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New Zealand Mail, Issue 765, 29 October 1886, Page 22

Judging from the tone of the latest English papers it seems to have been taken as a matter of course that while England would offer a strenuous protest against Russian.encroachments in Bulgaria, she would not be disposed to go to war with Russia on that question. The merits of the case are discussed at considerable length in the various journals, but there appears to be almost a consensus of opinion as to England’s duty in the matter. It is pointed out that for the last eight years, from one cause and another, Russian influence in the Balkans has steadily declined, but that lately Russia has made persistent attempts to regain that, influence It is remarked that if Prince Alexander returned to Sofia in spite of her dislike, and in spite of the Russian party of conspiracy, his position would be double as strong as it was, and Russian influence in Bulgaria would be absolutely at an end. But then it was asked, Could Russia, submit to this humiliation?- Would not she rather propose terms for thefiual partition of Turkey, even thoughsuch terms would involve sacrificessuch as she was at one time to make 1 It is thought possiblethat these terms have already beendiscussed, and that if Russia would only allow large enough compensation, to Austria, nothing need; prevent an agreement. A suspicion is-expressed that Prince Bismarck has made up-hia mind to let Russia go to- Constantinople, and that he is. not disinclined that she should now- realise that it is so. Such an event,, it is contended, would not hinder what is said to be his scheme for turning Austria into a great non-Teutonie Power For Russia to take Constantinople would mean an immense share of the Balkan Peninsula being transferred to Austria. Austria would go to Salonica. That would mean, the in corporation into the Austrian Empire of all the Provinces that lie between the Bosnian frontier and- the JEgean, if not the absorption of Servia and Montenegro into the bargain. *■ The balance of race within the Austrian dominion would be immensely affected, and thus might be hastened the time when the German-speaking lands would feel that they must drop off, and unite with the rest of the Teutonic tongue in a single Empire, under the guidance of Prussia—-the final end in view in all Prince Bismarck’s diplomacy. To allow Russia free play in Eastern Europe would also have more immediate beneficial results for Germany. Her difficulties there would prevent the race-hatred between Teuton and Slav, bitter almost beyond the possibility of belief, from breaking out on the Baltic and along the Polish, marches, and would postpone, perhaps for ever, the struggle in which Ger-. many would be fighting for her-lit© between the attacks of Russia and Prance allied. Such is one of the theories propounded as to the possible development of the present situation in the Balkan Peninsula. Referring 1 to this theory the Spectator remarks ;

Such fears maybe without foundation ; such predictions groundless. Yet, whatever is the outcome, England’s policy is clear. Qur fears of Russia must .not allow us to be made the cat’s-paw of Austria. She must ffight her own battle, not use us to obtain her ends. It matters to her very much what is the strength of Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula. To us it matters comparatively little. If England cared to play a purely cynical pr purely selfish •game, she -would be for ever urging Russia to advance, and to seize on •Constantinople. Russia, once there, would be drawn, for the first time in her history, into a position vulnerable to European attack. Her difficulties with her new conquests and the jealousy of Austria would keep her from any desire, or from any power, to attack India. Her energies would be concentrated in Europe, and for the next fifty years we should hear little of her activity in Central Asia. There could be no greater protection .against an invasion through the passes .of Afghanistan than the occupation of Constantinople by the Russians. But though England need not dread the advance of Russia, and will refuse absolutely to fight in a quarrel which is not here., we by no means desire that any policy so cynical as that just sketched should be adopted. We deplore that the small self-governing States should be overthrown; for in them is far more hope for progress and civilisation than in the deadening, materialising advance of Russia. To encourage these self-governing States by the exercise of moral influence and in concert with the rest of Europe is one thing ; it is quite another to inflict the miseries of war upon our people in order to uphold them, especially since we know that in doing so we are forcing Russia to expand along her other line of advance, where her forward movement might mean a life-and-death struggle for the possession of India.” This is a somewhat cold-blooded and selfish policy at first sight, but it must be confessed that there is much to recommend it. England has surely done enough in the way of redressing wrongs, assisting oppressed nationalities, and endeavouring to bestow order and good government on chaotic and misgoverned communities. The British taxpayer may fairly claim that some other taxpayer should take a turn at bearing burdens of this sort, and that the task of conserving Bulgarian liberty may reasonably be left to Austro-Hungary this time, if the matter do not seriously affect British interests. To quote again from, the Spectator:

The tone of the press throughout England has shown clearly that the country would never allow us to quarrelwith Russia on such a ground as the revolution in the Balkans. “ It’s a disgraceful business ; but it’s no affair of ours,” has been the feeling everywhere exhibited, and on such a feeling there is fortunately no chance of founding a war craze. It is ridiculous for the French and German papers to talk of the Bulgarian coup d’etat as a blow to England. It is nothing of the hind. . . . When the Powers begin to realise that England is not going to allow herself to be made useful by stopping the Russian advance, we shall probably see that, far from the coup d ’ etat being a blow to England, it will have increased our influence and power in proportion as it has made difficulties for Austria and Germany. As long as we wait and watch, we shall see very much the best of the game. It is safer not to play at the threecard trick, even when the players are Emperors.

But then arises the question—Can England honourably stand aside and calmly look on while the Treaty of Berlin is torn up—could Lord Salisbury, who was associated with the late Lord Beaconsfield in forcing that treaty down Russia’s throat at a time when she had Constantinople actually in her grasp, submit without a struggle to see his work thus coolly nullified ? He might, it is true, find the force of circumstances too strong for him, and see that it would be fatal to commit England to a tremendous war on such an issue. But now enters the new complication —the Egyptian question, that most troublesome and vexatious legacy of Gladstonian misrule. Is it not more than likely that Russia is urging on France and Turkey to press for England's evacuation of Egypt in the hope of being able thus to “ buy off” Great Britain, and to make terms with her for an unopposed Russian occupation of Bulgaria. Of course in that case Austria would have to be compensated, with another slice off the western side of the Balkan peninsula, as at the Berlin Conference when Bosnia was handed over as a sop. On the other hand it would not be easy to effect this without offending the susceptibilities of Italy and Greece. If, however, it could be brought about, it would virtually eliminate Erance from the Eastern Question, and leave her to fight out

that old duel with Germany, which will infallibly be resumed sooner or later.