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PROGRESS OF THE WAR

If wo may judge by the conduct of tho Kaiser, tho German retreat on tho West front is now over. He has written to tho King of Bavaria, announcing that tho credit for carrying out the operation is due to the Crown Prince of Bavaria, whose skill in conducting that opei'ation ho eulogises in the warmest /terms. Ho has written also to von Hindenburg, congratulating him and his staff chief—-von Luaondorf—for their determination to order the change of position, which gives a new base for tho Gorman opei’ations. The terms he employs in both compositions leave no doubt about the Kaiser's state of mind. He calls the retreat “a page of glory” for the Gorman arms, for which Prince Rupprecht aas tho credit, and treats it, as a groat benefit to the German strategy, for which ho gives praise to von flindenburg, in terms which savour more of a transfer of responsibility to that coueral than of unqualified praise. The latter is reserved entirely, not for the man who ordered the movement, but tor the man who cax’ried it out.

. Evidently the Kaiser is immensely relieved that tho operation has extricated large German forces from a difficult situation, and has arranged that if tlxo results are not what is expected, tho General Commauding-in-Chxef will have to face the .music. This, we must remember, was the general who refused to retreat denouncing his prodocessor’s advice to do so as puerile. The point is emphasised by the refusal of credit to the man who changed his mind, and ordered tho retreat which liis predecessor wanted. True, that predecessor wanted to go further, giving up both France and Belgium, in order to hold tho line of tho Meuse. The new line is not the line of tho Mouse, very far from the line of the Meuse. The point, however, is that von Hindenburg, who regarded any retreat at all as puerile, has ordered a retreat, and has not been praised tor it. Ho has merely been told that he has secured a new base, from which groat things are expected. Rupprecht is introduced to Germany as tho glorious saviour of the Gorman' armies of the West, while von Hindenburg, who has ordered, a new base, waits for commendation till the new base fulfils expectations. Hindenburg, in fact, is on his trial, while his subordinate is lauded to the skies in terms of extravagant adulation.

The question here is why did Hmdenburg order a retreat alter ho had denounced any retreat as puerile? That he ordered it, under the circumstances, clearly does not entitle him in the eyes of the Kaiser to any share in the “Page of Glory.” To understand why; we have only to oast our eyes bach over the history of the Sommu battle. Firstly the German positions when the Allies opened their push weee most formidable, and were regarded as impregnable not only by the Germans, but by many military experts of the Entente armies. They represented two years’ labour; they _ were intricate mazes of trenches, in the midst of which were powerful redoubts and fortifications, with vast networks of barbed wire, and countless machine-gun positions enfilading all possible approaches. That was the reason why Hindcnburg regarded ret .at as puerile.

Secondly, the determination to hold those positions at any cost was very evident from the first, and was made more so us the senes of fights proceeded by the prodigal concentration of reinforcements on the attacked points. The first attack after the great bombardment by the Allies at the end of June on a fio-milc front was met against the British portion of_ it by a ■tremendous - concentration af force. From Gonnnocourt to Thienvoi and Bean Hnipel the British struck the core of the defensive preparation and failed, io completely, that Gommecourt, Beau Ha.mcl and Thiepval were not even attacked again for several months. Tho French on that first day found the enemy unprepared, and carried all the positions assigned them. But they reported tho enormous 'strength of those positions, and their conviction that but for the surprise—the enemy only expected the British to advance- —their work would have been very much harder.

Tho right wing of the British fared better than the left, ' and there followed the awful fighting at Orvillers, Mamotz and Contalmaison. in which tho British at length won the ground. The French bringing u now array into action on their right, attacked, and after hard fighting won positions as far as Chaulncs. Then both British and French advanced against" the German second line, and there ensued the historic fights of Longueval, Guinchy, while the French moved through Glory and Maurcpas, and got well to the south of Comhles, at the same time establishing advances up to the Somme south of Peronne. Then Comblcs fell, and there followed the desperate fights of Flers, Martinpuich, the two Bazentins, Gucmdoeourt, Wnrlenoourt, Baucourt I’Abbaye, Sailly, Sailly Sallisel. St. Pierre Vaast.

In all those there was no thought of Gorman retreat. There were countless orders to hold at all costs this and that and the other position, The boss troops of the German army—Guards, Brandenburgers, Bavarians, Prussians —were flung into the fight, and beaten after stubborn contests. By the time the bulk of the second German line fell, the numerous counter-attacks of the enemy had failed—there was not one that succeeded—and the hitherto perfect work of the Gorman staff had gone to pieces. The reinforcements no longer came forward with precision, units were unable to find their appointed places in the firing linos, whole regiments and battalions were caught m artillery barrage where they had expected to march over free ground.

During this period the enemy made repeated announcements that the Somme offensive had been stopped, that it had failed, that it would never he heard of again. But the Somme offensive maintained its pressure. Autumn gave way to winter, and winter came near to spring, and the pressure continued relentless. When the British centre and right had surmounted The great ridge on which the enemy had expended two years of labour and incredible resources of fortifications, they took over many miles of' French trenches and with them a larger- share of the offensive. At last, their left swept up against the positions before which it had failed' on that dreadful first day of July, and bno by one the enemy’s positions fell. Thiepval, Beau Hamel, Gommecourt, Miraumont, the big redoubts, these were milestones of a procession, headed by German troops crippled by bombardment, retiring meekly before the exulting British. The fighting grew loss and less, until the advance closed up on Bapaume and began to approach the ridge of that name, and then the British general turned towards Pcronnc and the world looked for the speedy fall of those two historic places.

At this point the enemy gave up the fight, abandoned a couple of hundred fortified places, and mile upon mile of trench maze, wire-defended. His retreat had begun. Tho British advance had hecoxne a menace to his salient. The advance had fought its way against all obstacles for six months dr more, broken down all obstacles, mastered the enemy’s guns everywhere, driven his infantry oub of every position until it stood no more; the enemy was convinced by sad experience that overmatched as he was ho could never hope to Ixold the salient to his south. He arranged to leave it, and_ the French followed him close. Hxs arrangement was skilful, and his retreat well conducted. But it was forced on him. There was no idea of lure or ambuscade . or strategic plan . for victory well hidden. The enemy, kicked out of the vitals of his position, could not stand in his salient, know himself doomed in his salient, gave up, his salient to save, his life. That is why the general 1 who denounced retreat as puerile ordered retreat; that is why tho Kaiser reserved ■ all commendation for the Princelot who conducted. tho retreat (nominally only in all probability), and placed von Hindenburg on trial lor tho life of his new line.

The peasantry and townsfolk -in the track of tho retreat heard the talk of the German soldiery. They have given first-hand • evidence that the enemy’s commanders had grave doubts whether their men would face another British offensive; that tho dread of the men was that they might he ordered to figjht another Somme battle. There is no disguising the fact that the German armies have retired to their new line because they have been beaten in battle, steadily, unswervingly, remorselessly beaten, and what is more that they have seriously deteriorated in morale and in efficiency.

The glorious now page of Gorman military history is really inscribed with but a lew words: “Saved from, disaster by a retreat unexpectedly successful.” The glorious page is not the end, nor is it German victory deferred." It is a postponement of German defeat. The Bussians have made use of it to rally their revolution back to the energetic prosecution of the war, by declaring that Hindenhurg has, by shortening his line, liberated'large forces for the surprise of the unprepared Bussian • .armies of the East front". And it is reported that the rallying "cry has proved effective. It may well be that the revolution believes. But in the West the tale of the great Entente- victory of the Somme is better- understood. In th,e West they know-that whatever number of men is freed from trench work on the German side, that number is balanced by an equal number free on the Entente side"; that, therefore von Hindenhurg will want every man he has with him on the West for further Western work.

The enemy’s new lines we may now conclude, after the Kaiser’s hysteric and discriminating sigh of relief, runs from a point east of Arras through St. Quentin to Laon and Craonne, where itjoins the old line. It- is 50 miles shorter than the two sides of the salient. The Allies are moving against it. Sir Doug-

las Haig reports advances of his left through various places lie names in the direction of Cambrai, without serious fighting. Clearly his left is closing up. Of the centre beyond Bapaumo be says nothing, and of what is between Peronne and St. Quentin he is silent, it is a fair influence that his centre and right have closed up. Between St. Quentin and the Oise tho French have effected a. brilliant advance against St. Quentin and towards the part of his line east of the placo. Between the Oise and the Aisne they are in the valley of the, Ailcttc, moving on Laon: and in the plateau north of Soissons they arc moving against Laon and Craonne. It is fair to conclude that at Craonne they arc close up to the enemy’s new line. As in the. Ailettc they arc heavily engaged, and also on the plateau where they have captured Margival, and at Jseuvillo close to Craonne, where also they arc heavily engaged it is probable that they have come to grips with tho enemy’s main forces.

Tho latest news is that the British are at Roisel and Ecoiist—the first of these places is seven miles north-east of St. Quentin, tho second in the same direction and near Croisolles. ’That defines the line from east of Arras to St. Quentin. ■ The British, taking advantage of tho frost, aro bringing up their guns “hy leaps and hounds,” and the activity of rhes French further south increases. The army of Prince Rupprecht is digging itself in hastily, and two miles of trenches “prepared’' liar the road to St. Qucntin_ The general opinion is that a great battle is imminent. Tho French arc bearing on and past St, Quentin on tho south and the British arc doing the same on tho north. The weight of the attack will probably he on the St. Quentin sector.

It Begins to look as if the Allies are to assault the new , line, that the heaviest of the blow is to he delivered by tho French between St. Quentin and Laon and indeed that the blow is in eourso of delivery. The value of what the Kaiser euphemistically calls the new base is about to bo severely tested, The Germans hold the railway from Laon on tho Allette to Lafere on the Oise, and the French main attack appears to be moving between the Oise and the Somnie, and they already dominate Lafere, holding the only heights wgst of the river in that recion. To stop this advance the enemy has opened the sluices of this river and canal system, and flooded' Lafere. If this attack teaches St, Quentin the enemy must give up Laon, find if that goes, the whole of his new line will Begin to stagger. This l(j the appearance of things. But before more definite conclusion w© must have more Information about the artillery plovements on both sides. At, present it is probable ■ that tho enemy is digging himself in—if ho has not prepared Jus new lino—and mounting his great ghns in haste, while the Allies are hurry* mg to close with him, getting what guns they can to boar to make him give battle. In this connection it is satisfactory to read that the Allied engineers pro rapidly making tit tor service the roads damaged by the retreating enemy.

Tho Russian revolution has now been accepted: in every part of Russia, and It is possible that the-nation frill concentrate on the war. An alarm note is sounded, that the enemy is concentrating for an attack on P'otrograci, which place is swarming , frith spies and*-.- pro-Gormans and . reactionists. One can understand .the temptation to Germany. But it is not so easy to see, the forces , required for such a gigantic stroke against tho Russian Northern armies.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZTIM19170326.2.23

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9618, 26 March 1917, Page 4

Word Count
2,307

PROGRESS OF THE WAR New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9618, 26 March 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9618, 26 March 1917, Page 4

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