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PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The German official reports describe the French gains in their magnificent advance on tho Aisne plateau as a series of repulses. If the description were true those grand divisions of French veterans would be now south ot the river Aisno trying to consolidate new positions to bar the road to Paris —only about’ 60 miles or so off. But these divisions are in occupation of the whole Aisne plateau except one portion of the ridge north of Craonne. This the German communique virtually, admits, for it only mentions one position as in German hands. And the French divisions are consolidating their positions for another spring at the enemy to get him farther away from Pans. The greatness of the victory gained by our Allies is emphasised by the hollowness of this German report.

Ihe victory has given the French practically tho whole crest of the ridge which dominates the Aisne valley. The expression is striking. It reminds us that the British army attacked that very ridge from the wrong side of the river, when von Kluck’s army retreat irij-r from the disaster of tho Marne had entrenched itself on the crest, and was using heavy guns the like of which did not exist in the -British host. The British, Haig’s corps leading, crossed the river in the face of this overwhelming artillery—it was as great as the Gallipoli landing—and dug themselves in, resisting the enemy’s very substantial counter-attacks. He had been strongly reinforced, and he made the boat use of his numbers, as the late Dr’Martin.’who served with the .Medical Corps in this sector of tho campaign, going through the thick of the work iri and behind the firing lino, has told very well in his admirable book. Having 1 repulsed those attacks, the British worked their way ,up the ravines and heavy spurs,! coming down to the river from the plateau on the crest of the Trig ridge, pushing the enemy in front of them by hard fighting and consolidating position after position until they established their line on the plateau over against the German. They held that position a few weeks, until on leaving their trenches to take part in the flanking battles which culminated in the great story of. Ypres, they gave place to French troops, and these have held them for two years and seven months. So much for the positions dominating river valleys, it is a dominance not always respected by the British Arriiy. • • •

Now the French have captured most of the original German lino, practically the whole'of it, for it is'impossible for the enemy to hold their one remaining position on the ridge muen longer against the pressure surging all round thorn. ■ How that pressure works under the orders of General Neville is illustrated by its capture of the Craonno position, of which we have to-day a detailed account. A first-rate description, it may he called, and an infallible prediction. It is _ a big breach, says a correspondent, m the defences of Laon. The next will bo made when the last German position is captured, when the * Tench guns will command the Valley of the Ailette, to tho north—a domination of that vallev to the Germans —and range over the *St. Gobain Massif over the river. What that artillery is the enemy fully understands, tor he has described its fire on the crest Of the ridge—tho preliminary to the great French decisive assault—as .the very greatest on record. It is one' of the rare glimpses the enemy gives us of the effect of the hammer blows rained on him. The British aviators give us. to-day another glimpse after thenusual efficient manner, telling how, from great heights, they can see the German positions in the battleground of these French assaults covered with dead. This, too, enables us to realise that the life of the St. Gobain Massif position is not easily insurable. Nor will that be . tho only > breach in the defences of Laon, now more closely threatened. The fall of tho last point of the 20-mile Aisne position will, by compromising the German positions at Villo-au-Bois and Juvincourt, open the road by tho way of Reims, on a front wide enough to take in Berry-au-Bac. An advance up that way toLaon, in conjunction with tho French bombardments from the crest, and the French advance from the valley . of the Ailette, ought to be the final breach, after which Laon as a German stronghold will be a memory.

It is noteworthy that the French account declares that this advance was made in co-operation with the British. We heard of the British General yesterday moving his pressure on to the city of St. Quentin. Thabpressure has wo note, to-day got nearer to the city, German attempts to raid our trenches being at a discount. This co-operation with Marshal Haig is very interesting. Over two and a half years ago Haig established the Allied line on the Aisne plateau, after some of the hardest fighting of the war. And now he commands all the British armies of the West, ’ and is co-operating for the breach of the German line with the French armies advancing from his old quarters for the reduction of St. Quentin and Laon. The French, who are cooperating, claim to have captured a few kilometres of that part of Hindenburgs defence known ns the Siegfried line. From this we infer that the Siegfried line extends from St. Quentin on

Cue Somme to La Fere, on the Oise, and passes over the Ailette valley to the crest of the dominating rid go of the Aisue plateau, following that plateau to Craonne. This confirms the conjectures of the last few weeks. Laon is not, therefore, on the line, which runs in front of it to the '»cst. That matters little, for Laon is going to fall.

Further oast the French have repulsed all attacks and solidly established themselves in their new positions, giving the enemy unquiet about" the whole region of Craonne.. At the same the the British co-operation in the St. Quentin must have given him unquiet thoughts about the region between St. Quentin and Laon, the northern side. One wonders what he has behind this broad, shaking front that can shelter him from tho shocks of ,tho opening thrust of tho Allies. There does not seem to ho any reason for believing that ho has anything there like strong cover. If he has not, the lack of it will greatly simplify tho problem of destroying him. /

On the British sector tho enemy is claiming repulses along the whole line. But the details do not support the claim. First there is the capture in the Valley of the Souchez, and the advance (in conjunction) south-east of Loos, which shows that tho great offensive is closing up round Lens. Further south Fresnoy, Cherisy, and Fontaine are now British positions, and in each the only repulses are ot the enemy. He cannot hide tho tact that the British are gaining ground, in spite of his tremendous losses, his futile counters, and his most valiant communiques.

The centre of interest rcnlains at Bullecourtj near the southern end. And there the Australians are the heroes. After all, they do not seem to ha\-o hcen withdrawn, as Mr Hughes reported they had been after their great victory over the Prussian Guard regiments. Perhaps they were only temporarily withdrawn. Anyhow, they are once again in action, and holding the post of honour on the broken section of the Seigfried. These are the British troops which were described the other day as “sandwiched” in that -peculiar way. To-day they do not appear to be “sandwiched,” and, indeed, a jumble of that sort can never last long. Its end must come quickly, cither, like the end of the proverbial Kilkenny cats, or in the strafing of one of them. ' The Australians in Bullecourt are described today as surrounded by the enemy, and therefore the “sandwich” has ended In their favour. This is ascribed to their superiority in the gentle art of throwing bombs. That has come to them, evidently, through their cricket prowess. Another instance •of the advantage of athletic training. These erstwhile “flannelled oafs” have demonstrated that they were not losing their time in the field of athletics. Let no man sneer at thein again, or at “the likes of them.”

The manner in which they are holding the great Hindenburg fortress—for that ,is what they are doing, as is now clear —is winning the applause of the whole world. Tho village of Bullecourt ■ does not matter. The fortress is theirs. Seventeen great assaults they have smashed, and still the enemy comes on. Alive to tho importance of tho position, he is flinging his men against the stronghold, wave after wave, and the “Cornstalks” are grimly massacring them as, they come on. There can he but one ending. The German* line is going to break at this point. "When it does, tho British General will probably demonstrate the splendid provision he has made for widening tho breach and pouring troops through.

He reports that all along the line ho is holding his gains, and he adds today that/ he has tightened his grip on Lens at the far northern end. It is a great flame of battle, raging from Lens with hut few intervals —probably none in the artillery struggle—right down to Craonne, with very great losses to the desperately-resisting enemy, and the discomfiture of the enemy’s airmen right through.

• In one of these air fights, six of our flyers, being attacked by fifteen of the enemy, . turned upon them, met them in battle, .hurled down throe in destruction, sent down two disabled, and drove the balance out of that particular air field. It was a great feat of arms high in the air, with an eager audience of two great armies.

A high military expert i s quoted as explaining that the Allies have no particular object at present in this tremendous offensive beyond wiping out the German reserve of a million' raised by Hindenburg for his threatened great offensive in 1917 —tho great blow which all the experts agreed was tho vital necessity for the German power, and predicted as certain. It is probably quite true that Hindenburg was of that opinion himself, and did get together a great mass of men for the purpose. It is beyond question, however, that tho Allies’ commanders got their blow in first. That is the key to the present campaign. But it scarcely follows that the Allies struck merely for the purpose of destroying the collected masses' of the enemy. " Their compelling the enemy to use these masses otherwise than he intended is incidental-to their strategy, of course. Therein they outgeneralled the enemy s commanders. But to say that they struck merely to kill our men is to belittle their strategy, which is a splendid piece of co-ordinated military work, the greatest perhaps in tho annals of war. Tho German rush of many armies through Belgium and Franco towards Paris which opened the war was another example. But this exceeds it in the immensity of its munition preparation, and far surpasses it in the marvellous staging power displayed. Moreover, the object of it's attack is an array of formidable fortresses such as no human eye ever saw before, and no human brain ever dreamt of. To say that such a campaign was scientifically planned for the mere purpose of destroying the masses which it is destroying is futile. Tho expert who is made responsible for the theory himself sees the futility, for he is careful to say that “at present” there is no question of breaking through, etc. Of course not. The question from tho first was of breaking, not at once, as in the old tactics of the battlefield, but at some point which could only he reached after a prolonged struggle had made the enemy’s defences breakable, in the sense of being pierced decisively. Whether that point is near and the breaking contemplated is a thing “at present” before us, or whether it is far and the breaking is not just now contemplated, no one can say with any certainty,' except the planners of the great campaign. But that thej^

<3id from tlio first contemplate the breaking of the enemy’s lino and the consequent total destruction of his armies cannot bo doubted. I'bat is only another way of saying that tho campaign is not a mere hacking expedition. If it were, why should tho enemy trouble to rush up his masses and throw them into the fire?

He knows better. Ho knows that our Hue is in grave danger. But ho does not know when or where the heaviest Wow is going to bo dealt himSo Little does ho know under that head that after every stroke dealt him, ho triumphantly reports that his line has not been broken. All that he really does know is that a day will come when, if he cannot penetrate tho design of his adversary, his line will he shattered with disastrous results. As a matter of fact that day is being brought nearer by tho vastness of his daily losses. When the day comes tho whole world will understand tho plan which has brought it about. It is noteworthy that half his masses collected for bis blow has been consumed by defensive work.

It is reported that tho American and British Admiralties have a plan for solving the submarine problem. This is conjectured to be a plan for sealing up tho North Sea with mines. We presume this means that part of the North Sea touched by the German coasts. Such a plan was discussed by Mr Pollen recently in “Land and Water.” He declared it quite feasible, said that it would cost about twenty millions of money, and pronounced it too dangerous for the British Fleet, which would have to guard tho mine-laying, and be forced to fight a practically sta. tionary action in strange waters. Tho addition of the American Fleet makes a great difference. Obviously, for when the price is paid of the guarding, it is possible that enough will still remain out of two Allied fleets to keep the command of the sea, whereas with only one fleet engaged the command of the sea might be lost.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZTIM19170508.2.28

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9654, 8 May 1917, Page 4

Word Count
2,391

PROGRESS OF THE WAR New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9654, 8 May 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9654, 8 May 1917, Page 4

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