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New Zealand Times, Volume XXIX, Issue 4142, 30 June 1874, Page 2

Tub intelligence that .Lord Russell had interrogated the Secretary for Foreign Affairs respecting the probability of a war between France and Germany had been telegraphed to us before its receipt by the San Francisco mail, but the report of both question and reply will be perused with interest. In the opinion of Lord Derby there was no imminent danger—practically, that there was ultimate. This we know to be the opinion of Continental statesmen. Prince Bismarck and Count Moltke have been at n» pains to conceal their views. From the remarks they have made it is clear that if the French hate the German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, not less do German leaders profoundly detest the public policy of France. The only safety Germany has is, say they, to stand with the sword drawn. The army is to be increased, and the vote for its maintenance has been agreed to for eight years instead of for one, as used to be the case. Very probably one way of maintaining peace is being prepared for war, and the Gormans, besides doing this, are strengthening their hands by foreign alliances to as great an extent as possible. The Emperor of Austria has indicated his views by stating that a unite! and powerful Germany is a source of strength to Austria. Friendly relations hive been industriously cultivated with the wily diplomatists at St. Petersburg. The King of Italy is aware that the French have a grudge against him, because he took the opportunity of France’s moment of weakness to make Rome his capital. All these circumstances would have an important bearing on any war that might be undertaken in Europe within the next few years.

Lord Derby was accurate, as usual, when he stated that there was no fear of immediate war. Notwithstanding the marvellous elasticity shown by France in recovering lost prestige, she would have no prospect of wresting the two conquered Provinces from the Germans at the present time. If the Germans found so little difficulty in beating the French in the late war, it is obvious they would find still less at the present time. There is no pretence that France, though recovering, but still crippled, could meet the Germans on the field of battle on such equal terms as on the last occasion. And the Germans would go into the war with all the confidence of previous success, whereas the French would suffer from the remembrance of previous disasters. In this lies one of the dangers of an immediate disturbance. The German leaders seem fully convinced of ultimate war, and it is not likely they will wait for it till France is in a better position to attack them. When nations are resolved upon fighting, there is no difficulty in finding a pretext for doing so. In Franco the question would appear to bo who should throw down the gage of battle, and undoubtedly it tends to postpone the issue. The Republic is evidently on a basis that is not firm. The Monarchists are very sanguine of success. The Bonapartists believe that it is only a question of time with them. Which of these three parties may have the ascendancy will have a good deal to do with the war question. If the Prince Imperial should acquire the throne of his ancestors, it is not probable that he would wish to risk its possession by a German war. We are to suppose that if he should reign, he would virtually have the power, as his father had, of declaringwar. Again, if the Legitimists should reign, wo can hardly believe that they would wish to see France, still bleeding from the last war, thrust into a fresh one, out of which they would come, if beaten, a ruined family, The greatest danger of war probably lies in the continuance of Republican power.' But then few persona believe that the present custodians of authority are doing more than keeping a place for some one else. All these chances Prince Bismarck will certainly calculate, and if he considers that either of the two claimants for the throne may succeed to it, ho may put off the threatened struggle. The national feeling in any country, if it bo in favor of war, is almost certain to carry with it whoever may happen to bo in authority ; but national feelings sometimes undergo a change before effect can be given to them.

If war should ensuo at an early date, and the German armies hold Paris, as they probably would, the question would occupy the minds of the German leaders how to prevent a recurrence of trouble in the future. We Ixave seen that the clog which they thought they had imposed ■when peace was last made has proved of an unsatisfactory character. It will be recollected that within the memory of many persons the allied powers had, after the battle of Waterloo, to provide against the danger of war caused by French restlessness and ambition. Twice in a century has this been ineffectually essayed. Should it be necessary to again do so wo may bo certain that more stringent measures will be resorted to, which will grate more harshly upon the nature of the French people. And the groat Powers will recollect that the present state of armed peace, rendered necessary by the action of the French, is a fearfully costly affair. The Germans received a largo sum of money in' lieu of the costs of the late war, but as tho army has now to be largely increased, they are worse off than they wore before. We, in New Zealand, know something of the cost of war, and how fearfully it retards the prosperity of a country. But for their immense military establishments, both tho French and tho Gormans would bo much more prosperous than they are. Happily the mother country has recently been able to keep out of tho complicationsjcaused by European wile, diplomacy, and ambition. But it by no means follows that this will bo tho case in future. If the German leaders should again occupy Paris, and then proceed to enunciate a form of government for tho country, the Russian designs upon Constantinople would be again heard of. These might necessitate English interference.