The Naval Battle of the Future.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 957, 4 July 1890, Page 8

The Naval Battle of the Future.

(Lieutenant Fiske, in the New York Forum.) Let us imagine two fleets at sea in war time, each conscious that the other may appear at any instant upon the horizon. In the centre of each fleet are the heavy battleships of the first aud second-class, and the armoured cruisers, steaming ponderously along in columns of division, the flagship of each division leading, and the centre flagship bearing the flag of the commander inohief. Close in the rear of each of the heaviest battleships are one or more tornado-boats, looking to her us their parent ship. On the right and left wings, and ahead and astern, as far away as clear signalling, will admit, are the light, swift cruisers—the eyes of the fleet, the scouts; these scan the horizon iuoess-ut.!y. All the ships have distinguishing pennants unmistakably displayed, and frequent signals convey to the vi rious captains the instructions of their admiral. Suddenly the advance scouts of the opposing fleets discern each other as specks on the horizon. The announcing signal is already bent on, and up it goes. It is read at once, and now follow the rapid signals of the admirals to their ships. All clear for aotion ; forced draught is started, if not already up. The admirals reform their fleets, the soout ships exchanging perhaps a few shots as they fall back to take up their nlfoited positi ms. Undoubtedly the simplest formation for each force is the line, in which each ship beads towards the enemy, the line bring at right angles o this direction ; and probably eaoh admiral will at first so arrange bis fleet, •• ■ slowly advance until he has made an mate of the number of the opposing ships, their size and character, and has formed the plan on which he purposea to open the engagement. Perhaps one admiral will at once precipitate the action by signalling ‘ engage the enemy,’ especially if, from any evidences he may see of hurry, confusion, or misunderstanding, he judges that the other is not quite prepared ; then the fleets will rush at each other and a mdlee will at once

ensue. Battles have been thus fought ere this both on sea and land, one side or the other eventually ooming out victorious, nobody ever knew how or why; and the lucky commander 'has been crowned with' imperishable laurel. Possibly the next great naval battle will be fought in this way ; but it is the opinion of the writer that at present the whole teucienoy is in the other direction. The iucreased use on shipboard of fine guns requiring-great care, the employment of so much delicate electrical apparatus, the necessary precautions attending the storage and firing of high explosives, the nicely compensated compasses, the precise method essential to effective gunnery at sea—all are breeding an exact habit of thought and action. This exact habit is not incompatible with bravery and dash, but it predisposes an officer to plan deliberately, not to throw away good ammunition by reokless firing, coolly to take advantage of every mistake and every mishap of the enemy, and at the proper moment (bat not till then) to overwhelm him by a decisive charge. Perhaps the one of the new inventions that will make the most radical change, and that will contribute more than anything else to bHng this about is smokeless powder, or powder so nearly smokeless that a battle can be seen as well as heard. In the battles of the past, an admiral had little control over his fleet after the action had .once begun; he had to depend on his captains to carry out the general instructions with whioh ,the battle had been opened, for the srr.oke of the guns obscured the field of aotion. Farragut’s famous ascent of the rigging of the Hart, ford, made in order that he might see above the smoke, will occur to everybody. With smokeless powder, an admiral need no longer be a simple spectator of a conflict, as Sieglinde was of the duel between the mistenshrouded heroes of the Teutonic legend, but from the armoured conning tower of his flagship may exercise as active a control over his ships as does a che3i-player over his pieces. With a well.trained signal corps, and with swift despatch vessels to act as messengers, an admiral can mass his whole force upon a given point, cr give reinforcement where his own line seems to waver. While the battleships bear the brunt of the. engagement, the lighter and swifter cruisers seek out each other, or assist the battleships at some designated point. In obedience to Bignal, the stealthy torpedo, boat darts out at intervals from her biding plaoe behind her parent ship, delivers a torpedo at some ship that has approached too close, and runs back for shelter, or perhaps is sunk by a single shot. Meanwhile some Vesuvias, also hidden behind the. parent ship, throws long, arrow-like projectiles, each holding 2001bs or more of dynamite, perhaps a mile. Her target is the whole surface, deck and sides of an enemy’s ship, while that of the powder gnns is only the area presented by the vertical side : and one hit from her means wreck. In view of the destructiveness of the new weapons of offence, there has been no lack of predictions that' the naval duel of the future may simply reproduce the conditions of the famous conflict of the Kilkenny cats. While it is hardly wise to go to 3uch an extreme as this, it is none the less true that the modern naval conflict may he affected bv ca-ieea for less ; overwhelming in appearance, hut none the less potent in reality, than those whioh gave victory or disaster in the battles of the past. The vast multiplication of delicate apparatus increases the chances of accident, and therefore the difficulty of predicting the result of any given engagement; butit’will always remain true that the chanoeo will still be in favour of the ship that is tne best equipped and the beat managed. The various inventions of the past few years—-rapid-fire guns, high explosives, torpedoes, sub-marine boats, dynamite guns, and range-finders ; the increased power and perfection of steam and electric machinery ; the improvements in powder and in steel for projectiles and for armour—have riot revolutionised naval scienoe so much as they have broaaened it. The principles of strategy remain the same, and so does the necessity for the seaman’s skill. New tools have been placed in the hands of naval commanders, and with them comes the necessity of learning how to use them. Torpedees have not abolished, but they have mane constructors build ironclads with an eye to resisting them, and have made commanders study how to avoid torpedoes, and how to use them in return. Rapid-fire guns oame into use just when ordnance men were declaring that the future held only very large, gnne, and that shipe would carry but few ; and now wo see a suggestion of the oldeu days in the numerous rapid-fire guns carried in every war vessel on the seas. There is a perpetual readjustment of the powers of offence and defenoe ; mw weapons of destruction call forth new methods of protection. Engineers construct, inventors invent, experiments are tried, sham battles are fought, and hea'ed discussions agitale the naval mind ; but the only thing that can determine the real conditions of modern naval warfare is a modern naval war.