REVIEW.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXX, Issue 4509, 2 September 1875, Page 2

REVIEW.

We have received another pamphlet by the Bishop of Wellington, bearing title, " A few Remarks in Answer to Zetalethes." When we, on the 10th of August last, noticed the pamphlets of these two writers, we centented ourselves with giving a brief outline of the arguments of the two pamphlets without expressing any opinion of our own. We thought the matter clear enough to be left to the judgment of our readers. We now, however, owing to certain ethical features in the present pamphlet, feel called upon to express, chiefly on ethical grounds, a very decided opinion. The Bishop, in his last pamphlet, tells us : —" I have proposed no such question as, 'ls a miracle reasonable ?' or, ' Are miracles to be believed on rational grounds alone ?' (p. 7.) Again : ' I did not come forward in the capacity of a theologian to defend miracles ; I guarded myself from being supposed to do anything of the kind' (p. 8.) Again : ' I have not come forward to prove that a miracle is possible ; but I deny the truth of the assertion that the immutability of the order of nature can be so proved that its denial should involve either a contradiction or an obvious absurdity. . . . Reason may or may not be competent to the task of rendering miracles perfectly intelligible to the human mind—a question Ido not enter upon' (p. 12.)" Now, on reading this, any candid person who is nothopelessly afflicted with a mental and moral squint, will at once ask, " Why in the name of candour did you put such a title on the title page of your first pamphlet ?" If that title was not intended to mislead, it is certainly well calculated to do so. Why did not you put on it some such title as this, viz., "Is the belief in miracles inconsistent with the metaphysical dogma of the necessary truths of reason ?"

Stich casuistry as this, paltering with us in a double "sense, keeping the "word of promise to the ear and to the eye, while it avowedly breaks it. to the sense, is most reprehensible. Since the word reason is used in the title in the general logical sense, and in the body of the pamphlet in the metaphysical sense, it would have been most natural and excusable if "Zetalethes" had, as he is accused, misapprehended thp Bishop's scope and meaning. This he most assuredly has not done, as any one can see, on referring to his pamphlet. Let us briefly recapitulate the argument. " I contend," says the Bishop, " that a miracle, thatis to say, a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose, is neither incredible nor repugnant to reason. This implies, of course, the existence of a divine personal author of nature ; and those who deny that, are not to be argued with by. Christians. By reason, I mean the necessary truths of reason maintained by certain metaphysicians, such as the axiom of geometry, that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and the contradiction of which involves an absurdity. And as the immutability of the order of nature cannot be shown to be such a necessary truth of reason, therefore a miracle, which is an interruption of such order of nature, cannot be repugnant to necessary truth, that is, to reason." To this, " Zetalethes" replied: " I object to your definition. I deny your premises (pp. 5, 7). For, Ist. After stating the question in the terms you have done, you have no right to narrbw down the word ' reason' in this way. The word covers the whole field of logic, which is the science of inference and of proof, and you must not, therefore, treat probable arguments as collateral to such a thesis, for these have a recognised place in every logic. 2nd. I deny that your figment of necessary truth is ' generally admitted,' for it is rejected by three eminent men—Mr. Mill, Mr. Spencer, and Sir J. Herschel, and by many others I could name—who prove that both geometrical axioms and natural order alike, rest on inductions from experience. 3rd. I assert that the constancy of the order of nature after the application of the test of verification, as has been done millions of times' by means of deduction, observation, and experiment, is a necessary truth of the most, supreme order, having a validity which nothing can transcend. .4th. I deny your assumption of a personal God as the author of miracles, which is implied in your definition of a miracle. Your argument in support of it, from consciousness, proves too much, and. is suicidal. And as this assumption of a personal author of miracles is absolutely necessary to your case, that case would on that ground ' alone, be fatally defective. sth. As you have put the discussion on the ground of. reason alone, you have no right to fling opprobious epithets—'Atheist,' or any other as an excuse to evade the question." We are at a loss to comprehend how the Bishop can assert as he now does that he has been misapprehended, that his meaning has been missed, &c. When he thus speaks and talks of "setting-up a man of straw to contend with," assuming that he is sincere, we fail to discover any other meaning in his language than just this, viz.:—"Anyone who refuses to accept the case as I state it, who cant see it as I do, who understands 'reason' in any other sense than the narrow one I put on it, who will not treat all arguments which are collateral, to this narrow and exceptional sense of the word, as collateral issues sets up a man of straw." The less the Bishop talks about men of straw, and appeals ad miserccordiam, the better. The expressions are equivocally suggestive in the present case. No writer has exposed the fallacy on which this (metaphysical figment of " necessary truths of reason" rests so clearly as Mr. G. H. Lewes, the founder of the "Fortnightly Keview." "When, says that gentleman, it is said that a necessary truth is one soen not only to bo true but one" which thore is no possibility of our conceiving otherwise; this can only be valid on tho assumption that no change be made in tho terms formulated. On this assumption, however, all truths are equally necessary; without this assumption no truth is so. What is possibility? It is tho ideal admission as present of absent factors. It states what would bo tho fact if the requisito factors were present. What is contingency? It is the Ideal admission that certain factors now present may bo on any other occasion absent; and when they are absent tho reßult must be different from what it is now. What is necessity? It is tho intuition of the actual factors, tho perception of adequate relations, tho recognition that "that what is, must be what it is." Now apply this to a few specific cases of miracles. "Take the making of the axe-head to float (2nd Kings, 5-6); the case of Christ walking

on the sea (Matthew xiv, 25) ; the case of the sun standing still forawhole day (Joshua x, 13); the case of Balaam's ass speaking (Numbers. xxii, 28) ; and also the horrible case (for it is as an example just as good as the rest), ofSwift's Struldbrugs, or immortals. ! Now, assume that the natural law or laws in question in each case are not necessary, but contingent; that, although the laws have been proved true ifc millions of instances, yet as we caunot say that it must be true in all other instances—that is, e.g., although the earth has turned on its axis in every case in the past except the one which is questioned, it is possible, notwithstanding all the physical results that must have followed, that it may, on that occasion, have stopped for a whole day, and might do so again. It is also (by the hypothesis) possible, though not proved, that besides the absence of the conditions which make natural laws necessarily true, the positive conditions of a miracle, i.e., a divine personal agent might be present—what does the whole concession amount to ? Simply this, that the thing " might" on the assumption have happened—bare possibility, the ideal admission of conditions, both negative and positive, which are not proved to be present. And this possibility, forsooth, this almighty " might be " is to stand against the millions of verified instances in which the uniformity of natural law has been proved. And, therefore, a miracle is not unreasonable ; we beg the Bishop's pardon—"not opposed to reason." This is the logical position which the Bishop now tells us he wishes to occupy. We hope he is comfortable in it. It will be noticed that in the case of the axe-head floating and others in the Bible, the presence of a divine agent is not pretended—the thing is done by " a man of God." Mr. Lewes has most lucidly and cogently proved that this metaphysical figment of necessary truth has arisen out of a looseness of thought and a looseness of expressioo. The true antithesis is not between necessary and contingent truths, but between necessary and contingent propositions, or rather between verified and unverified propositions. All truth is, and must be, absolutely true. There is no contingency in the objective fact, but there may be in our subjective knowledge of the fact. But all unverified propositions are contingent truths ; all verified propositions are necessary truths. The correct definition of a contingent truth is " one which generalises the conditions ;" while that of a necessary truth is " one which is an unconditional generalisation." Hence, when we say that 2 and 2 equal 4, or that the internal anales of a triangle are equal to two rightangles, we abstract the relations of number and form from all other conditions whatever, and our propositions are true whether the objects counted and measured be hot or cold, large or small, heavy or light, red or blue. Tho reason is that we abstract the relations from all variable conditions ; that is, we i-emove every element of contingency out of the case. It will repay the trouble to see this important matter most clearly settled in the following books :—Mr. G. H. Lewes' "History of Philosophy," edition 1871, vol. 1., Prolegomena, chaps, ii. iii., and particularly chap, v., sections 66, 67, 68, 71 ; also, vol. 11., pp. 476, 480 ; see also the same author's •' Problems of Life and Mind," chaps, xii. and xiii. of problem i., pp. 354, 390, et seq.; also, the recent able work "Cosmic Philosophy," by John Fiske, vol. I, 53 to 60 ; see also on the way in which these so-called necessary truths as to the relations of number are evolved out of experience, Mr. Tylor's " Primitive Culture," chap. vii. There are in the present pamphlet a number of small sneers and paltry criticisms which are unworthy of any other notice than this, that the Bishop would, in our opinion, have much better consulted his dignity if he had not descended to them. There are one or two other points requiring a different notice. Thus, it needs no ordinary assurance at this day to tell any community of educated people "that there is no legitimate inference in induction," and that Hume and Mill admit it (p. 5.) Again, when (p. 3) he refuses to follow his opponent into "any consideration ■of the theories of Comte and Lubbock," from which " Zetalethes " drew his argument, from concomitant variations against the Bishop's assumption of a personal God as author of miracle ; this is simply saying " I prefer to assume it." And we freely confess we are unable, after trying hard to find any other meaning whatever in the remarks on the latter half of the same page and the first half of p. 4 than ju?t this, viz., " Having in my definition of miracle assumed, the agency of a personal God, without proof, I have a right to do so, although I put the case on the ground of reason." Again (p. 10), the Bishop cannot or will not see the dilemma by which Mr. Ruskiu put in a nut-shell the suicidal nature of the denial by miracle defenders of the uniformity of nature. Let us put it in form for him. If nature (A) is uniform (B), a miracle (C) being by the definition a breach of natural law is impossible (D), or if nature (A) is not uniform (E), a miracle is still impossibb ; for, since there is then mere chance or chaos, there is no room for the miracle-working personal agent which the definition requires. But nature must be either uniform or not uniform; therefore, on either supposition miracle is impossible. Here it is then : —lf Aisß, or if A is E, C is D ; But A is either B or E, Thereforo C must be D. The Bishop tells us, in answer to this, " that he finds it convenient in argument to deal with one subject at a time :" we have not the least doubt of that, but unluckily that is not the way to rebut a dilemma, which this clearly is. Now, if the Bishop had (as he has told us he has not) come forward as a theologian to defend miracles, he would have had respectable and tangible ground to Btand upon, and would have had our sincere respect and sympathy in defending it. But when ho talks of "appealing to CiEsar," and the court of ultimate appeal, when examined, turns out to be no more than a casuistical equivoque on the word reason, the proceeding, is in our opinion, most reprehensible, and to be condemned by all people whose moral sense and mental vision are not alike warped. In these days of allpervading mannmn-worship and mounting irreverence, the clergy have a most difficult duty to perform, and as long as they try to do it in a spirit of manly and ingenuous straightforwardness they will secure the sympathy aud respect of all right-minded people, however they may dissent from them in opinion. But they may be well assured that casuistical equivocation and word-quibbling are not the way to secure this respect and this sympathy. We do not presume that the Bishop's opponent will notice the present publication, for besides the ethical obliquities we have dwelt upon, there is absolutely nothing for him to reply to.