THE LATE WAR

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1617, 25 February 1903, Page 58

THE LATE WAR

February 17. General Sir George White, giving evidence before Lord Elgin’s Commission, testified that prior to going to South x\frica he considered that the expenditure on the preparations for war was too restricted.

Sir George said he went out tin instructed and uninformed of any plan of campaign. General Symons, in an interview at Durban, urged him to hold Glencoe; nevertheless, he only retained a force there owing to the Governor emphasising the probable effect of a withdrawal on the people. The action at Talana Hill produced a valuable effect. The witness justified tho strategy of holding Ladysmith, which upset the Boer plan of campaign, and saved Natal. Ho said he intended as a last resort to cub his way cut.

LONDON, February 18. Sir Redvers Duller, in giving evidence before tho War Commission, stated that when selected in June, 1899, to act as Commander-iii-Chief in the event of war breaking out, he concurred with Lord Lausdowne that an Army Corps and a, cavalry division, with seven battalions for the lines of communication, would be sufficient if the war was confined to the Transvaal, hut he declared it would be impracticable to ignore the Orange Free State. The only practicable route, he considered, was through tho Free State. He estimated that fifteen thousand men south of tho Tugela would suffice for tho preliminary defence of Natal. He did not anticipate that the Capo would be seriously invaded until the Boers had succeeded in Natal. At the beginning of September, he foresaw that war was inevitable, and be recommended a diplomatic delay for the purpose of .strengthening tho* colonies. He recommended on the 24th that in the event of war they should advance into the Freo. State. Lord Lausdowne concurred on tho 30th, and decided to proceed with the preparations, except as regards mobilisation. Tho witness said he urged that reinforcements and reserves should be summoned on tho 7th. He was always convinced that the Free State would cooperate with the Transvaal. Ho held that tho Commander-iii-Chief designate ought to have been more fully consulted. Ho was not instructed regarding the plan of campaign.

Tho witness added that the relief of Kimberley was decided upon owing to persons there at the end of October representing its danger. General Buller’s examination was adjourned. LONDON, February 19. General Duller testified that he withdrew the guns at Colenso early. Tho guns had been taken too close to the enemy, contrary to his intention. The openness of the ground and the men’s exhaustion prevented covering the guns. To rescue the guns would have required many men under fire until night, and possibly they would not have succeeded without great loss. The action at Spionkop enabled the men to gain a knowledge of war and confidence in themselves and their officers, besides inflicting on the enemy great loss in men and morale. The existing system of training was inimical to the exercise of independent judgment in action. Tho men knew how to do things, but not what to do.

In his evidence before the War Commission, General Duller said his telegram of December loth, 1899, merely implied an abandonment of any immediate attempt to relieve Ladysmith. The Government, without consulting him, deprived him of the Fifth Division, and he did not think himself strong enough to l'elieve the place. The Government’s sending the division to Modder River he interpreted to mean that they preferred the relief of Kimberley. Tho holiogrs.nl to General White was intended to be followed only in the event of General "White s inability to hold out for a month. He hoped, thinking it practicable, that it would induce General White to break out and join hands with him.