WILLS AND LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1354, 10 February 1898, Page 29

WILLS AND LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES.

An important majority decision of the Court of Appeal was given in the Supreme Court last week in the Christchurch case Ruddenklau v. Ruddenklau, which involved a question under section 33 of the Life Insurance Policies Act. The plaintiff, who is the widow of the testator, claimed that there was an intestacy so far as regarded the proceeds of certain policies of insurance. The question for the decision of the Court was whether a general gift of the whole of a testator’s property, real and personal, carries with it policies effected by him upon his life, or whether as to such policies there is an intestacy, unless the policies be specially mentioned. Mr Justice Edvards, in his judgment, which was concurred in by Mr Justice Williams and Mr Justice Conolly, said the enactment in question had already been four times under the consideration of the Supreme Court. There were three decided cases directly opposed to the claims of the plaintiff in this case. He thought that the cases in which it had been held that moneys payable under policies effected by a testator upon his life pass under a general gift by will of all his estate, or all the residue of his estate, were well decided. It was well known that in New Zealand those who saved, ordinarily saved in the shape of insurance upon their lives. Wills were frequently, probably more often than not, prepared by persons ignorant of the law and unread in the decisions of the Courts. The result, if the plantiff’s contention were to prevail, would be that in scores of cases the intentions of testators would be defeated, and they would die intestate as to substantially the whole of what they possessed. He thought that the plaintiff here had failed to establish her case, and the judgment ought to be for the defendants. As the views previously expressed in the Supreme Crmrt, and the division of opinion in the Court of Appeal, showed that the matter was one which ought properly to be brought before the higher Court, he thought that the judgment ought to be without costs. The Chief Justice and Mr Justice Denniston dissented. Judgment was entered for the defendants. The question of costs was allowed to stand over till the next sitting of the Court of Appeal.