latter, as a consequence of that crafty delimitation of the frontiers, would have been unable to repel the superior forces of Austria. In a war between the two countries alone, Austria would always have had the option of invading Italy, while, on the other hand, the invasion of Austria would have been quite beyond the power of Italy. But the war in which Italy engaged Austria was not confined to the two March Powers. Austria, being heavily engaged on other fronts of battle—Poland and Oalicia—and faring badly, could only dispose of a portion of her strength on the Italian frontier. Italy was freed, therefore, from the certainty of invasion by superior forces,

and was justified in even hoping foi a. chance of invading Austria.

There was not a moment to lose, however. Obviously, the first step imperatively required was the securing l of the valley heads and passes. Tho Italian general did not hesitate. Tho declaration of war found him ready to move. War declared, ho sprang forward and captured groat lengths of the Austrian lino, and in a few months his methodical persistence, helped by the extraordinary skill of the Italian engineers ‘ and the mountaineering skill of his Alpine troops, enabled him to neutralise the Austrian frontier advantage everywhere except in the Trontino, which was too big a salient to be captured by any process short of attack on the largest scale. But the Trentino salient was reduced by those early operations, the Italian advance having established itself about four miles south of Roveroto, in the Adige (or Lagzarina) Valley, and a mile or two west of Borgo, in the Brenta (or Sugana) Valley. Between these fronts their line was established along the ridges of the Austrian -frontier line, from tho mass of Monto Pasttbio to tbe neighbourhood of Borgo. Behind 1 that ridge is tho Asia-go or Sette Commurii "Plateau, and Gallic, now often mentioned in the repewts, and the ridge is carried on by the heights of Gomborto and Millicta to the Brenta Valley, east of Borgo, in its course south. South of the Asia.go basin is tbe final ridge, with crests 4000 to 6000 feet, pierced by the small rivers Bosnia and Astico.

Such is the wild tangle of mountains and subsidiary foothills of the Alps wh.ch fills the space between.the valleys Q f tho Adige and the Brenta. its northern watershed affords mustering room for armies determined to break through the tangle by such roads ana passes as offer themselves. On the west tho Pasubio and tho Zugha ridges stop the way as far as the Adige. On the south tho tangle is bounded by a continuoua ridge 3 tbe southern side of wiiicJi touches the plains of Venet.a. On the oast tho approach to the Brenta troin the tangle is exceedingly difficult. The Italian advance in this region, as above noted, established itself north of this tangle with impregnable bastion holds on its boundary rivers, «s Adige and tho Brenta. On the rest of the northern frontier—-in the region of the Dolomites, the Cadore or Venetian Alps, and the Carnic Alpsthr advance captured and fort.hea every pass and semblance of a pass. The eastern frontier was attacked by the advance—the strongest of all—which ultimately crossed the fsonzo, captured Gorizia, and established itself from the Carso to Tolmino, above Gorizia. ,

Having realised these great and wonderful gains in cur minds, wo can understand the extent of the disaster represented by the loss of the wnoe of them from the Brenta Valley by the Alpine country to tbo sea in tbo neighbourhood of Trieste. Prom the Brenta and tbo Piave a little south of Feltre, tho line of holding goes down the latter river to the sea. The holding moans tho necessity for a huge effort of roconquesb before Italy can be regarded as restored to the old, frontier position, so advantageous to Austria. To tbat must bo added the tremendous task of reconquering the now frontier which the Italian armies captured so promptly at the outset of their fine campaign. • • •

The enemy's effort to turn the Italian lino is pressing against the centre of the great mountain tangle above described between the Adige and Brenta Valleys, In 1916 he attacked from tbe Trontino eide. The defence held at the ends,, but bent like a bow between them, the arc at the deepest point, southward and westward of Aidago, getting very near the desired plain. This time the attack is again playing on the tangle, but it has not made any headway into it. There is as yet no' sign of bending back in the line. The attack is co-ordinated by another to the east, just over the Brenta. That attack presses on the ridge between the Brenta and the Piavo; it is fed from the Brave reinforcements and munitions coming over the passes of the “divide” into the upper valley of the Piavo and down the stream past Belluno and Feltre to the lines of assault.

The, position of the Italian defence can be roughly described as in two lines, one facing north, the other east. That will servo, though the angle between them is not a right angle, the eastern line facing rather north-east than east. This line follows the Piave 'fiiver from the sea across the Venetian plain to the high country of the rough foothills, which it reaches about the bend of the Piave in the Aldobiadene region. From the Piave the line runs west, the defence facing north, over the Brenta ; and on through the tangle of mountains above described as the theatre of the great Austrian offensive of 1916. This line is far from straight, zigzagging from the upper Brenta west of Borgo, down to Valstagna, on tho river, and zigzagging between the two rivers along the contours of the Monte Grappa position. This zigzagging clement is the hinge of the whole line, so describe! in themessages to-day. Here the hardest of the enemy’s attacks are being delivered, and here the defence is most obstinate. The enemy is maintaining waves of assault with heavy artillery co-operation, after the manner of thr German assaults at Verdun during the severest days of that great war storm. The enemy suffers repulse after repulse, and tho Italians succeed in various counter-attacks. It is tho sway of a great battle, just as it was at Verdun.

If the enemy gets through here he will reach the plain of Venice, cutting the lateral railway connecting the Italian armies with the arsenals and supply depots, and industrial works of Lombard and Turin. That is what the correspondent means when he says that if the enemy gets through he will reach the plain of Lombardy. As a matter of fact it is the _ Venetian plain, which is a continuation of the plain of Lombardy.

The attack on the hinge consists •partly of. these waves against thse Monto Grappa ridge, on which Tomba and the otner crest mentioned are peaks, and partly cf attacks on the Italian positions on the east and south-east of the Asiago basin in the eastern region of the tangle between the Adige and the Brenta. Valstagna, pn the Brenta, is the southernmost point of the attack here, and lies at the end of a narrow valley served by a mule track. In this sector the enemy is without the advantage of his greater artillery. Whether the same may be said for his other attack on, the hinge—that against Monto Grappa (the Mort Homme of the Verdun battle repeated)

—has not been made clear. The probability is that lie has not the weight of artillery to which he is accustomed for the fighting has developed too quickly for the march of these ponderous pieces. Moreover, the communications' of the Austrian line of the upper Flare are probably not able to supply the enormous munitionment needed for the greater artillery work. Wo incline to this opinion also because the steady progress of the Italian counters hero argues that the enemy’s artillery is not overwhelming.

Moreover, the correspondents report that this battle for the hinge is only preliminary to tho great battle winch will develop when tho enemy gets his heavy «uns to work on the lino of the lower Piavo. That is evidently expected to bring tho main tug-of-war. Then will the great battle develop to full intensity. Wo gather from this (1) that tho enemy has decided to use his heaviest guns on the plain where they cad be fully supplied, with munitionment from his bases on the coast; (2) that tho arrival of the pieces has been delayed by the need for mending the rails and the bridges destroyed by the retreating Italians.

There is a report that Allied troops aro lighting in tho Italian line. If that is correct, then the enemy’s great attack is somewhat late. Whether it is too late, however, remains to be seen. At all events, some Allied troops have arrived, and arc at work in the defence, and tho Italian moral —assuming that any moral was ever lost, and we have hoard nothing of that lately—is completely good again. How many troops have arrived from the West •front H It is hard to say, but we know that the French Prime Ministosr said that the help would match the danger. Now the disaster on tho Isonzo position began on October 25th, and Washington announced on that date that British and French reinforcements were on the way to Italy. Mr Price had said the day before m a message that the Italian array was about to ue subjected to one of the great” drives of the Gorman system developed during this war. Ho spoke of it as a menace serious enough to alter the face of the whole campaign. An enormous force had been, he said, brought from tho Russian fronts. It is possible that Italy, knowing the danger, had asked for reinforcements and that these had al-t-sady been started when the blow fell.

If we assume this to be tbe case, wo get four weeks for the arrival of strong forces to the rescue. The usual calculation is of eighty trains for a division. If wo suppose that ton divisions wore sent, they would require 800 trains. Supposing two lines of railway fully 'available, the problem for each lino .■was to run 400 trains in twenty-eight 'days. That would require fifteen trains a day with an interval between each •;of three-quarters of an hour with com'plete stoppage of all other traffic. The [train service was relieved, we know, 'by marching various units over the 'passes. . But oven with that relief the llines, considering the uncertainty of tha starting date (for the Washington story is not authenticated) could not have deliverer! fifteen trains a day. If they did it was a very fine feat of transport. For a safe conjecture, however, it is bettor to credit the service with no more than half the daily number as the average. of the calculation of 28 days. Taking ten divisions at 20.000 men apiece, this would give u 100.000 Allied troops now at the Italian front—say the equivalent to the Italian force of what the British Expeditionary Force -was to the French at the Marne.

The French lines, we must suppose. Would take more trains to tho border than they could take over, for more lines roach the neighbourhood of the border than pass it. That would give more troops marching over the passes than going over in the trains. (That way of calculating—if it [can be called calculation—would add another 100,000 men in the time. Wo may, on the whole, hope that between 100,000 and 200,000 Allied Loops have got very near , the Italian front by this time. One paragraph of the nows to-day is startling in its suggestivencss. It is that von Hindenburg has collected from all parts troops enough to give him the initiative for a great battle B.nuiltaneously bn all tho fronts—enough to attack the British and French in Flanders and France in great force and maintain the maximum pressure at the same time in Italy. The German command, in fact, thanks to tho paralysis of Russia, is going to do what the Allied command has_ always been talking of doing: send in a strong offensive on every of the war, if necessary violating Swiss territory to turn the French _ eastern flank and cut tho communications between Italy and her Allies. As American troops are landing every day in France in spite of the U-boats which tbe British, French and American navies keep off the track of the transports, the need for a rapid decision by a final stroke with all the remaining strength of Germany and Austria is obvious. It is dire enough to bring on this great battle of the fronts, and to brine; out the German Fleet to strike at the sea communications of the British and American forces.