FACT V. FICTION IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1831, 10 April 1907, Page 10

FACT V. FICTION IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

A LABOTJR MEMBER’S VIEW OF THE HOUSE OP COMMONS. -‘'A JUNTA OP NOMINATED POLITICIANS/'

Once every four- years, or thereabouts, the country? is called upon to elect six hundred, and seventy men to conduct the nation’s business and make new laws in accordance with tkeii' judgment and' the people’s wishes. At least, that” is the underlying assumption in the popular mind whilst the elections are in progress. Government by elected representatives, that is the theory. But do the.facts fit the theory? There ai’9 many new members in the present Parliament who believe .that they do not, and I am one Of them. I cannot say that in my case the belief .is a new one- born of new experience of Parliament at close quarters. It is rather in. the nature: of confirmation, of opinions previously formed on the- basis of careful observation from the outside. / Some things are clearer now in the light of inside knowledge, that is all. The impressions of .six months’ life in the House of Commons have strengthened my views as to the shadowy nature of the r power which representatives aro supposed tot exercise over the executive departments of the State.: They have also proved how difficult it".is for. a private member to exercise any effective influence on the making of new laws so long

as he acts in accordance with the cus- _ toms and traditions of the- establishment. The chief of these traditions, that of the two-Party house, Government and Opposition, each party following its leader in attack or defence as the- case- may be; according as to whether he happens to be in or out of - office, is likely to suffer under the extension of the group: system. Eor which heaven be praised, for it has outlived its- time. The old forms which flourished under that twoparty system are still in existence, and they will die hard; but die they must, or. government will become impossible. In the present parliament there are some half-dozen groups at the least, and they- threaten the supremacy of the Ministerial and Opposition leadership on which the old system of Party Government rested. In the past the function of the rank, and file member has been to< back up his side with his vote and his cheers. The new member has been expected to fall in with the system, and, in many cases, he is not taking to the position very well. He is impatient with the antiquated forms and the time-wasting, methods of procedure-; and:; no wonder. They are remarkable indeed,, and all lead in the same direction, to sham fights and oratorical fireworks. To the man seeking a political reputation of the traditional sort any excuse is good enough for making a speech. The- leading artists monopolise the floor; -while their supporters look on in much the same temper as if it were a football or-cricket match. At enormous length they attack each other for inconsistencies fancied or real. Divisions are challenged repeatedly far no other , purpose than to waste time. Formal proceedings; for which there is no? real use are utilised, for the purpose of" increasing the opporunities for ] speech-making. The Address in answer to the. King’s Speech is a case in point. Tlie> King’s Speech itself is merely an announcement of the Ministerial programme. It is little use com- - inenting ,on the measures, referred to in the Speech,, for, they may be expected to. come before the House in due • course’. Yet long, speeches- are made by all Thfeleading:-men for the benefit of the public' outside, and- not for any pur- \ pose? they; can- serve to the . business in hand. On* the motion to send a reply

to. the. King’s Speech, amendments are moved, to the motion, on which more ' speeches are made day after day for a -Week* oh more. When the accounts are supposed- to- be under consideration most of'the time available* is again taken up by the leading: men, who make* more long speeches attacking or defending the; Government’s- policy; Very often there is no time left to consider the expenditure, ■_ and the money is voted without disenssion. . Parliament has no effective control over the executive. Theoretically it can refuse; to vote the necessary supplies and in that way disapprove of the action of a department, but in actual practice the Ministers, by the tacit arrangement, according to precedent, to stand or fall together, make it practically impossible to secure a decision adverse to the conduct of any one department, even if a majority of members disapprove of its

action. In? the? exercise of its legislative functions Parliament is almost equally powerless.. The absurd system of three readings and a report, which affords the opportunity for the repetition of long speeches at each stage, needlessly ‘ lengthens the proceedings and stops the progress of legislation. At every stage the chief men are given preference by the Speaker, as is only natural; but they make speeches of such inordinate length that the closure becomes a necessity, and others who may have something to add are shut out. The crowning: folly of all is that of throwing a complicated Bill into a Committee of the full House for some hundreds of members to practise updn it the art of drafting classes. Scores, and, in some cases, hundreds of amendments to the wording, are put down; and it is almost impossible for the members who do not happen to be lawyers to keep an intelligent oversight on all of them; and when the Bill finally emerges from the ordeal, it, as likely as not, defeats the intentions of its promoters through the haphazard drafting process to which it has been subjected. It is also necessary to add that the practice of . trusting the wording to so large a number of members, many of jthem desirous of obstructing the business by moving as many amendments and making as many speeches as possible, leads to the consumption of most of the available time on the lines and clauses which come first, leaving the rest to be voted on without comment or discussion. The object of the system of closure by compartments is said to be to avoid this kind of slipshod work, but it by no means accomplishes its purpose. The private member has so little opportunity of influencing the decision of the House on the Comniitee stages of a Bill that the majority content themselves by remaining on the premises ready to return to the chamber when the “star turns’’ are on, or a division is called.

As for the private members’ opportunities for carrying Bills of their own, they are practically nil. Only in cases where the Government give special facilities and allot the necessary time is there any hope of a private members’ Bill being carried Such facilities are rarely granted, and, as a rule, only to the Government’s own supporters. Year after year private members’ Bills are printed and presented with no chance of proceeding beyond the first reading stage. One of the Bills printed this session has been printed twentytwo years in succession, and if there is no alteration in procedure, there is every prospect of its being in the same position twenty-two years hence. Every member can get his pet project embodied in the form of a Bill and printed. If he secures a favourable place in the ballot he may be able to put the measure to the test of a second reading; but the remaining stages are not negotiable save by a combination of fortunate circumstances, which will rarely happen unless the Bill is one to which no .single member takes active objection.

In short, for all practical purposes the whole of the business of the nation, executive and legislative, is in the hands of a junta of nominated politicians, whose action is subject to no check except that of vexatioins obstructioin, which is only effective when practised by the regular Opposition, or by groups of members on one side or the Other. Ministers are liable to be asked awk ward questions, it is true; but the imofficiai member is at a serious disadvantage when he is heckling a Minister Avho is backed by official sources of information, and who has the power, -if he chooses, to parry, evade, and at times blankly refuse to answer a question. Of course, if a question is put by an ex-Ministcr this power has to be used with reserve, but in the end it is for the Minister himself to determine whether he will answer or no. In the regular way the only course open to a member who is not satisfied with the conduct of a department of State is to try for some opening to make a speech. The possible openings are few in number, and in a. House of six hundred and seventy members, in which possibly some hundred or more are looking for opportunities to speak,.. it is hard to secure a turn. When.a holiday adjournment motion is under ‘ consideration any subject can be started during the- few hours allotted for the purpose; but the chance of a particular ifiember, unless he happens to be one of the leading figures, being called upon by the speaker is a slender one. When any supplies are being voted, part of which are intended for the department against which the member has a grievance, there is also supposed to be an opportunity for him; but, as often as not, some important question of public policy falls to be discussed under cover of the. accounts, or the Opposition leaders have some political bone of contention which they wish to quarrel with the Government over, in which case the ordinary member, who has a departmental grievance to. state, has no prospect whatever of being called by the Speaker. Even if a member does get an opportunity to speak, as a rule there is no satisfactory conclusion. He has expressed his opinion, that is. all. He has no opportunity of following the matter up if no action, is taken by the department concerned. In the extreme case where a; member feels his complaint against one of the departments is of such importance that he thinks it necessary to take a vote on it, his motion must be to reduce the supplies by a stated: amount; but it is impossible to ascertain-the real- feeling of. the members by such a proposal, for if it is carried it involves the resignation of the Ministry, and 1 it is only .natural that members who are in general agreement with' the Government in office will refuse, to ; imperil its existence by placing it in a [minority on a, matter of relatively small importance., .

• The- theory of Parliamentary- control: : over .public business rests on am entirely: i J mistaken, notion of am active check on<

Supply. No doubt, when the conduct of the Administration was a much more simple matter than it is to-day, there would be more ap.pearance ; of reality/in the theory; but so vast and multifarious has the State’s business become, that even the appearance of examining the business-after it has been executed—has had to be abandoned. The Supply votesare carried by the Party battalions, voting according to order; The public outsider is often struck by the odd and seemingly unaccountable way in which Parliament fails to pass judgment on some piece of administrative folly which hardly anybody either inside or outside the House can be found to defend. Any old Parliamentary . hand could relate numerous instances where the common sense of the great majority of the members of the House of Commons would have led them into the lobby to vote against some administrative department (in connection with the War Office this has occurred repeatedly); but the mere announcement that an adverse vote would be treated as a vote of censure on the Government has caused members by the score to vote against their convictions. Under such circumstances the most conscientious of Party men may be excused for considering that, muen as they would like to express their disapproval of a department of the Government’s administration, the larger questions for which the same Government stands are involved in each vote they register; and hence they have supported a discredited War Office not because they wished to do so, but. because they believed in the maintenance of the Union, or the State Church, or something else which they believed to be threatened by the opposite Party. Then also there are other and less worthy considerations that sometimes prevent individual members of the Party in majority from voting according' to their convictions —except on such occasions ns they are permitted by the Government — the fear of a possible dissolution in which they might lose their seats, and in any event would have to spend large sums of money in getting themselves returned.

With the growth of the power or groups, tne Cabinets of the future will find themselves unable to preserve /the system of joint Cabinet responsibility intact. Independent groups will insist on putting separate issues to the test, and that will involve a change in tiie whole system of Parliamentary procedure. It is obvious that when it becomes a frequent occurrence for Ministers xo be outvoted on departmental affairs, some means will have to be found, of accepting decisions without upsetting the whole Administration. Members of Parliament will not always consent to be mere outside spectators, whilst a small knot of nominated persons conduct, or pretend to conduct, the business of the State. Nor is it to the nation’s interest that they should; for the supposition that each of the nominated persons can, and without previous experience, administer a huge department is arrant nonsense. We should not. think of employing a man to do ordinary tradesmen's work if we did not understand that he: liad had a previous training. Yet people do not think it strange that a successful lawyer should assume personal control of the War Office, wiv its enormous expenditure and complicated problems’ of administration, and in less than six months speak by the hour as one who has got the whole thing in his head. Under such a system the permanent officials of a department, with their cumulative knowledge, which is continually increasing, are the real masters of the situation. Every nominated Minister placed in authority over them begins raw and new. Oil an average the permanent officials get a new political chief every two or three years at flie outside.

The reader will now perceive whither I am tending. It is towards administration by committees that I look to provide the counterpoise, committees drawn from every section of the House, the personnel of which, would never undergo a complete change at one time, and would therefore always be in possession of experience. Such committees being drawn from all parties could be overruled by Parliament on any separate issue without a change of Government; and as all parties would share the inside knowledge concerning every department of State and share the responsibility too, it would no longer be understood to be the duty of the Party in opposition to oppose as a matter oi principle. A Party, even if in a small minority, would have some, of its members taking part in the administration of every department of State, and through them could exercise a useful influence on the conduct of public affairs. As for the legislative side of Parliamentary work, it must be simplified, it must be made easier to get. clie feeling of the House on a new measure. Ihe preliminary work of hammering out clauses should be done in committee,. where all sections are represented. Hverv such committee should have the assistance of expert draughtsmen, whose services would place the lay members of the committee in a position of ■equal advantage with that of the memhers who happen to be the [legal profession, and whose pustom it has ..been, when desirous of crippling a [measure .which they wera powerless to kill outright, to so order the words that they could be construed to mean something different from what they were expected to mean. The conclusions of such committees should be submitted to the whole House in a report which could be accepted or The House should sit all the year round, with the exception of reasonable holirlftY recesses, but at reasonable hours \ and not ivhilst committees are at work. Une portion of the day could be devoted to committees, and another to the ordinary sittings. At present such committees as are in use sit during part of the day when the full House is assembled, and this is not fair to members who undertake committee work. Atime limit on speeches, subject to am extension at the discretion ?dH ar tWo-: thirds majority, would Nfc:

gain from a business point of view, for most of the long speeches are recriminative in parts, and at best are of the debating club order. What is wanted is a House of Commons organised for. work. At present the most substantial features about the House are not connected with work at all. Tea on the Terrace is real. The fashionable din-ner-parties are real. The smoke-room with its chess and draughts is real. The daily procession of a Speaker in horsehair wig and silk gown, accompanied by his Chaplain, his train held up by a grown man in knee breeches, silk stockings, shoes with silver buckles, and a useless sword by his side, is also real. The Sergeant-at-Arms is real, and so is the Mace with jvhich he masquerades as if he were performing in some old-world play. All these things are real enough, but in all the establishment there is. no. bureau, or office, where a member can go for assistance among the pit-falls of Parliamentary procedure. The unofficial member can have every want supplied that appertains to liis personal comfort; but he is left to draft his own clauses and Bills without so much as anybody to tell him how the matter is- affected by the contents of some odd passage- in. a monster collection of musty old tomes,, such as lawyers are trained to deal with. There is no place he can go to for an explanation of any point about departmental business or the nation’s accounts. The blunt truth of. the matter is, that • an unofficial member is not expected to worry himself , over business—Ministers are supposed to do that. It is his part to give loyal support to his side and. not be too inquisitive, unless his side happens to he in opposition, when he can be as vexatiously curious as he likes. : JLet it be noted, however, that there is a desire, which is rapidly spreading among new members, many of whom have served long apprenticeships on other public bodies, to take part in the business they have been sent to perform. That desire cannot be met under the present forms of procedure. The prevailing customs, founded on precedent, will be broken repeatedly by -men who lack that reverence for the forms of. antiquity which generations of legislators seem to have worshipped.—i' 1 . V. . Jowett, in the “National Review.”