THE WAR.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1367, 12 May 1898, Page 38

THE WAR.

Being in possession of the HongkongManila cable, the Americans now have a monopoly in the issue of information con-1 cerning the battle in the Philippines and its consequence.- 8 . What we learn from them these circumstances is that Manila his surrendered. Tint being so, Spanish influence in the Philippines has been destroyed, because Manila is in the Philippines what Havana is in Cubs, the seat and stronghold of loyalist influence. Then there arises a question a 3 to what the future disposition of the islands shall be. The suggestion made by some Americans that they should be handed over to Britain in exchange for the Bermudas, Bahamas and Jamaica is untenable for several reasons. It is essential that Britain should retain her possessions in the locality of the Caribbean Sea, because she has important American possessions to defend, and because it is not advisable to allow the United States to obtain too strong a foothold there. And as to the Philippine?, though their acquisition might be acceptable enough, there are likely to be great diftiiulties to be overcome in that connection. The Powers which have lately been doing their best to reduce Britain's influence in China would not agree to her possession of such a valuable base in that vicinity as the Philippines could be mi.de. They would object as they did when France proposed to take Formoaa. Between France and Britain — especially Britain co-operating with the United States—there is all the difference, of course. But even the Anglo-American alliance, if it should ever come to anything, would hesitate before affronting all Europe by doing what Europe was opposed to. Besides, Britain if it took the Philippines would only add to its list of troublous possessions. The population of the islands is a mixed and rebellious one, which is not likely to be more amenable to British rule than it has been to that of Spain. From the other side come reports which go to show tliat the Americans are followino 1 the war policy which we predicted some days ago. The intimation that 2000 troops were being sent to Cuba was on its face absurd, such a contingent being obviously too small to have any effect on the war in the island. Much more feasible is the later report that an expedition is being sent comprising 3000 infantry, 1000 cavalrymen and 10 batteries of artillery. Such a force would effect a great change in the strength of parties. This latter report is inferentially strengthened by another that the squadron which has been blockading Havana has left that vicinity and is believed' to be returning to Key West. This looks as though the Americans, taking advantage of the slowness of the Spaniards in getting westward, had decided to reserve their ships from the Cuban blockade to resist the impending attack by massed Spanish naval forces, contenting themselves meanwhile with pouring men and arms into Cuba. The Spaniards, it is to be observed, are slow to ton the mark. The Cape Verde squadron, which includes the p : ok of Spanish warships, only sailed a day or two ago, and to have a chance of success must effect a junction with the torpedo flotilla that has been lingering in the neighbourhood of Puerto Rico for some time. If it can do that a great naval battle.in iy be expected; the two forces will then be fairly equal. If not—if the Cape Verde squadron is intercepted by the great American combination evidently being formed for that purpose then the war will be over. Broken at sea the Spaniards will have no other chance of keeping the fight up. Already the United States is making preparations to hold the Philippines by heavily garrisoning them. Tuis it must do, of om''--\ t-> provi.ifc th>» Spaniards uaiug the islands as a has< t * of that step being taken is remarkable, however, as showing how heaviiy Spain has been smitten in the first brush. Of her two great colonial possessions she has lost one, the Philippines being about 114,400 square miles in area and carrying a population of five and a half millions. Their export trade in 1896 ran up to £7,500,000. Probably it will be best for Spain in the end to lose these colonies (for she will assuredly also lose Cuba), which she has so expensively proved her unfitness to govern. But the fact that she is shut out by force necessarily makes the loss harder. According to the cable there has been a " scene " in the Spanish Chamber, in the course of which the Government was accused of supineness. There seems to be some foundation for the charge. The Cape Verde squadron, for example, has been wasting valuable time which the Americans spent in preparation and concentration; and the Manila defences must have been culpably weak when the whole*island could b'e taken, by eus werahjpathat were allowed

to steam into the harbour without fear of mines or other hindrances. If the Spanish policy so far is representative of what is to follow, the war will be a short one. It will not last the three years the Spaniards predicted the other day. It will not last three months. In much less than the last-mentioned period Spain will be hopelessly beaten and thenceforth penned up in Europe.

Already the predicted consequences to Spain of war with the United Sbat-es are happening. Madrid is in a state of surging rebellion, and riots in other towns are reported. All this was to be expected. Monarchy exists precariously in a country peopled with hot-blocded, fickle people like the Spaniards. The head that wears a crown is, indeed, as uneasy in Spain as in Greece. When the war with Turkey went against them the other day the Greeks threatened to depose the King they had compelled by their insistent clamour to go to war; and similarly the Spanish mob is furious, after compelling the Government to challenge America regardless of its unreadiness to do so, because the Philippines have been lost in the first tussle. The observant may deduce from such events as these one of two lessons either that it is ill work governing a country in transition from despotic to representative government, or that there are some peoples who are so ill-adapted to governing themselves that the safest way of ruling them is by harsh and arbitrary despotism. However that may be, the ascertained fact is that the Madrid mob threatens the life of the Premier, while the Cirlists and Republicans are busily promulgating their views. Looking a little ahead it seems possible that the result of this war may be to seriously affect the government of Spain. Many a war has had an effect of this kind. The American civil war established the power of the Federal Government. The Cbino-Japanese war set the Japanese Government safe in their seats and enabled them to avert the reverto feudalism and old Mongolian methods which was imminent when the Chinese Emperor's declaration of war was issued. And the Franco-Prussian war made Germany a united empire and France a Republic. Here, what is inferred by the course of events is the conversion of Spain into a Republic. That Spain will be defeated is" a foregone certainty. It looked probable at the outset that she would, at least for a time, make a hard fight of it. That hope has not been justified. The Spanish precautions have proved so hopelessly bad as to invoke the memory of that critic who wrote, a year or two ago, of the great "army in a dream" in Cuba. The Philippines have been- lost; and the Cape Verde squadron, which contains some very fine warships, has lingered on the African coast for weeks, when it should have been making a junction with the torpedo flotilla at Puerto Rico. Meantime, the Americans have been busily preparing and massing their ships and buying new ones. In March they bought two Brazilian warships then in England for about £500,000. These were the Amazonas and the Almirante Abreu, two second-clafS cruisers of 3500 tons, with a speed of 23 knots. Spain, on the other hand, failed to purchase either the Chilian warship O'Higgins—Chili being unwilling to sell—or vessels from the Argentine. Again, the United States fights on its base with ample supplies behind, and is buying large cargoes of Australian coal for delivery at San Francißco; while the Spanish Government does not seem to b 8 able to get enough coal to keep its ships moving. In these circumstances the result of the war is easy to prophesy.

At present the Spaniards seem to be hard at work making bad worse. The Cape Verde squadron, which was reported a few days ago to have sailed south, has turned up at Cadiz, and is being reinforced there with ships. T>a ausrtrented squadron i 3 to saii for Puerto R.co to jv>m the torpedo flotilla, and promises to arrive there in time to find the Americans in possession. The American policy at first was to blockade Cuba and to an extent stand on the defensive. But the Spaniards were so slow to move that time has been given for preparation and aggressiveness, and the idea now evidently is to striky sue enemy where she is weak. With ih:>.t <>;-j. ct a large squadron has sailed for Puerto Rico. If it succeeds in destroying the flotilla sent there from Spain some time ago, the Cadiz squadron will have small char.ee of doing any damage to the United States. Though it will be the best and biggest fleet Spain has ever sent out, it will laok both a base and the necessary support of a torpedo fleet.