PRESSURE ON ENEMY

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9804, 30 October 1917, Page 5

PRESSURE ON ENEMY

SIMULTANEOUS OFFENSIVE violent fightixg ox three FLOATS AT OX OH. From Our Special Correspondent. LONDON. August A 3. The Flanders trout continues to blaze, the Verdun front has again trnrst into flames, the Italian front is burning with a white heat. That, in a sentence, sums up the war situation as it presents itself this week. That we are now watching is the nearest approach to the simultaneous offensive that the summer campaign has yet produced. If for no other reason than that it affords evidence of the close coordination of the Allied plans, this would bo a matter for gratification. But for the temporary collapse of Russia there is little doubt that the Russians' in the East would bo cooperating also with the Allies in the West, As Air Lloyd George ■ said in the House of Commons last week, however. one of tiro claws of the pincers is, for the time being, out of order. Nevertheless, there arc evidences sthat the Germans are hard put to it to hold their own even in face of the limited simultaneous offensive which is all tliat the Allies are able at present to attempt. Whatever may be the result of tile. offensives which the Bidr bish, French, and Italians are now launching in their different spheres of activity, one consequence of the conflagration that is now raging from the Belgian coast to the Adriatic is more or less assured. They must severely limit von Hindenburg’s ambitious in the East.

Fighting desperately on the Isouzo and for the eminences of tho Carso Plateau, the Austrians, who have been more severely tested in this war than any of the other belligerents, will assuredly not be in a position to give Germany any assistance against tho Roumanians in the South. If von Hindeaburg has, indeed, designs on Odessa, as lias been frequently suggested, his prospects of success in this direction will diminish with every yard that the Italians succeed in advancing on the forty-mile front on which they are attacking. Moreover, it is a safe assumption that the Germans find then- own bands embarrassingly full, with the British driving ahead in Flanders, and tho French seizing positions of great strategical importance at Verdun. CLOSING IN ON LENS. So far as tho northern hattlo is concerned, the most significant movements are those directed against hens. Tho fighting around this doomed industrial town has been amongst the most severe that tho war has witness©od. At one phase of tho fignting there was a truly Homeric struggle between the Canadians and the Oarmans, Both sides went; .‘‘over .the top” practically ’ simultaneously,, and Gormans and Canadians were mutually surprised. Our offensive and the enemy’s counter-offensive had apparently been timed for the same moment; the opposing .forces met midway across No Man’s Laud in a grim and terrible struggle. ■ Tho Canadians were greatly out-num-bered, for when they take the ottensivo tho Germans still fight in much closer formation than do tho Allies. For a time tho Dominion troops were opposed to forces vastly superior, but even so they held them up. Then ware upon wave of reinforcements swept forward to their assistance, and with neither tho British nor the Ucrman artillery able to fire, a terrible bayonet fight ensued. But this is a form of fighting in which our men are admittedly superior to the enemy. The - Germans were forced bacK into their first lino trenches, which were croweded with reserves waiting to follow up their advance. Tho Canadians followed them with irresistible dash, and when at last tho struggle ended they were left in possession of tho enemy’s trenches. This and other operations _ hav« brought us within measurable distance ■ of the capture of Lens itself. Lille is thus threatened from two separato points, though Polygon Wood 6till remains in tho hands of' tho Germans. In this afea von Hmdcnhurg lias concentrated some of tho best of the remaining Gorman troops in order to bar our advance along tho TpresMenin road. If we reach Menia and are able to secure the bridgehead covering tho passage of the Lys River, Sir Douglas Haig will directly threaten Lille from the north, while bir Henry Horne may be said to do so already from the positions ho has captured in the outskirts of Lens. THE VERDUN STRUGGLE. In dealing , with the French and Italian offensives one gives the honour to the former, not because it is on a greater scale than Dio operations m the Trentino, but because success m this arena would probably carry bigger consequences on the future course of the war. The Germans have always regarded, and rightly regarded, Verdun as one of the danger points oi their battle line in the West. The importance of the positions which the French occupy in their strategical bearing on the entire 'Western lino will be manifest to anyone who studies » map of the Western front. , . Any serious advance in this arena would menace the entire German communications with the Meuse. The country is of great defensive strength, and possibly because the Germans rely on the great natural obstacles which present themselves to an attack in this area, tho French seem • *or have caught the enemy more or less unprepared. Our Allies advanced on both sides of the Meuse, and scored an immediate success. On the ‘Ott bank they at once recovered the whole of tho Mort Homme position with the Corheaux and Cum.eres Woods while on the right bank they advanced over tho Cote de Talon, which has ■ been No Man’s Land practically ever since tho Crown Prince’s failure H.-a-year, to Champneuvdle, capturing also BBU 344, Moimoat Farm, and Hill Still further to the right they penetrated into the Chau me Moods, and, attacking on a front of nearly a dozen miles, captured over five thousand prisoners. The Germans, who .find it necessary. - to sustain the spirit of their people by fabricating imaginary victories every week, followed up their lie about the recapture of Langemarck from the

British by claiming a French repulse. A repulse which costa them positions rif first-class strategical importance and over five thousand prisoners takes some explaining away, and the. position in Germany must bo pretty bad when von Hindenburg finds it necessary to resort to tricks of this kind. THE ITALIAN OFFENSIVE. If Mr Lloyd George were right in his opinion that the number of prisoners taken affords the best indication of the magnitude of a victory, the Italian success in tho Trnntino would have to bo regarded as incomparably greater than the French success at Verdun. They have taken twice as many and arc attacking on a front which, when all its irregularities are taken into account, ran;!, extend to very nearly fifty miles. But tho number of prisoners taken in a battle must depend, In some measure, on tho moral of tho army that Is forced to civ© ground, and it is pretty generally admitted that the Austrians nits not now shelving as much heart for tho war as tho Germans continue to evince. The Italians have resumed tho offensive after a relative lull which has now lasted more than three months. Tho now battle began with tho usual artillery dud, but General Cadorna is not, and never has been, a boliovor in prolonged bombardment. In this particular he belongs to tho sarao school as General Nivcllo, General Potain's predecessor in the French Command, who sought to put his theory into practice when he set out to storm tho heights of Aisne, but had all his plans deranged by torrential rain which forced him to continue his bombardment for many clays longer than had been originally contemplated. The advantage of tho short bombardment lies in the fact that the enemy is given no time to move up his reinforcements. In the new Italian offensive the bombardment lasted for only twenty-four hours, hut it was carried out by an enormous number of batteries. Amongst the hills and on the stony desert of the Carso shells, of course, do their work much more rapidly than on .the soft marshy ground which distinguishes tho Flanders front. Wo may Judge of its effectiveness by the fact that within eighteen hours the Italian troops had crossed’ the Austrian first lino defences along the entire front from Plava to the sea. The advance still continues,, and General Cadorna has been able to convey the satisfactory information that “on the Carso Plateau and in the coastal zone the enemy lino is beginning to bond at various points.” THE BEST ANSWER.

In all this the Allies are affording tho 'best possible answer to tho enemy's now peace offensive.' If Austria, is really in extremis, as private advices from Vienna tend to suggest. General Cadorua could hardly have struck at a more timely moment. Vienna, it is known, lias been making the most earnest representations bo Berlin to persuade her powerful neighbour and ally to offer terms of peace eh a kind likely to prove successful to the En- ' ten to Powers. Her anxiety to end the war will certainly not bo lessened by this new strain imposed on her weakening resources and by tho new menace to Trieste which it constitutes. It has to be remembered, moreover, that wo are as yet only at tho beginning of the simultaneous offensive. Tho August rains interrupted operations on the Flanders front to some extent. But August rains generally mean a. fine and dry autumn, and we may reasonably hope that two months of, good campaigning weather still ho in front of tho Allies. On tho Hi stern front there has been comparatively little to report. But tho Germans are certainly not making much progress, and the presumption is that tho ■ discipline of tho Russian army is steadily improving. ' Tho enemy’s military resources are steadily declining, and, hard pressed on the West, tho German Higher Command may well hesitate to take on any fresh commitments. It is always important to remember that tho further tho Germans penetrate into Russia tho greater their difficulties become. Napoleon found this out to his cost when he marched on Moscow, and tho lessons of that disastrous campaign have not been forgotten even to this day.