CAPTAIN MAHAN ON THE WAR.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1507, 17 January 1901, Page 9

CAPTAIN MAHAN ON THE WAR.

With regard to the much-debated frontal attack by Lord Kitchener when Cronje was trapped at Paardeberg, Captain Mahan, without pronouncing a decided judgment inclines apparently to approve the action’. He says: —The question is one of expediency, upon which the author does not presume to give a certain opinion. It may be remembered that the Boer position 'had , been hastily assumed, under conditions not long foreseen, and therefore quite possiblv net very solid. The fact could be tested only by trial. So severe an assault unquestionably tends to benumb the victim, and to make less probable his escape, quite independent of his actual loss. Moreover, the flanking gains, which ultimately hastened and determined the inevitable surrender, could scarcely have been secured except under stress of the frontal attack. The professional appreciation of this great movement, which dislodged the enemy from Magersfontein, .(relieved- Kimberley and cleared the way to> the occupation of Bloemfontein, is brief and impressive: The larger force, to compass its object, had to- reach secretly and rapidly positions which interposed decisively between the inferior and its line of communications and retreat. To do this secretly, a. large circuit must be made, that is, a road must be taken far. beyond the enemy’s ken, therefore much longer than that he himself would traverse to pass the same decisive points and thereby evade interception. The question is one of exterior and interior lines, and therefore Of speed. Speed in a country without resources, and especially when opposed to an enemy notoriously mobile, means not only hard legging* and much privation, but high organisation of transport, to ensure even a. bar© sufficiency of support. By virtue of the interior line l , notwithstanding the rapidity with which Roberts’s men and horses moved, Cronje got past the decisive points; but for French he might have escaped. His success in this changed instantly tbe.,whole direction of the British operation. .Trains directed upon one expectation had to be diverted elsewhere, which means not the mere turning* round of waggons, but the reversal of a. complicated machinery working at high pressure: perhaps rather the redistribution of parts in an engine while in actual operation. That the transport system under this extreme test stood the strain without dislocation, though with necessarily lessened output, is as creditable as the patient fortitude of the hosts, who. lacking full food- and water, Toiled uncomplainingly in pursuit, . under the burning - - sun, not knowing but that; after all their labour would be in vain.; The “mishaps of Reddersburg and Kroonspruit do not detract from Captain Mahan s admiration of the rest of the campaign; These things he looks upon as “the bruises and barked limbs that men get in any rough sport,” and nothing more, as “mosquito buzzings about Lord Roberts''® ears or on his trail,” not preventing him from making his “second long leap” . when necessary. Captain Mahan’s review of the situation was completed on 26th July, when he concluded thus:—“At the present moment, 26th July, the British have communication from Johannesburg and .Pretoria to the sea coast by two routes—to Capetown and to Durban. The actions of the Boers show that it is notr in their power seriously to incommode either the one or the other. The trivial raids performed by their mounted men- under De Wet and Botha may protract the sufferings of the war, and add to the close of the struggle a certain lustre of persistent resistance ; but, barring* events now unforeseen and scarcely to be anticipated, they cannot change the issue, which has become simply a question of endurance between combatants immeasurably unequal in resources.” ’