PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXVII, Issue 5373, 5 September 1904, Page 5

PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN

THE FIGHTING IN' MANCHURIA. RUMOURS OF DISASTER TO RUSSIA. When the German and French correspondents who had been with Konropatkin’s army in Manchuria reported that the Japanese General had turned th© Russian’s left flank, cut oft his communication with his base, and driven 1 him to choose between destruction, surrender, and the forlorn hop© of a retreat through Mongolia, it was clear , enough that they spoke as friendly critics; but th© event was so tremendous that their story obtained' but little credit. For a day or two ac--1 counts kept coming in of the groat battle round the Russian central position of Linoyang, and it became evident ‘that 1 the armies had all concentrated at last; ■ that the Japanese commander had dcJ livened his long-prepared blow, and that the concentrations of the Russian General had marched pace for pace with those of his formidable and more numerously furnished opponents. This was evidence of the highest military capacity on the part of Kouropatkin. He had commenced tho campaign against th© superior forces of Japan, i fighting against a never loss than two- ; . to-ono superiority, and yet for many ’ weeks he managed to hold all th© keys to the long lino of his defence without weakening at any one point. At last, however, th© enemy delivered his blow, and tho only thing forth© Russian General to do. after congratulating himself that he had got his men into order for meeting it to th© best advantage, was to set himself to th© task of parrying tho same. The troops under his command had up to that event acted separately, divided into th© army of. the north and tho army of the south, and no doubt there must have been some sort' of corps of observation in the centre. This is probably th© reason wiry the critics have jumped to the conclusion that the Japanese drove a wedge into tho heart of th© Russian position. It is, of course, evident that they did nothing of th© kind. The concentration proves that conclusively, because when tho various Russian forces came together in rhythmic obedience to tho outer pressure exercised by Kuroki, Oko, and Nodzu, it was evident that tho Russian line was solid. Henco tho groat, battle, of the 500,000 combatants. Th© next shadow of disaster camo from tli© Russian capital. It camo in a wail of public and official opinion united, a wail of fear for th© very worst; though oven the Japanese were said to have admitted that in the great fight round the Liaoyang position neither side had gained any advantage; but the Russian scar© had something tangible behind it. Th© telegraph had been interrupted for three days, and the train service between Mukden and the headquarters of the Russian Oomraander-in-chief was stopped. During those three days th© Russian people have' passed from the height of confidence to tho depth of despair.

THE HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN IN THE LIAO VALLEY.

The original mistake of the Russian uirection (probably not on th© initiative of the commander in the field, who knew the facts of the situation, but of the military council at St. Petersburg, who didn’t), was the holding of the port of Newchwang. This was determined upon in order to help Port Arthur as much as possible. Obviously, if Stackelberg was to do any good in his attempt, the possession of the port at the mouth of tho Liao would be of the greatest advantage. The port, moreover, was the only sea link left with the great stronghold under the shadow of the TigePs Tail. When the defeat of Stackelberg showed the impossibility of relieving Port Arthur in the absence of the Russian force of half a million of which the defenders of the port were always dreaming, the special difficulties of the situation had to faoed. . Stackelberg was safe, but there was a large army at Kaiping, and troops were scattered along the whole line between that place and Liaoyang; tho strongholds being at Tashichia and Haichong. Tor the safe retreat of these forces. left too long, far away from tho help of their comrades of the centre, it was necessary to hold tho mouth of tho Liao; otherwise the retreat of these outlycrs would , have been imperilled by a Japanese flank attack moving from Newchwang- The operations need not be described in detail; enough to say that the Russians effected a perfectly masterly retreat to Tashichia in tho face of a superior and very enterprising enemy. Once safe at that place, the Russian commander lot go his hold of

the mouth of tho Liao and continued his retreat with tho same masterly tranquillity to Haiclieng. While these movements were in progress tho Russian commander resolved to send a strong force under General Keller to attack Motienling. Tho operation was described by the correspondents (who throughout this war have been exceptionally ill-informed) as an attempt to regain a jposition which ought never to have been surrendered. Tho attack was, however, nothing but r. reconnaissance in force. It did not avail much, for the Russians were very quickly repulsed by tbc enemy,- who bad not been forced to show any part of Ills hand. .Wc now know that tho Japanese were moving their troops behind tho screen of tho mountains so as to got them into readiness to strike the decisive blow at tho chosen moment. It speaks well for the Russian generalship that, in spite of his ignorance of the Japanese movements, the commander was enabled to draw bis whole force together to receive tho blow when it was delivered.

After reaching Haiclieng the southern Russian army was soon compelled by the advancing Japanese to abandon that place, and it made its next stand at two other positions, fighting two heavy general actions, in which it appears to have been compelled to admit the superior weight of numbers well manoeuvred. While tills was going on, the northern army was attacked on the north-cast. Gradually tho circle closed round the Russian armies, much harassed, outnumbered, and out-genoralled; for in presence of a .superior force properly handled, to bo out-numbered is to bo also ont-generalled. Tho southern army of Russia retreated north on the Liaoyang position, while tho army of tho north held its ground for its comrades to como up; until at last the two found themselves in the combined semicircular position, with Liaoyang as the centre, sustaining the attacks of tho concentrated Japanese armies, the whole of tho fighting men on both'sides numbering half a million of men.

THE BATTUE. Th© fight lasted for three days, so far as we may judge by tho latest accounts. Tile Japan©-© pressed the enemy on three sides, north, east, and south, and it is possible that they also had a column of attack operating on the western side. In other words, it is possible that the Russians were completely surrounded. At ail events, tho Russian accounts admit an attack from the west, for they talk of having dispersed a force operating from that side. What the Russian jilan was is not easy to make out from the accounts. ■Whether they intended to place their whole force under Kouropatkin’s command into tho “second Port Arthur” of the Liaoyang position, carefully fortified during recent months, or whether they thought' of leaving a strong army corps there, and falling back with tho balance of their army cn the main centre at Mukden, it is difficult to, decide with certainty. The probability seems to ho in favour of tho second, for that would account for tho presence of tho army of General Linevitch between Kouropatkin and Mukden. It would also explain tho dismay at St. Petersburg at the cessation of railway and telegraphic communication. Wo may assume fairly enough that it was the Russian commander’s intention to leave the southern army at Liaoyang, and withdraw tho northern on Mukden, with tho view of waiting in that strong place for the balance of numbers to foe redressed by tho , railway before attempting any further forward movement. In that case the plan would have been to wait till tho southern army had got comfortably into the “second Port Arthur'” after its masterly retreat in front of Oko; then to march out in tho face of Kuroki with the army of the north, relying upon I tho “ second Port Arthur ” to keep the i bulk of Oko’s troons from falling’ on his rear, and trusting to th© co-operation of Linevitch to keep Kuroki from getting too strong a position on the Mukden road; and ho might even have had a hope of inflicting a serious defeat on the Japanese commander before getting away on his road north. If this ho correct, then the creation of the “second Port Arthur” was intended to double‘th© effective strength of the Russian armies in Manchuria, to keep hold of the disputed and to enable a largo proportion of the overmatched Russian forces to withdraw to their baso to await in that place th© arrival of reinforcements from Russia. Tho fact that tho flower of the Russian army in Europe is under orders to march at onco for the East with tho prospect of a winter campaign appears to round off the Russian plan very completely. ! As soon as the southern army marched into the “second Port Arthur,” tho northern army prepared to march out. But th© commander was fully alive, and at once attacked th© two combined armies of Russia at all points. In tho fight, th© southern Russians, whose forts dominated th© plain of the Liao, held hack Oko’s army, but Kouropatkin was unable to force his way through the army of Kuroki. As the hattlo raged, it gradually became evident that Kuroki was too firmly fixed across tho Russian line of retreat for tho Russians to move him. and on tho third day tho troops of Oku pierced • through the line of defence, buret into the southern forts, and no doubt turned their guns against the rest of tho Russian position. In other words, the third day of the fight found tho Russian army of the north cut off from its base, and half at least of the “second Port Arthur” in the hands of the enemy, with a vast amount of military material in lurid conflagration. This is the disaster predicted by the German critics; hut it was not an inevitable disaster, for it might have boon averted by tho holding of the “second Port Arthur.” Th© storming of those forts was unexpected. It was that tremendous feat of arms that decided tho fortune of tho battle. That appeared to be the position as described in Saturday’s cables —tho Russian general being left to make up his mind whether to try and crush a way for his whole concentrated force through tho Japanese in his front, with th© armies of Generals Oko and Nodzu pressing on his flank and rear, or to retreat behind a strong rearguard westwards, in the hops (a forlorn one) of being able to turn north later on, and fight his way to" Mukden.

To-day's cables show that the Russian general made up his, mind to try and Force his way through Jvuroki’s army, leaving a strong rearguard to check the pursuit of Oko and Nodzu, after evacuating tho balance of the “second Port Arthur” left in their hands. They show, also, that Kuroki has driven the enemy from Liaoyang, and now holds the railway and has forced tho Russians to move on to Yantai, north-cast of Liaoyang. Here Kouropatkin may be able to join hands with General Linevitch, who is coming down with fresh troops, but the Russian army is now in a sadly disordered condition, and can hardly he

expected to put up a great stand against the victorious enemies. The statement in our latest cables that ‘•fighting still continues'’ indicates that Kouropatkin, in his retreat, has had to leave behind that portion of his army which was resisting Oko and Nodzu, and these have evidently resolved to die hard.