COURT OF APPEAL.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXIX, Issue 4258, 12 November 1874, Page 3

COURT OF APPEAL.

Wednesday, November 11. (Before Sir G. A. Arney, Chief Justice, Hr. Justice Richmond, and Mr. Justice Gresson.) VINCENT V. JAMES. , Mr. Travers appeared for the appellant, the Attorney-General for the respondent. This was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Johnston, who discharged a rule nisi obtained by the appellant (defendant in the, Court below) to set aside the order for execution on the ground that no judgment had been entered up. The point involved raised a doubt as to the correctness of the course adopted by the Supreme Court Registrar, who, in pursuance of the judgment recorded by him at the conclusion of. the hearing of the case, issued a writ of execution against the defendant. Against this proceeding a rale nisi was obtained, which, upon subsequent application, was discharged, and gr ounds of appeal being stated, the case was sent to the higher Court. The contention of Mr. Travers was that the so-called judgment was no judgment at all—that it was a mere nullity, an unsigned entry in a departmental book, and had nothing of the nature of a formal judgment. The original proceedings were taken to recover a sum of money upon a bill of exchange, and the entry in the book was simply a minute of an order made by the ■ Registrar in the absence of the Judge, giving the plaintiff leave to enter up judgment for the amount claimed, but an unsigned entry in the minute book of the Registrar was simply a statement of fact which might or might not be correct. In all cases judgment must be entered up before the issue of a writ. Rule 182 was absolute in its language on that point, and he submitted that in all cases where a money claim was made there must be a formal judgment signed before execution corld issue. An unauthenticated entry, such as that contained in the Registrar’s book, Could not possibly have the force of a formal judgment. It was material for completing the judgment, but was inadmissible as a record of the Court. The question, therefore, for the Court to decide was whether the entry as it stood in the book constituted “ signing” or “ entering up” judgment within the meaning of the rales. If it were not, then judgment must be for the appellant, but if it were, judgment would, of course, be for the respondent. The Attorney-General briefly replied, when it was decided to await the return of Mr. Justice Johnston before proceeding further with the case. The Court then adjourned., •