DOES BRITAIN RULE THE WAVES ?

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1536, 7 August 1901, Page 34

DOES BRITAIN RULE THE WAVES ?

One of the heaviest indictments yet penned against th© naval authorities of Great Britain is contained in an article contributed by Mr Arnold White to the July number of th© “National Review.” In the first part of his able paper, Mr White tells how brightly the fires of patriotism burn in the fleet, and upbraids the nation fcr the complacency it manifests towards the British Navy, which it regards as everywhere supreme. The British peo* pie have such implicit and absolute faith in the readiness of. the Navy for war at a day’s notice that even the ( South African war has not really stir- ; red them. Mr White characterises the : attitude of the masses and classes in relation to the vital interests of the nation as “languid indifference.” They care not for parties, politics or parliaa ments, because they are persuaded that the Navy will see them through anything that will turn up on the hither side of the Judgment Day. Britain’s splendid isolation, the writer tells us, is a tribute that voters pay to th© Navy, because they remember the Nile and Trafalgar. They sing “Bfritain rules the waves,” and flatter them- \ selves that one Englishman is equal to j three Frenchmen. And so, concludes ; Mr White, they go on buying and sell- j ing, eating and drinking, marrying j and giving in marriage, as in the days | of Noah, “and knew not until th© flood i came and took them all away.” This ; is all very striking and picturesque, but is it correct? Do the facts t&garding the British Navy justify anyone making such assertions? As he proceeds Mr Arnold White increases in boldness. “Nowhere,” he asseverates, “is th© British Navy strong; everywhere it is weak.” The China, squadron is outnumbered. In the Mediterranean, Admiral Fisher’s ten battleships are confronted by fourteen Frencn vessels of th© same class, while Russia has one in the Levant and nin© in the Black Sea. The allocation of Bru tain’s fleet among the various stations is such that it is supreme nowhere: everywhere it is weak or outmatched. Notwithstanding the apparent pessimistic tone of his contribution, Mr Arnold White is probably doing his country good service iu directing attention to th© weakness of th© Navy in som© quarters and of endeavouring to quicken public opinion to a livelier realisation of th© truth that on the Nay hang the peace, security and commercial pros* perity of the Empire. If the Austra.lian Squadron is weak, it is to cur interest in this colony that it should he strengthened. When the Boer war broke out, all th© world knows Great Britain was not prepared for the ata tack. Lord Lansdown© himself has as* serted that “the country was not ready fcr war and the British Cabinet oon-

which it was advised were sufficient to ensur© th© safety of the colonies.'’’ The fact that we now know how made* quate those measures were, and how ill* informed the Intelligence Department of the War Office was, enables Mr Arnold White, with all the knowledge he possesses of naval affairs, to point a moral by directing public attention to the “weak spots” of th© British fleet. The Mediterranean squadron is his chief concern, and his paper is mainly directed to showing how necessary it is to provide for its reinforcement. Ho dwells upon th© ambitions cf France and Russia, and gives point and significance to the recent visit of the First Lord of the Admiralty and. his colleagues to Malta during the session of Parliament. He deals in detail with th© inefficiency of th© Mediterranean squadron, and urges the British people not to rely s© much upon the friendli* ness of Russia and France as upon the readiness for war of “our great fighting fleet.” But Mr White asserts that we

no longer possess the supremacy of the sea, because our ships are stinted of material, and strength is net concentrated where it is most required. He shows how dependent Great Britain is for existence upon her ships of war, and declares that every million spent upon the Army above twenty-four mil* lions a year is taken from the Navy, since that Army could not move from one place t© another unless th© Navy commanded the sea. All this is som© may describe as the scream of an alarmist, but Mr W'hite does not stand alone. Another authority informs us that it will require sixty-two torpedo destroyers to ensure the safety of the Mediterranean squadron, and these vessels cannot be found with the same rapidity as army corps and colonial con* tingents can be raised and despatched to a seat of war. With the Mediterranean fleet at its present strength the temptation to France is almost irresistible, and it might happen that the combined fleets of France and Russia would “bottle up” Admiral Fisher as effectually as General White was hem* med in by Joubert and Botha. It is said that every vice-admiral, rear-admiral and post«captain in the Navy knows its comparative weakness, and if they could speak would tell John Bull how necessary it is to maintain its efficiency, for a strong British fleet is the surest guarantee for the peace not only of Europe, but of the world. A powerful fleet is also necessary as a protection to British commerce.. Without it the working man .at Home would find his daily occupation gone, and his children crying for bread at halfea-crown a loaf, while the people of this and other colonies might find themselves laid under levy by their country’s enemies. Let, therefore, the Navy be

strengthened. If ships are ancient and their armaments obsolete, let the nation arouse itself freon its torpor and demand that Cabinet Ministers shall render the British Navy at least super* ior to the combined fleets of any two Powers in strength, equipment and efficiency. If such an essay as Mr White’s helps to attain that end, it will not have been, penned in vain..