PASSING EVENTS.

New Zealand Mail, 3 September 1902, Page 44

PASSING EVENTS.

History is pbilosopliy teaching Kr amplss. T .. Thucydideg, Along with President Roosevelt's do. liverance upon trusts comes a proposal fioin Russia for an international conference to deal with all commercial com binations. Tho Russian Government lias more than once surprised the world wuh similarly far-reaching propositions For instance, there was the disarmament proposal at the Peace Conferenceand although Great Britain, the nation aimed at, went so far as to say that it foreign nations moderated their exertions m budding war-ships, she would modify her naval programmes, Russian arsenals and dockyards on the Black Sea wore never busier than when tho Czar’s delegates were strenuously pleading for international cjn-armament. The British have reason to look with suspicion upon any proposal that comes from S Petersburg, and this one coming so soonafter the signing cf the Su<mr C’omen non at Brussels, whereby Russian Mas penalised because of the fact that the Czars Government grants indirect bounties to producers, gives the impression that Russia is actuated more fiom selfish motives than bv anv desire to seek the solution of a great economic problem. Yet. it is possible that the t zar is serious, and that he is rcallv desirous of honestly considerimr steps the Governments cf Eimme and America might take “to protect inter national commerce against the .artificial inflation and depression of prices bv tlm means trusts and combinations employ.” should such a conference be instituted it will certainly be of interest to ail nations, even although its practical results may be insignificant and worthless Yvhat is aimed at is no doubt tho placing of supreme power over trade organisations in the hands of a Government, which is not representative of the people 111 Russia, but of a few individuals who control the affairs of an autocracy.' Still in all fairness it must be observed that the Czar’s advisers realise how-trusts may injure the rights of the people, and they also may°see how it is possible for the captains of industry and the men who handle millions to practically control Ministries and defy their edicts. It cannot be denied that tlie question of how such combinations as the steel and shipping trusts may be prevented from menace ing tlie interests of nations is becoming one of the utmost importance. 'What would suit the Russian Government would bo the absorption by the various Governments of the businesses conducted by the combinations. This idea is not new. Russia has given practical effect to it in the State control of the trade in aleo-holic stimulants, and the monopoly is found to be lucrative. Under a despotic form of government too much State'control is not desirable, hut in countries where the peoplo through the franchise arc able to control Governments, punishing mismanagement by rejection at the polls, the State absorption of monopolies need not be attended by unsatisfactory results. It may be too much to expect that tho nations’ representatives in conference would evolve any really satisfactory solution of the * problem which the vast aggregation of capital in given industries presents. It is not reasonable either, to expect that a scheme to avert the evil wrought by trusts under the control of the unscrupulous will be propounded; hut however suspicious the nations may bo of Russian proposals, no harm can come through a discussion in international conference of so great and so far-reach-ing an economic subject.

It is difficult to understand why! the friends of Sir Redvers Buller have persisted in dragging that general’s conduct of the Natal campaign before the British public. The more the inquiry proceeded and the fuller became the details, it was apparent that General Buller had egregiously blundered, and the surprise is, now that the facts are known, that he was not recalled immediately after Colenso. But the British Government asserts that the position was difficult, and that the only men who could be appointed to succeed him were locked up in Ladysmith. To give a command of thirty thousand men to one of General Buller’s subordinates would have imperilled the situation by lowering the morale of the soldiers, and invited even greater disaster than subsequently befell them at Tugela and Spion Kop. The friends of General Buller claim, however, that, his conduct of the Natal campaign- was never impugned, that he finally relieved Ladysmith, and made possible the completion of the *graud plan of campaign laid down by Lord Roberts. They also assert that his appointment to Aldershot was . the highest gift tho Government could bestow upon a successful general, and that to compel him to relinquish such a post on account of an indiscreet speech was harshness without parallel. Tha Wav Office may be excused for not re-

tiring General Buller from the Natal conimand, but having the racts before fim Mr Brodrick must be blamed for Sng Sir Redvers the Aldershot apnmiitment. Having condoned conduct that deserved dismissal, the British. Government was bound for the appearance of consistency to follow up one blunder with another. But is all this ■justified by tiie recent publication of the despatches themselves? Our cablegrams this week inform us that the issuing of a War Office Blue-book containing the despatches in full demon-, strates the blundering of Buller in Natal, his willingness to abandon the position, and his readiness to accede to the fall of Ladysmith. It may he remembered that General Buller and his friends maintained that when no heliographed to Sir George White u> surrender ho believed that Sir George was in desperate straits for provisions and would be starved out- in a fortnight, while Sir Redvers himself. would not be ablo to make another attack for a month. The blue book now published shows that General Buller a full fortnight before his first repulse at Colenso had recieved accurate knowledge as the supplies in Ladysmith. Yet after one ill-advised, ill-planned, ill-executed attempt at Colenso to relieve the beleaguered garrison, General Buller actually proposed that Ladysmith witii twelve thousand British soldiers should surrender. That would have been a blot on British arms that a hundred years would not have altogether ef-

faced. When Sir Redvers sent his tele-

gram to Sir George oil December 16th, 1899, lie had in his possession a tele-

gram which reached him from Ladysmith on November 30th to the effect

tliat the garrison had supplies for seventy days. This is the fact which is revealed by the latest despatches.

and it was the publication of this Joc-ii-mentary evidence that was to vindicate the conduct of Sir Redvers Buller as

Coininandc-r-in-Chief of the British army in Natal! There is another revelation made by this new blue book. When Spion Kop was abandoned, Lord Roberts on January 26th, 1900, telegraphed to General Buller suggesting that if lie did not feel confident ot forcing his way into Ladysmith to remain in a defensive attitude on the

Tugela until Lord Roberts should carryout the plan he was about i.o execute by marching into the Free State from the Modder river. What was Sir Redvers’s reply? On the 4th February Buller replied: “I don't think a move into the Free State will have much effect on the position here”; and regarding an expected attack on Ladysmith“White affects to be confident, but I don’t

know if ho really is.” Although these papers have been called for by General Buller s friends, they have, far from exculpating his character as a soldier but emphasised his failure in the field and Lis unfitness for a peace command. The Mar Office, notwithstanding the fact that it was actuated by motives of consideration for General Buller, cannot be exonerated from blame : but the t name of failure in Natal must be borne by him alone.

What most people read ■ nowadays is light, sensational and mostly criminal. The majority of the more popular uovels deal with criminality. True, they run the villains to earth and mete out such punishment as the author in his judgment deems adequate. For the mass of the modern productions no gtoat merit can be claimed, and much or the work of some of our favourite novelists is careless and inartistic. A gentleman observed to the writer the other day that it was worthy of note that writers of fiction had towards the end of the nineteenth century fallen into a groove—the -groove that paid. Generally speaking, people road not for instruction or enlightenment in this generation, but for entertainment or merely -‘to pass the time.” Tolstoy may have been thinking only of Russian society when he wrote that for a long time past in well-to-do circles the publication of books, which is undoubtedly useful for the great, insufficiently educated masses, has been the chief organ for the dissemination'of ignorance and not enlightenment, but it is not without its application to' the publication of many works among Eng-ish-speaknig peoples. The question for it liters of books to consider to-day is not so much, How many people will I bo able to instruct ? but To bow many peopie will I be able to sell my book? -the author looks upon his novel-writing as a commercial undertaking, and the greatest number of consumers is necesRs success. Among the reasons “So sted for the unreal and inartistic character of modern novels is that the character of a people is reflected by the ve lfd > , a nd tliat those distinguishing /characteristics of presfcnt-day fiction but des ®? lbo the characters of the araupd S mSe in° S l moreover, is^vmvnfi ia^i as .F be taste of the majority A lobned > not positively coarse, mu si n°J a “ e n °, Ve i t° r ®ach the majority Eef j f T l y b( > reduced to the same suit tbit t no jf; st dld not write to soon sh»r, aSteS ° f lus , Patrons he would who W ’ f S ™ uld the tradesman able t S oods . that were not fashionhave tbe judgment of men who existence *11? ab nost the limit of human lie ims i’ 1C taste of the reading pubtho IL/l nerated ' Looking back on firm P tw f f y -J oars ’ they fearlessly afthat writers nowadays make no

effort to heighten the taste or common sense of their patrons. Although it is usual to make allowances for that love of the past and the regard for its achievements which so characterise men of sixty years and over, yet it cannot bo denied that their judgment in this respect is not without evidence to its support. Many writers could bo named who are in their profession of novelists mere literary hacks,, who work like horses in the production of novels as evanescent' as the sparkle of gingerale. Amid the flood of novels that is annually poured out from the printing presses of Europe and America, how many will be reserved by the world as works of art ? Matthew Arnold once said that the object of literary criticism consisted in finding what is most important and good amidst all that has been written in any place and at any lime, and in drawing the attention of readers to. the important and good. We do not envy the work of those who set out to discover and save Die best from the flood of so-called literary effort with which the earth is deluged. Yet withal wo muse bo patient. It may be better to read an unreal and inartistic story by Marie Corelli than to read nothing at all: and it is possible an appreciation for better work may be stimulated.

General Babington’s recommendations to the Minister of Defence suggesting various reforms’ in the methods we had adopted for the training of the defence forces of New Zealand are well supported by other officers who have had experience in South Africa, and have had occasion to give expression to their opinions as to how troops ought now to be trained. Troops are still to he drilled and disciplined; but they are not now in the aggregate to be treated as a mere fighting machine. They are to he regarded as intelligent individuals. The individual fighting qualities of the Boers taught the British a lesson. The efficiency of his rifle practice enabled him to do much mischief against packed bodies of men, and the Imperial generals learned to their cost that the frontal attack of an enemy's position by massed troops was sheer folly. The battlefields of Natal and the Transvaal reversed preconceived notions and convictions, and it is the highest testimonial to the intelligence and resourcefulness of our troops and their leaders that they were able to reform their methods in time of war and in the end stand out victorious over accomplished and skilful foes. But now the Imperial authorities are bending all their energies to a reform in many training. They know that they must -conform to what experience has taught them, otherwise the same disasters would overtake our troops in the next war. A new drill-book is being issued, and although it. is provisional pending the results of the inquiry into the conduct of the war up to the entry into Pretoria, it has received the approval cf Lora Roberts. He tells us in a prefatory note that “the power of the defence to meet frontal attack has been materially strengthened by the long range of the modern gun and rifle, and by tlieir rapidity of fire, while offensive operations have been rendered more Ctanplicated and hazardous by the difficulty of locating the position and estimating the numbers of an enemy posted under cover in the direct line of advance.” General Buller experienced this at Colenso, and we have seen how the reverse unnerved him. Lord Methuen also suffered disaster at Magersfoiitein in a similar way; and dark and foreboding as these losses were to the nation, they have not been without their lessons. For the future, Lord Roberts says, a much more open formation will be adopted for the front lines of attacking and defending forces. But the most important reform is the recognition of the entity of the common soldier. His individuality is not to be forgotten or obliterated in the mass of troops. Leaders will, of course, require to posses the tactical knowledge and zeal necessary for their positions, but their subordinates must play their part in the general plan, and exercise their resourcefulness in a moment of stress or difficulty, while non-commissioned officers will have to be so trained as to be oapable of taking command if need be. The soldier’s profession will in this way be considerably heightened, and his courage and ability raised by the new methods of army training. It is almost certain that the European nations will reform their methods as the result of Britain’s war in South Africa, and tliat being so, the next war will be long and tedious.. Still, the wars of the future may he under different conditions, present implements may be superseded, and much that may be learned as the result of the Boer conflict will have to be unlearned. _ The science of war in an ago of new inventions cannot he expected to be stationary.