PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9812, 8 November 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

There is a good deal about the Tagliamento in to-day’s messages, a good deal one way and But the balance of the testimony is that the Italians are abandoning that river and hope to stop the invasion on the line ■of the next river, the Piave, 20 miles to the west. Mr Price makes'the Italian stand on the Piave conditional on the arrival of the heavy guns of the Allies. He declares at the same,,time that the Italians are seriously short of both guns and munitions. Whether he means because they have been inferior from the first in these or because they have lost, as the German reports claim, 1800 guns to the enemy, and much ammunition (one year’s supply) in their own dumps fired during the retreat, is not clear. It matters little what the cause. Whatever may have been the case when the British guns were sent up to help the Italians, the heavy losses in the retreat have left the Italians very short of artillery now. How short may be judged from the statement of Mr Price that the Italians cannot hold the line of the Piave unless the heavy guns of the Allies come up.

We have yet other causes assigned for the Italian defeat. One is the shortage of munitions, and the other, that General Cadorna was outgeneralled owing to his holding the wrong lino. This daily addition to the confusion of causes is more than wearisome. It is entirely beside the mark. There is the disaster. The' right-; thing, the only thing to do is to repair it by rapid movement, and superior concentrations on some battleground to be duly selects ed and worked up to. Whether it was bad generalship, shortage of munitions, or disaffection of units at critical points, the defeat of the Italian armies, so complete, rapid and almost immediately decisive, by inferior forces, is, as Colonel Repington has said, a stain on the Italian army. If there was disaffection—a point still to be • cleared up —the arrival of reinforcements may not make much difference. For if the army that retreated was’rotten, the arrival of reinforcements will not make it sound, and unite may again give way in critical places, involving _ the Western troops in the general ruin. The first Italian excuse was cowardice of certain units. Between cowardice and disaffection there is no difference, as both produce the same result. However, the point has to be cleared up. We can only wait in : the hope that the enthusiam aroused in the nation.bv- the arrival of the Allies will restore whatever may have been wrong.

If the sole cause of the disaster was the superior battle disposition of' the enemy, there is no reason to fear that the Italian troops ■Hull not fight well, now that supplies of generalship have come as well as men and guns. At any rate we must hope that when the armies meet again in battle there will be recovery on the Italian side in all things.

A very important change in the central part of the Italian frontier position has been made in consequence of the Isonzo disaster. The retreat-of Cadoma’s armies across the Friuli Plain threatens the communications of the whole frontier line from the.Tarvis saddle, north of Tolmino, to the.&Ur, gana, or, Brenta Valley. The enemy reports that the Italians have abandoned the whole length between these places, about ninety miles, and are retreating between ' the mountains and the sea. The Italians mention no names. They merely say that they were compelled to evacuate portions of territory in the mountainous area, which the enemy have occupied. We can understand the reticence of this, but the reticence cannot disguise" "the" fact that three-fourths of the Italian frontier on the Austrian side has been abandoned. This ninety miles , to the upper valley of the Brenta—known ns the Sugana—is not crucial in. the. sense of invasion, for the mountains

are pierced by very narrow passes. a* the heads of the Italian rivers, crossing the main ridge into the valley of the Brave, and such passes do.nor favour the movement of large forces.

The danger of this upper country is due to the fact that the new Italian line has now become a salient. The remaining fourth of the frontier is to be held across the valleys of the Adige and the Brenta, across the only route that can sustain a powerful invasion—the very route by which the' Austrians made their great attempt to invade Italy last year. That line ends in what may be termed the bastion of Col Bricon, north of the Sugana Valley. There it meets at right angles the new line of defence coming up from the sea. Whenever the enemy tides to force his way down from the Troutino, by the Adige and Brenta Valleys, this double line will be open to the danger of an attack from the east breaking through and taking the cross defence line of the Italians in the rear.

Mr Price says that the attack on this line of the- Adige, repulsed yesterday, was only a feeler. If that is correct it implies that the enemy, in attacking the line of the Isonzo, had not arranged for an attack in combination. Poss.bly lie did not expect to succeed so completely on the -isonzo; did not hope, probably, to do more than give the Italian lino a bend backwards. But now that not only the Isonzo line has gone, but also the whole frontier Italian line to the Col Bricon bastion, north of Val faugana, the situation has been considerably altered. It has now become the enemy’s imperative duty to do everyth.ng in his power to force his way into Italy by the Adige route, in the rear of the Italian armies resisting von Mackenseh’s advance. If he only tried a feeler, as reported yesterday, he found the Italian line well held. it was a which has told him all he wants to know about the extent and equipment of the force he must hurl against the Italian defence. The success of a comparatively small reinforcement on the Isonzo—Colonel Repington calls it a mere handful or men—emphasises and encourages the duty of piercing the remaining fourth of the frontier and coming down in the rear of the great battle. It may be regarded as a certainty that the enemy will rush troops to the Trentino by the railways of the Dravo Valley and the Brenner Pass. • a «. In the plains below the forces are gathering for the big battle. To save thoir flank in this battle, the Italian army of the Adige is waiting to play the same part as de Castelnau’s army played on the Couronneo of Nancy during the battle of the Marne, with this difference, that on this _ occasion the enemy’s lines are not in touch, whereas in the battle of the Marne they were. The Allied reinforcements are pouring into Italy daily in great numbers.

Later . reports' declare the front of the retreat to be 100 miles. This evidently takes in the retreat from the Canuc Alps and the Dolomite positions,!'the: last of which, north of the Sugana and Borgo, is the pivot of the swing. This account describes the Italians, as unable, for want of guns, to stand before field artillery. Mr Jeffries, however, puts a better face on things by reporting that the retreat from. the , Tagliamento is going on in perfect order. The enemy is following his advanced patrols, being twelve miles west of the river at the time of writing. Another account says that the Italian'"troops' are still desperately weary.

Mr Hughes, of Australia, has made some pointed remarks on the extreme gravity of the situation, the most anxious since the Marne. He even hints that there are portentous signs which give cause for grave alarm. Whether he is quoting from information received from the War Office, or making the most serious comments possible for the purpose of leading up presently to a revival of the question of compulsory service, is not clear. Of course, if ho was speaking from information received there is reason to that the condition of the Italiap armies is very serious. On© item of the news, however, certainly sweeps away all the gloom for the moment at all events. The troops of the Allies are pouring into Italy in great numbers daily. That is tangible, real, reassuring. It reveals a line of strength on which the retreating armies can rally; beside which the Italian forces in reserve can he aligned.’ Where the enemy will he stopped no one can say at present. That he will be stopped before he gets far we may feel fairly certain.

■While these movements are preceding the great battle for Italy, the British General is striking another blow in Flanders. This time his attack extends from tho neighbourhood of Poeloapelle to the much-contested ridge of Passchendaele, and on tho Poeldefhoek position, near Gheluvelt. The main progress appears to have been made along the Passchendaele ndge. The Canadians are there, following after their success of last week, gradually, in fact, enveloping the ridge. In fact one report says that fheir objective is Westroosebecke, at the other end of the ridge, which cannot he very much over a mile away now.

Mr Gibbs sings a paean of victory over the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge, declaring that practically the ridge is captured. We can understand that from another account, which tells us that the British guns are playing upon Roulors with "some effect. But Mr Gibbs does not leave us to come to understanding without his help. He declares positively that this final capture of tie last of the ridge which has hemmed our troops round in the Ypres position is Victory. The difficulties and dangers of the attack on that circumventing ridge, he tells that no one but those on the spot know. He is satisfied-to say that the capture of the formidable position is tho greatest feat of war in the British annals. He makes us realise what our troops have been enduring since the result of the Second Battle of Ypres enabled the enemy to establish himself on the northern part of this ridge system, the southern part of which he had taken in the first battle of the name. He shows us that, having fche whole ridge once more in our hands, we have the victory of Flanders m our grasp.