SOCIALISM AND WAR

New Zealand Mail, Issue 9, 1 November 1907, Page 32

SOCIALISM AND WAR

(By H. N. Brailsford in the “Daily News/’)

It is possible that a few sentences in General Kuropatkin’s report on the Manchurian campaigns, written apparently with with only a dim consciousness of their importance, may come to figure UaS a decisive utterance in the history of European civilisation. Analysing the causes of the Russian defeat, he mentions among the more important the simple fact that the rank and file of his armies regarded the war with indifference, and even with hostility. They had no interest in the success of the Russian arms, they viewed the whole quarrel as the adventure of a Government with which they refused to identify themselves, and despite their natural caurage and endurance, they had none of the zeal-which is the first factor in military success.

How' far can this check be consciously used and organised by the working classes, who are at once the chief victims of war and the human instruments of every triumph? Can socialism, even before its triumph, deliberately use its influence with the working classes to paralyse and frustrate any Government which in the future declines to arbitrate, and embarks upon aggression? It is a question so general that to Englishmen it may seem odd that it should give rise, in a time of profound peace, to a vital and actual controversy. "But it was the main issue before the last French Socialist Congress, the largest issue at the International Congress of Stuttgart. There lies as one might suspect, an angry chapter of contemporary history behind this apparently theoretical debate. In several senses of the word French Socialism has always been anti-militarist. It has always fought for civil rights against the arrogance of a military caste, sort to shorten the period of service, advocated arbitration, and denounced war in general terms as a crime. Ro far it did not greatly differ from the more idealistic Radicals, and this sort of “anti-militarism” in no way comprised its success with the masses. It also condemned the use of troops in strikes, and even declared in angry moments, as M. Briand. now a Minister, once did. that if an officer ordered his men to fire on their comrades on strike it certainly was their duty to fire—at the officer. Here, again, no theory was at stake; the doctrine was popular enough; no one could call it specifically anti-patriotic.

Difficulties began only when M. Horve, an orator of rigid logic and violent words, to his friends a personality of great charm, to his opponents an outrageous incarnation of every anti-social force, began to organise a deliberate anti-militarist campaign in the Press, on platforms, in the trades unions, and even in the barracks. He was not content to preach furiously against the use of troops in labour disputes; he aimed at organising a strike among soldiers, which would render war impossible at its very outbreak, and he refused to make any distinction whatever between necessary and unnecessary wars or even between aggression and defence. He had a certain success, and a still greater notoriety. A scries of violent strikes, in all of which the military were engaged, gave his propaganda a. certain actuality. The conduct of the French infantrymen the other day at Narbonne proved that it had not been without its success. Making no progress at all among Socialists in the Chamber, and relatively little in the organised party throughout the country. Herve’s ideas none the less dominated the central trade union organisation (the 0.G.T.). It is this conquest which governs the recent history of French Socialism. A war with Germany became an anxious nossiblitiy towards December, 1905, and the. French patriots asked what would happen if the trade unionists were really to obey nerve? That is why M Clemence.au set himself, as far as he dared, to crush the C.G.T., and involved himself in consequence in a complete breach with the Socialist Party, which could not control its enfant terrible, and would not expel him. His furious sayings—a metaphore about planting a flag on a dunghill, and the headline, “Down with the Republic,” which he once printed across the front of his newspaper—filled the enemies of Socialism with joy, and its defenders with terror.

In the debate-at Nancy three tendencies were sharply defined, those of Herve Guesde, and Jaures. To M. Herve nothing is real or significnat in politics outside the sphere of economics. Everything is at bottom a war of classes. War is only one of the manifold activities of capitalism, seeking by tiro conquest of markets and concessions to win fresh fields for exploitation, fresh victims to oppress. Patriotism is only one of the illusions by which capitalism seeks to blind the working class to its own interests—religion is, of course, another. While capitalism rules, there is motherland —our countries are all stop-mothers. The only moral link which a man can recognise is that which binds him to the fellows of his class at home and abroad. His enemy is a capitalist anywhere; his friend is a workman anywhere. He has no country to defend, and his interests are in no way compromised .by the government, least: of all by the one which oppresses him. It- follows then that the true policy for Socialism is to repudiate every national label, every middle-class patriotism, to fight only for the defence of a communistic regime.

and if capitalist governments go to war, to reply by a military strike and an opportune insurrection. One can understand the emotional power of such an appeal, especially to men who had the uniforms face them during a strike. As for its logic, when onco the premise is granted that nothing matters in politics save the class .struggle, it is difficult to challenge the conslusion. M. Guesde’s answer did not, so far as I can gather from the reports in “PHumanite,” challenge the moraltiy or the truth of this argument; it merely questioned its expediency. The main business of Socialism, lie argued, is to establish the collectivist regime; it must not fritter its energies bp fighting now clericalism and now militarism. These doctrines are unpopular, and will ruin the main propaganda, which must be economic. When we can hope to make an insurrection with success, let us make it to establish Socialism, and not merely to stop war. The success of Socialism will be the end of war. Meanwhile the more advanced, the more moral, the more Socialised community, if Herve’s ideas were accepted, would be the most likely to suffer in the world. That is hardly calculated to recommend Socialism to the average citizen.

Here, then was the case, stated from the purely Socialist standpoint—by Herve from the side of abstract theory, by Guesde from the side of party tactics A party congress ought to have adopted some view or the other, but, being human it did neither. It followed M. Jaures by a majority of more than two to one, and M. Jaures, though he did occasionally the class war and the party’s interests in a parenthesis, talked like any human and modern man. He happens, in matters of economics, to be a Collectivist, but, whatever language lie may use, it is perfectly obvious that his mind revolts with indignation against the orthodox Marxian attitude, which would treat economies and the class war as the whole of life and politics. Herve, if only French Socialism knows how to use him, will serve the purpose which a good fanatic always ought to serve. He has presented a narrow first principle in its extreme consepuences, and the result is felt to be a reductio ad nbsurdum. Some day the party will realise that it is the principle and not Herve who must be blamed for that.

Just because it commends itself to common-sense and the instincts of humane and broad-minded men, M. Jaures 5 solution of the, riddle has a future before it. He accepts the fact of nationality—it is a good scaffold on which to build a regenerated society. He believes in a world which allows diversity of nations as it welcomes individuality among men. He proclaims (in the official resolution) that every threat against the independence of a nation is a crime against that nation, against its working class, and against the interests of the working class the world over; he affirms the duty of self-defence against any such attack, and the right of the menaced country to call upon the aid of the working class in every other country. In a word, he would have the working class assist in a defensive war, but revolt aggainst an aggressive war. If France attacked Germany and refused to arbitrate, be would favour every means, from a general strike to an open revolt, which would render the war impossible. But if Germany were to refuse arbitration and take the aggressive against France, he would strain every nerve in the duty of national defence.

It is, I think the attitude which every man who thinks clearly would adopt, unless he accepts M. Herve’s premises or is prepared to say, “My country, right or wrong.” It would take a volume to discuss the ethics of the question. But its political bearing on the world’s peace is very clear. No formula that could possibly be invented could do so much to avert unjust aggression. No country in which Socialism is strong can afford to ignore this threat of internal disorganisation if it meditates aggression; while to a country which acts justly it offers the premium of discriminating patriotism. How far Socialism is anywhere strong enough to bring direct and material pressure to bear in favour of peace is a question which only experience could decide. But General Kuropatkin’s report suggests that even without a organised passive resistance, the mere opinion of the rank and file is an element counts in the winning of battles.