GERMAN DESIGNS

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9632, 12 April 1917, Page 7

GERMAN DESIGNS

ON SOUTH AFRICA THE PLAN TO FOMENT REBELLION. Perhaps tho most remarkable document among the many cited in the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the South African Rebellion is a letter, dated August 31st, 1914 from Magistrate Bohmer, of Luderitzbucht, to Dr Seitz, Governor of German South-West Africa. The letter, which urges the desirability of fomenting rebellion in the Union is headed “Secret,” and is in the following terms: — To His Excellency the Imperial Governor, \Vindhuk. Further to my cipher telegram of to-day, reading as follows; “Kroplin, with a certain Boer A., known to him for twenty years as reliable and familiar with the country, is proceeding to the AVarmbad district with the object of taking across the eastern boundaries newspapers and reports of victories to trustworthy German farmers in English territory, in order that tho truth may become known among the Boers. In order to pass the German boundary guards A. will arrange with the local German commanding officer, either personally or by means of trustworthy natives. It the foregoing is approved of, please send instructions to this officer.” When I had already dictated a draft of this telegram, Kreplin came to discuss tho above matter with me. Ho said he was prepared himself to pay the cost of obtaining native messengers. I replied that, in my opinion, these expenses could well he borne by the Government, subject to Your Ex- , cellenoy’s approval. I believe I may i assume that Your Excellency approves of energetic measures in explaining matters to the Boers. So far as I have consulted available statistics, at least one-fourth of'the grain, meal and meat that England must import from overseas comes from Australia, New Zealand, and India. Steamers to Australia and New Zealand, even in peace time, proceed, in part, via the Cape. As ships which touch regularly at tho Gape are forced to coal in one of tho Union harbours, these harbours are of very great importance to England. The possession of these harbours might thus become a question of life and death to England, as they would be indisperfsablo’ for English sea transport to India, Australia and New Zealand, should the Suez Canal be closed. In that case they would regain their old importance, which originally induced the English to lake the Cape, and not surrender it again. And. although the English will try by all means in their power to prevent a blockade of the Suez Canal, this eventuality is by no means impossible.' j, In ‘Nanticus” for 1914, one can read between the lines that our naval warfare with England, besides an attack with mines and torpedoes, will be cinflnod in' the beginning principally to tho prevention of the importation of foodstuffs to England. The. expulsion of the English-from the harbours of tho South African Union would thus be an important' factor in • the war against England. By this means, not only tho importation of foodstuffs to England, hut also in conjunction with the blockade of the Suez Canal, the maintenance of English rule ,in India would bo menaced. The appearance of the Olympic and Mauretania in these 'southern waters is, perhaps, to be explained in this way, that these ships, which, owing to their draught, cannot pass through the Suez Canal, are destined for transporting foodstuffs from India; Australia, or New Zealand. That South-West Africa, even if all serviceable men were called up, is not able to expel the English from South Africa, goes without saying. Any attack from hero, while the Union apparently confines itself to the defence of its borders, would be a mistake that would bo used by the Ebglish to make tho Boers believe in German plans to conquer the Union, and would arouse file 'hostility of the Boors against us. The only possibility of depriving England of South African harbours necessary for her sea transport would thus be a Boer rebellion, and support of this rebellion hy us. In ■ this way alone could South-West take an active part in the war to the general advantage. According to an article on the development of the South African Union by Hans Grimm, sent nie by the author some months ago, and published in the “Colonial Monthly,” it appears that, according to the census of 1911, the Dutch churches of the Union counted 693.000 members, the English Church 255.000, the Methodists 82,000, the Presbyterians 58,000. the Catholic 54.000, the Jewish 47,000, the Lutheran 24,600, the ■ Independent and others 13,000. Among the .Methodists there are many Germans. The Presbyterians and Independents are principally English, and the Lutherans German. Leaving the Jews out of the reckoning, there were, three years ago, about 700,000 Boers, as against 400,0()0 to 450.000 English, besides 47.000 Jews, and at least 24,000 Germans. These figures will not have undergone any change in favour of the English, as there has been little immigration, and this probably partially, if not wholly, in favour of the Jews, and, further, because the birth-rate of the Boers is generally higher than that of tho English. With regard to numbers, therefore, the Boors, to whom in this connection the Germans have to he added, have an important advantage. This advantage is very important when, it is considered that the great proportion of the English population lives in towns and villages (chiefly in Johannesburg, Capetown, Durban, Port Elizabeth. Kimberley), and they have much more to learn with regard to warfare than the Boer population.

The question now is whether there is a prospect of success in inciting the Boers to rebellion. In the article referred to by me some important points are mentioned in this connection. I may here state that the writer has lived fo’r 14 years as a merchant in South Africa, chiefly East London, and is thus in a position to express an opinion. He states in this connection that, owing to tho numerical strength of the Boers, the sentiment which binds the Union to England is much weaker than in British North America, Australia, and New Zealand, but that the general recognition of the benefits of constitutional connections has an influence which must not be un-der-estimated. On the* other hand, he points out that where, in the case of Canada, the proximity of the American Union inigilt lead to a closer union with Great Britain, or. to a- absorption

in the American Republic, the absence of such a powerful neighbour makes the South African Union tend more and more to develop its forces centripetally.

The following remarks with regard to the party divisions among the Boers are important; “It appears to us in Europe, who have now been hearing for more than a year of the HertzogBotha struggle, that Hertzog in contrast to Botha sometimes represents more the reactionary (older) Boer interests of former times. This is due to the fact that the Unionists, in general, support the international newspapers, whilst Hertzog has no great organ ot his own iu tne South African Press. Hertzog, the talented ex-judge of tho Free State, one of the real brave and stubborn generals in the last war, the well-known legal luminary is much too clever to follow an oui-of-dato Boer Eolicy. He opposed Botha because e did not want to pursue blindly tho policy of conciliation, and thus considered a tortuous course as dangerous and embarrassing. The fact that Hertzog is a Free Slater and Botha a Transvaller has certainly contributed much to the broach between these two men.”

To show what is desired by the strongest supporters of Hertzog, the writer points to the resolution passed in April, 191, hy the National \ igilanoe Committee, at Bloemfontein. One of the most important points reads as follows; “The conference declares tha't, according to its view, when the interests of South Africa and the interests of the British Empire are in conflict, thq interests of this country must ’ take precedence. _ This principle will be followed in tin fullest sense of the word in treating tho native policy, the immigration of Asiatics and other problems.’ Although Hertzog did not draw up these points, they appear nevertheless to agree with his policy. The above resolution will, however, in any case justify a rebellion against England in the interests of South Africa! ■

In the first place it is important to ascertain ’the. strength of Hertzog’s following. In this connection the writer mentions that Hertzog at the present moment evidently, possesses the largest following among the voters of the Gape Province and the Free State, though not among the members of Parliament, while Botha appears to possess more friends in the Transvaal. Very many English Afrikanders —in contradistinction to the immigrated themselves among Hertzog’s friends. This remark is ot very great importance, as it points to disunion among the English of South Africa. In this connection I may mention that here two persons, thoroughly English, have seriously assured fne that they were ' only kept from offering themselves as volunteers (to the Germans ?) hy the belief that they would not he accepted. ... It woifW certainly he too optimistic to . expect that English Afrikanders would take sides in our favour; at any rate, I consider it not wholly impossible that in the,case of a Boer rebellion with the Object of making the Union completely independent, English. Afrikanders will he found on the side of the Boers, or that they will at least remain neutral. Indeed, tho American War of Independence also took place during a war between England and France, and only succeeded owing to support from France. The writer further adds that before the last session of Parliament, the supporters of Botha numbered 60, those of Hertzog 8, the Unionists 41, the Labour party 6. After the last elections the figures were; 62, XI, 41, and 6.

To judge by the tone of the Congress o.f the 'National Party held in November, 1913, one may conclude that a general election will result in tho following alterations to these figures: Supporters of Botha 43, Hertzog 30, Unionists' and Young Unionists 41, Labour party 6. Tins would not yet give a majority to the radical Nationalists among the Boers, but tho influence which the war has upon tho radical tendencies among the Boers must not be underestimated. As the English are exercising a strict censorship—which in itself is suspicious—the hitherto unfavourable results of the war for our opponents will only gradually become known among the Boers. It must, however, not he forgotten that all who took part in the Boer war in South Africa'know well enough how much is to be believed, of English accounts of victories. It may be taken, for granted that at this, moment, only twelve years after tho Boer war, which lasted nearly three years, the old enmity of the Boers against the English will burst into flinne again. At such a time a man like Hertzog, who is without doubt more of a national personality among the Boers than Botha (who is clearly on very friendly terms with the English international capitalists, and, it is even said, has been bought by the capitalists) will in all probability increase the number of his supporters to an important dagree. And .it may he regarded as certain that Botha himself, if his position in endangered, will turn round in Hertzog’s direction. Through the agency pf a certain trooper Welter I hope shortly to learn something of tho feeling in Capetown from a certain exceedingly rascally but clever . . . . S-. who is returning hy a Norwegian boat. If I learn anything I shall let you know. I will also inform you if I should Jearn anything of which use could bo made. • Apart from what can be done from here it is possible that the fire is being fed from Holland as well. To my knowledge the Boers are in relation with- Holland, and in Holland great interest is taken in independent Boer South Africa, as many Hollanders held posts in the Republics before the English took possession of these. It goes without saying that economic relations between Holland and an independent South Africa would develop further, especially in view of the removal _of the preferential tariffs on English goods. On the part of Germany support could be given to the Boers without requiring further compensation from them, since the rebellion of the Boers during our war with England is itself already a valuable service. Walvis Bay, the Guano Islands and the middle of the Orange river would certainly bo easily obtained from an independent South Africa after tho war, particularly if a few millions were offered to them as a sop to its pride. Finally. I wish further to draw your attention to the fact that the moment is peculiarly suitable, as since the great strike numbers of Boers have been provided with arms and ammunition. From the war number of the “Cape Times,” of which I lately informed you, it appears that the Government even now has not required the arms to he returned, hut merely to be registered. (Signed) BOHMER.