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SPECIAL. ARTICLE.

fAix Rights Reserved. 3

IS A COLONIAL NAVY DESIRABLE P (By W. J. Napier, M.H.R. for Auckland City). / A suggestion made recently by the Commander of tho Forces in Queensland that tho Commonwealth should, in considering the question of Australian defence, endeavour to lay the foundation of a colonial navy rather than continue tho present system of paying a monetary contribution to the iin pcrml Navy, has led to widespread discussion both in tho colonies and the United Kingdom, hue discussion shows that tho weight of opinion among those competent to judge is adverse to the proposal. Tho Commander of the Forces in Queensland docs not appear to have considered the question in all its aspects, and as might have boon expected ho entirely eliminates political considerations. But in weighing any proposal which if effectuated would tend to emphasise tho existeuce of a colony a.s a separate national entity and not as a province or part of one great empire, the political results which would be likely to follow its adoption should undoubtedly be a factor in determining the matter. Naval strategists of all ages agree that concentration of force and not its dispersal is one of tho so-called secrets of success so far as the belligerent power of a navy is concerned. That a great dispersal of cruisers for the convoying of ships of commerce may- be necessary in time of war is admitted; but for the actual duties of fighting your enemy it is essential that there should bo a strong united and mobile fleet, capable of concentrating on a given point and dealing smasliing blows immediately on the outbreak of war. A small colonial navy tied to its base, as is suggested, would, I think, be but a paltry substitute for tho protection of a gi-eat Imperial fleet commanded by one mind and able to protect Australasia by destroying an enemy, in tho China sea for example, long boforo ho could reach Australian waters. A largo fleet or squadron could search out tho enemy wherever ho might bo lurking and could bring au overwhelming force to boar on him, and tho mora' results of an early naval victory by tire employment of “offensive” defence would far exceed the effect of even a high state of preparedness of a number of tiny locally managed squadrons scattered throughout tho colonial empire and waiting to bo attacked. Tho cost of small colonial squadrons if they were to bo kept in a state of efficiency wpuld very much exceed tho contribution which the colonies would bo expected to make to tho Imperial navy, and no commensurate gain would result to the colonies. Tho Imperial navy affords a wider field for colonial boys entering upon a naval career than, any local naval force could possibly offer, and there is no reason. why there should not bo admirals of colonial birth commanding the Channel and Mediterranean squadrons. Tho Imperial navy, after some reforms are effected, which are now imminent, can draw for its personnel 611 tho whole empire, and thus by the law of averages will necessarily have a larger proportion of able men than if its source of supply were tho British Islands alone. Tho moral effect upon other nations of one strong united Imperial fleet would bo greater than that of a congeries of naval atoms scattered over tire globe. Caesar, Napoleon, Nelson and every great captain in the world’s history attest tho supreme importance of combination and unity of control in tho art of fighting. Tho Australasian squadron of the Imperial navy should bo under the unfettered control of the admiral on tho station, and no conditions as to tho ships not leaving colonial waters should be imposed. The present hampering conditions might paralyse tho squadron in time of war and prevent it from achieving perhaps a decisive naval victory. Now, as to tho political aspect. The setting up of a purely Australasian fleet would unquestionably have a disintegrating effect so far as tho unification of all parts of tho Empire is concerned. Wo should no longer have the Imperial fleet calling in our ports, wo should no longer bo able to meet the officers and men of the Imperial navy serving, so to speak, yesterday in tho China Sea, to-day in South America, to-morrow in Australasia—wherever in fact tho British flag floats—men who are living exponents and symbols of tho universality and unity of the Empire. That the effect of the permanent absence of His Majesty’s ships from our waters would be centrifugal and not ’centripetal cannot, I think, be gainsaid. Though I am opposed therefore to the creation of a colonial navy, yet I am strongly of opinion that there should be a colonial naval reserve force capable of manning the Imperial fleet in time of war. It took many years of agitation by puhlic opinion to convince thd Admiralty of the necessity for an adequate number of coaling stations throughout the Empire, and even now the navy sadly lacks stores depots outside the British Isles. But, the fact that no provision is made except in the United Kingdom for re-manning the navy or replacing casualties in time of war shows a most surprising want of foresight and business aptitude on tho part of the responsible authorities. Ships fighting in Australasian waters or on tho coasts of Africa would he seriously handicapped and perhaps imperilled if they had to go thousands of miles to replace tho losses of men incidental to a state of war. It is therefore of tho greatest importance that there should be a naval reserve force in tho colonies trained annually on board His Majesty’s ships with the guns and in tho duties that they would he called upon to perform in time of war. The present naval volunteers of New Zealand and Australia * trained as they are as garrison artil- * lery are useless as a naval force. They are not a naval force at all. While they should he converted into garrison artillery in name as they now are in fact, there should be organised a naval reserve force. There is plenty of material available for such a force. Its members in addition to the ordinary capitation payment as colonial volunteers should receive Imperial pay at colonial rates during the annual period of six weeks or two months they were being trained on hoard the war vessels. As the Admiralty has now made Auckland an Imperial naval base, with repairing shops, dockyard facilities and coal depot, and probably also in tho near future stores depot, tho next step is to see that trained men will be available m e colonies for active naval service alien war breaks out. In tho “Times” of Wednesday next, 23rd April, will bo published a Special Article on “THE WAGES QUESTION.* ■Rrr TVfr T> JT. O’PjarWi. •

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZTIM19020416.2.35

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXII, Issue 4637, 16 April 1902, Page 5

Word Count
1,140

SPECIAL. ARTICLE. New Zealand Times, Volume LXXII, Issue 4637, 16 April 1902, Page 5

SPECIAL. ARTICLE. New Zealand Times, Volume LXXII, Issue 4637, 16 April 1902, Page 5

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