Law Intelligence.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 285, 14 July 1877, Page 7

Law Intelligence.

SUPREME COURT. CBIMINAL SITTINGS. (Before his Honor the Chief Justice.) The Court sat on Eriday at the usual hour. THE OCEAN MAIL PERJURY CASE. Alexander Caiman was again brought up on a charge of wilful and corrupt perjury in connection with the inquiry into the cause of the wreck of the Ocean Mail, held at the Chatham Islands. Evidence had been taken and concluded on the day previous, and Mr. Travers accordingly addressed the jury, submitting that the question as to whether the log had been hove was not material to the inquiry into the cause of the wreck, and that beiug so, the prisoner at the bar could not be convicted of committing wilful and corrupt perjury. He pointed out that the captain of the vessel had been guided by a chart, which was admittedly incorrect, as the Chatham Islands was given a position on it widely different from that which the islands actually occupied. In summing up, his Honor referred to this point, and directed the jury to the effect that the heaving of the log was a most material point for thair consideration. The jury then retired, and after consideration brought in a verdict of guilty. William Harrison was then brought up, charged with a like offence, and it was resolved to take simply the evidence of Mr. Deighton, and treat this case as the other. Accordingly another jury Avas sworn in, and the case was soon over, the verdict being one of guilty. Prisoners were then remanded till Tuesday next. Certain law points were raised by Mr. Travers, which it was agreed should be gone into on Tuesday next. SENTENCE IN GREY'S CASE. Charles Grey (on Thursday last found guilty of wilfully neglecting to discover to the trustee in bankruptcy certain property connected with his insolvent estate) was brought up for sentence. Mr. Gordon Allan, for the defence, intimated to the Court that he had determined to abandon the law points he had raised in two of the counts, as his Honor appeared to be of opinion that they were immaterial. His Honor then proceeded to pass the sentence of the Court, just remarking with regard to Mr. Allan's last remarks, that it was as well the learned counsel had decided to abandon the law points he had raised. The charge in question was one of the first which had been brought up tinder the new Act; it was, in fact, the first case of the kind, he might say, in the colony, and there could be no doubt that the omission to discover to the creditors was a very grave offence —dishonest and dishonorable; and more than that, had been made penal by an Act of the Legislature. He had been considering over authorities on the subject, and what had been done under similar circumstances in the mother country, and from all he had seen he did not think it necessary to pass a very severe sentence, as perhaps the case would be a warning to business people in general that the law in regard to creditors' property should be respected. The present charge was not one of concealment, but one of not discovering to the trustee; and within the last sixty years such an offence was a hanging matter in England, and recently the extreme penalty had been fixed at two years' imprisonment, with hard labor It was not, however, his intention to pass such a heavy sentence in this case. He thought that sometimes lenient punishment had as good an effect, and jierhaps better, than the heavier sentences under this law. He should sentence the prisoner to two months' imprisonment without hard labor.

Tuesday, July 10. regina v. calman and regina v. morrison. Prisoners were brought up for judgment, and Mr. Travers moved in arrest. The prisoners had been indicted for having committed wilful and corrupt pei-jury before a Court of Inquiry at the Chatham Islands, in respect of the Ocean Mail. Perjury was assigned in the cases on different statements, but in each case the form of the indictment was identical. In the first and second counts they were charged with perjury before two justices of the peace, and in the third and fourth counts with perjury before two justices of the peace and a resident magistrate. The fifth and sixth counts were for having taken a false oath. It appeared on some of the counts that the resident magistrate who sat with the two justices also filled the position of chief officer of Customs at the Chatham Islands. The Inquiry into Wrecks Act provides that the principal officer of Customs shall initiate all proceedings thereunder, and conduct the proceedings before the court of inquiry. Mr. Travers raised the following objections. That it appeared by the evidence that the oath administered to the pilsoners had been administered by a constable by the direction of the Resident Magistrate, whereas it should have been administered by the magistrate himself. [This point was overruled by the Judge as soon as raised.] Secondly, that the officer of Customs having sat on the Bench, had thereby virtually assumed the positions of prosecutor and Judge in the same case; Thirdly, that the Court had been improperly constituted, because the Act provided that there should be two justices summoned by the Collector of Customs to hold the inquiry, whereas in the present case, there were more than two justices on the Bench, and the chief officer of Customs had himself sat, and merely asked the others to sit with him. Fourthly, that all the necessary formalities had not been observed, notably that of giving proper notice.

Mr. Izard contended that the prisoners were properly convicted ; that the presence 'of an additional magistrate did not in any way

vitiate the inquiry, or disqualify the Court ; that the Besident Magistrate, though he was Collector of Customs, had a right to sit, not being interested in such a manner as to be biassed. To prevent a person taking a seat on the Bench, it must be shown that he was interested either pecuniarily, or that he was the person on whom the 'wrong had been inflicted. (The great Yarmouth case, 6 B. and C, 6±6 ; and Wild v. Russell, L.E., 1, C.P. 777.) His Honor the Chief Justice in giving judgment said he had had the benefit of the opinion of his brother Bichmond, whose opinion quite coincided with his own. He thought the statute had contemplated that the principal officer of Customs should perform special duties, not that of sitting on the Bench to adjudicate, but of superintending the proceedings before the Court. The Court must, therefore, uphold the contentions of Mr. Travers that the proceedings were invalidated by the incompetency of the Collector of Customs to hold the position he had assumed, and he (the Judge) must admit he should have directed the jury to acquit prisoners upon certain counts. As to the other counts, he should upon these discharge the prisoners, they entering into their own recognizances to come up for judgment when called upon. In the meantime the Crown would no doubt take other proceedings or pardon the prisoners. Prisoners were therefore discharged. The Court then adjourned till next morning.

CIBCHIT SITTINGS. (Before his Honor the Chief Justice and juries of twelve.) Monday, July 9. petherick v. luxford. Mr. Travers for plaintiff ; .Mr. Brandon for defendant. This was an action brought by Mr. Petherick, a builder, against defendant, to recover certain moneys alleged to be due and owing. His claim was made up of three separate items — one for a fixed sum of £250 for erecting a certain addition to a house in Ingestre-street ; the second for a sum of £4O, for alterations and additions to the original building ; third, a sum of £ls, for the cost of some fencing and hanging gates at a place called Brighton House, in Willis-street—in all £305. Plaintiff gave defendant credit for a sum of £l5O moneys paid, leaving a balance of £155. Defendant pleaded never indebted except as to £76, which he had always been and still was ready to pay, and had tendered before the commencement of the action. The issues put before the jury were—(l) Is the money paid into court sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claims ? (2) If not, what further sum is plaintiff entitled to recover ? Plaintiff, examined by Mi*. Travers, gave evidence as to the value of the work done. To Mr. Brandon: The work was all done in a workmanlike manner. The floors were level ; the doors opened easily. All the work was done properly. Be-examined : Mr. Luxford was constantly present when the work was being done. This was plaintiff's case. Mr. Brandon, in addressing the jury, said the work had not been done properly, which he should call "witnesses to prove.

Mr. Travers objected that under the pleading? in the case such a defence was not open to defendant.

The Court took a note of the objection. George Henry Luxford gave evidence, admitting that he had employed plaintiff to do certain work, but stated that the work had not been done properly. It was understood that the work was to be done properly. Plaintiff said he would make a good job of it. Everything had been done badly. Samuel Brown, contractor, was called, in support of the defence, to prove that the work had been badly performed. Messrs. Scoular, Toxward, Archibald, Wilson, Wallis, Banson, and other witnesses were called, and gave evidence as to the manner in which the work had been done. It appeared that the matter had been left to Wilson and Wallis as arbitrators; but they disagreed, not as to the quality of the work, but as to the amount of work done. They then referred the matter to Mr. Banson, who awarded £230, but this award was not carried out.

Counsel having addressed the Court, His Honor charged the jury, who after a short absence from Court found for plaintiff for the full amount claimed. TAYLOR V. M'DONALD. This was an action to recover £55 on an overdue promissory note. The plaintiff is William Waring Taylor, of Wellington, merchant ; and defendant had carried on business as a saddler and harness maker in Wellington. There were transactions between the parties up to July, when defendant dishonored the bill, which plaintiff now sought to recover upon, subject, however, to a set off of £ls. Mr. Brandon appeared for plaintiff; Mr. Bell for defendant. Owing to the form of the pleadings the burden of proof lay upon defendant, and Mr. Bell opened his case and called the defendant, who admitted that the bill had been dishonored. When the bill became due, he said he went to Mr. Taylor, and told him he could not pay the bill, but paid him £5 on account, and suggested that the balance should be taken out. Defendant agreed to this, and plaintiff thereupon commenced to manufacture goods for him, and supplied him with such goods to the amount of £56. In cross-exami-nation he denied that he had from time to time sent these goods to Mr. Taylor merely as security for the debt due. Thi3 was the case for the defendant. Wm. Waring Taylor stated he had never agreed to purchase the goods, but had merely taken them as security for the debt; and as a security they were insufficient. Messrs. Wingate and John Taylor confirmed plaintiff's statements as to the nature of the transactions between plaintiff and defendant. The jury found for plaintiff. The Court then adjourned.

Wednesday, July 11. (Before his Honor Judge Bichmond and Special Juries of Twelve.) ANDERSON V. GILLON AND OTHERS. This was an action for libel. Mr. Allan (with him Dr. Buller) appeared for plaintiff ; Mr. Travers for defendants. Jury : Messrs. G. E. Tolhurst (foreman), C. P. Powles, J. C. Kreeft, J. McDowell, R. S. Ledger, John Sawers, S. Carroll, J. B. Blair, W. J. Gandy, A. Jackson, E. W. Morrah, and Charles White.

The declaration alleged that on the 10th day of January, 1877, the defendants falsely, ironically, and maliciously, and in a defamatory sense, printed and published of and con cerning the plaintiff, in a newspaper called the Evening Argus, printed and circulated in the city of' Wellington, an article in which it was stated that the plaintiff, as a member of the Wellington Proviucial Council, in a certain debate, " denounced the iniquities of Mr. Henry Bunny, and sought to drive that gentleman from office ; that on leaving the hall after that same debate, to cool his feverish brain, to moisten his parched lips ... he met the man he had denounced ; there was a private conversation ; Mr. Anderson, always open to conviction of the right sort

entered the hall and voted for the man and the measure which had alike been the object of his vigorous denunciation just before. It was, of course, purely accidental that this vote saved the Government ; that Mr. Anderson almost immediately resigned his seat, and that he received from Mr. Bunny a permanent billet, which, as providing bread and butter, he then very much needed. Censorious people may think they can trace some connection between those circumstances, but these people do not understand the pure patriotism of such noble characters as Mr. Henry Anderson." Meaning thereby, that the plaintiff, while a member of the Provincial Council of the Province of Wellington, and been guilty of bribery and corruption as such member, and had as such member corruptly voted contrary to his expressed convictions, and had corruptly accepted an office of emolument under the Government of the Province of Wellington as a bribe for so corruptly voting as aforesaid. 2nd. That in the same paper, on the same day, another article appeared, in which the following words were contained : —" Eor the moment he (McKenzie) forgot all about the unfortunate results of Mr. Henry Anderson's canvassing trip to the West Coast, Avhich terminated Mr. Anderson's connection with the Independent in a somewhat unpleasant manner," also referring to the plaintiff as " the Prince of Humbugs." The innuendo complained of being—" That the plaintiff had been guilty of misconduct and dishonesty in collecting such money and in transacting such businesg on the occasion of such journey as aforesaid, and that the iDlaintiff had been dismissed from his employment in consequence of such imputed misconduct and dishonesty." The defendants, in their pleas, denied all the material allegations, admitted the public cation of the words quoted, but denied that the words had the meaning imputed to them, and asserted that they were true in their natural sense.

Dr. Buller having opened the pleadings as above stated, Mr. Allan opened plaintiff's case, and proceeded to call witnesses. Hon. W. Gisborne, M.H.8., examined by Dr. Buller, said he had heard the alieged libels read His impression on reading the first article was that Mr. Anderson had been guilty of voting in the Proviucial Council against his conviction, in order to obtain an office from the Provincial Secretary, Mr. Bunny. The other paragraph did not convey any distinct impression to his mind. He did not know what a canvassing tour meant. He understood that, in consequence of some disagreement, the connection between the proprietor and editor had ceased. It did not appear to him to impute dishonesty.

Henry Trueman expressed the opinion that the first article imputed that Mr. Anderson had voted against his own conscience to secure a Government billet. As to the second article commencing, " blessed are the peacemakers," he took it to impute dishonesty. A canvassing tour meant that a man had gone to collect money and canvass to advance the interest of the proprietor of the newspaper. His impression certainly was that the article imputed that Mr. Anderson had been appropriating his employer's money, or had been acting contrary to the interests of the proprietor. To Mr. Travers : I am a bootmaker, and reside in Wellington. I have never had any connection with newspapers. I know that; canvassing means collecting money. I do not know that the article necessarily means embezzlement, but that is the impression it made upon my mind. I was a supporter of Mr. Anderson, just as I was a supporter of you at your election. (A laugh.) I proposed him as a candidate for the Superintendency in 1871. I cannot give any grammatical reasons why the words conveyed to my mind the imputation of dishonesty. lie-examined: I have seen notices in the papers with reference to canvassing, and from them have gained my impression as to the meaning of the word canvassing. The Hon. John Johnston said the first ai-ticle conveyed the impression to his mind that Mr. Anderson had sold his vote. As to the second the impression it made was slight. Taking the definition of canvassing to be collecting money and promoting the interest of the paper, the impression was that he had misconducted himself —that he might have got " screwed" or had pocketed the money. Cross-examined : It does not necessarily mean that he had embezzled money. Thomas Whitehouse, storekeeper, of Wellington, thought the first article imputed that plaintiff had. sold his vote to Mr. Bunny; the second paragraph, he thought, imputed that plaintiff had made use of his employers' moneys or done something else equally wrong. Mr. Francis Sidey gave similar evidence Henry Anderson stated he was plaintiff, and editor of the Evening Post. He was connected with the Wellington Independent from

1862 as sub-editor till 1864, v- 1 .-a he became editor. He then gave evidence as to a canvassing tour iu 1869. Before starting, notice was given by the proprietor to the subscribers to pay all due moneys to him. The journey was commenced iu January and lasted till March. There was not a large amount of moneys due, but he made exertions, and brought home £SOO, which he paid over to Mr. McKenzie. On his return he resumed the'duties of editor of the paper up till 11th August in the same year. He resigned his office owing to a disagreement in politics between himself and the proprietor. The circumstances of his trip had had nothing to do with his resignation. Ten weeks after his return Mr. McKenzie assisted him in getting elected in the Provincial Council for'Wellington. He was opposed to Mr. Pox, while the proprietor took an opposite view. The position of affairs fretted him, and during the last two or three weeks of his tenure of office he gave way to a little intemperance. He was ill in consequence, and therefore resigned. Mr. Halcombe, Mr. Fox's nephew, succeeded him, and as a consequence, the paper " ratted" and supported Mr. Pox instead of Mr. Stafford. Witness then proceeded to give evidence as to his connection with the Wellington Provincial Government and Council shortly afterwards. Mr. Bunny opposed the Brandon Government, and he allied himself with Mr. Bunny. He voted with Mr. Bunny almost in every instance. That was in the 1870 session. In the March session of 1871 he still supported Mr. Bunny, except on points of minor importance. In the interval between March and June Dr. Peatherston went out and Mr. Pitzherbertcame in, Mr. Bunny and Mr. Halcombe forming the Executive. Witness supported the policy of Mr. Bunny, which was to borrow £IOO,OOO. This was the session in the Odd Fellows* Hall. Prom beginning to end he voted in favor of Mr. Bunny's'Government. He announced that he should give Mr. Bunny a discriminating support. At the end of June, 1871, he received an appointment in the Land Office, at the special recommendation of Mr. Bunny, having resigned his seat in the Council; and he held this office till he accepted the editorship of the Evening Post. It was not true that prior to the month of June, 1871, he had been a strong and consistent opponent of Mr. Bunny. On the contrary, he had supported him when in Opposition, and when in the Ministry. He had never, at the request of Mr. Bunny, changed his policy. Cross-examined : Had been a candidate for the Superintendency in opposition to Mr. Pitzherbert. The speeches on that occasion were partially reported in the papers. He remembered the report published in the Independent of his nomination speech. It _ was a grossly inacctirate report, in many particulars. He had not furnished the report himself. Was under the impression that -he had used the following expressions:—" Mr. Pitzherbert had deliberately insulted the electors at the Athenaeum, and had been happily named when he was called the political Pagan of New Zealand. The title had been admirably deserved by him. Place and pay and power had always been his creed, whether serving in a Pox, or a Weld, or a Stafford Ministry ; but he did not blame him, as the man had only acted according to his rights." His opinion of Mr. Pitzherbert had not undergone a change during the time between the election for the Superintendency and the session of 1871. His opinion had been that Mr. Pitzherbert wished to uphold provincialism on account of the profit it would bring him. He did not say Mr. Pitzherbert was the political Pagan of New Zealand ; but that he had been called so. In fact that had been said 500 times by public men. He opposed Mr. Pitzherbert because he had provincialistic ideas. Mr. Bunny was opposed to provincialism, but when he saw a chance of getting office he expressed willingness to see the particular instance of Wellington provincialism continued; hewaswillingtoseeif he could not get our "cart out of the rut." The proposal that he should get a billet had not been discussed before he resigned. There had been conversations between himself and Mr. Bunny during the previous session, and even before he had been a member. He was aware when he resigned his office that he would be offered some position. There had been an understanding between them as personal and political friends, that if any time he should want assistance it should be afforded him. He had resigned his seat because he could not afford to remain in, and because while he was in the Provincial Council Mr. Bunny could be of no use to him. He subsequently found out that there had been dissensions in the Cabinet in consequence of the appointment. Mr. Halcombe and Mr. Hunter were in the Executive. They resigned their seats in consequence of the appointment. He admitted having read an article which appeared in the Independent, which described him "as a man who has more than once figured as a drunken brawler and a bully in our Police Courts, and who has grossly insulted our Superintendent by applying to him at public meetings epithets too shameful to be introduced."

Mr. Allan raised the question whether such an article could be admitted.

His Honor thought it was not admissable unless in mitigation of damages, but no notice of mitigation had been given. It was rather a dangerous thing if persons were bound to answer everything against them which appeared in the Press, or else have it brought tip against them years after as being true. Mr. Travers said it was a question of character. If a man allowed such a statement as that to pass unchallenged could he value his character very highly. The Judge ruled against Mr. Travers. Cross-examination continued : Did not oppose the education measure of the Government in 1871, except as to the denominational question. However, Mr. Bunny said the measure would stand or fall by the clause, so he supported the Bill as a whole. The District Highway mea lire was brought forward by Mr. Bunny. He supported that measure. The Court adjourned jfor lunoh.

On resuming, Mr. Travers cited Queen v. Newman, E. and 8., in reference to his attempt to introduce the evidence which had been refused by the Court. However, he said he would not press the matter. Cross-examination continued: At the time he was in the Provincial Council he was a poor man. He considered four days before accepting the office, because he might have o-ot a better office had he remained in the Council. He thought he might possibly have got a seat in the Cabinet. He took the billet also because of his health. The billet was first offered to him four days after the session. He doubted whether he should resign and render it possible to get a billet, or whether he should hold on to 'politics and leader writing. He knew pretty well that he would get something, because Mr. Bunny had promised if he voted with him and assisted him to get into office to help him if opportunity offered. He knew from the services he had rendered Mr. Bunny both in the Press and in the Council that he had a claim upon him. But he had higher motives ; he desired to see a do-nothing policy overturned. He supported Mr. Bunny mainly from a sense of public duty ; secondly, because it was the wish of his constituents; and thirdly, and he did not think any shame attached to him for it,because he thought by supporting Mr. Bunny he would have a claim upon him for assistance in the event of his quitting public life, for which he was not altogether fitted owing to a physical infirmity ; but there was not any corruption as between himself and Mr. Bunny. He resigned his position on the Independent because his eyesight was bad, because his health was going, and for political reasons; but he admitted that during the last few weeks of histennreof office he had been intemperate. The letter produced was that in which he had tendered his resignation. ["The letter was put in. In it he acknowledged hard drinking for two years, and bad health in consequence. A letter in reply from Mr. McKenzie, accepting the resignation, was also read.] During his trip to the West Coast he had not been frequently drunk ; he never neglected his work. He did not believe he had been drunk four times during the whole course of his life. He had no disputes with Mr. McKenzie about money matters. There was no arbitration about accounts.

Re-examined: None of my votes were given on the promise that I was to get a billet. I never made any speech denouncing Mr. Bunny in my life, therefore I could not, as alleged in the libel, go out, have a conference, and change my views. Arthur Edward Grimstone produced certain journals of the Provincial Council. He could only produce the votes and proceedings for the session of 1871.

John M. Taylor, ex-clerk to the Provincial Council, proved that the records produced were original. This was the case for the plaintiff. Mr. Travers then addressed the jury for the defence, and indicated the nature of the evidence he should call.

Mr. Allan objected that the class of evidence Mr. Travers intended to produce was shut out from him, owing to the manner in which he had pleaded. His Honor thought there was something in the objection, and Mr. Travers said he should not call any evidence. He then proceeded to criticise the evidence given for plaintiff, and referred at great length to the manner in which the appointment of plaintiff had been made, and remarked especially on the attitude Messrs. Hunter and Halcombe had taken up in reference to the transaction. It was absurd, he contended, that a political man and newspaper editor who had frequently criticised the actions of other men in no measured language should himself object to criticism. As to the second alleged libel, he contended the case for the plaintiff had utterly broken down. No doubt the statement that the West Coast trip had led to a rupture between Mr. McKenzie and plaintiff was entirely a mistake ; but after the evidence given, could they come to the conclusion that there was any libel in the statement ? Mr. Allan remarked that there was no attempt to justify the libel ; but there had been an attempt uncler the personal direction of Mr. Gillon to blacken plaintiff's character. Did this not prove malice ? He thought it did, and he asked the jury to punish malice by a verdict for plaintiff, with substantial damages. The libel was all the worse by reason of the fact that after a cor siderable period of trust plain - tiff had been attacked on a matter which had passed over some years, and had been almost forgotten. He had not been charged with political dishonesty, but with personal bribery and wanton corruption ; but there had not been the slightest attempt to justify or prove the truth of the statement. As to the second alleged libel, there could be no doubt that it had a defamatory effect, and whether the construction they put on it were really correct or not, still the verdict must be for jDlamtifF. His Honor charged the jury. He said this was a case which must be left almost—he might say wholly—to the jury ; but at the same time, there was a task before him of some little difficulty. Now as to the first alleged libel. If there was anything at all clear, it was this—that plaintiff had been charged with having on a particular occasion and in a particular place sold his vote on a particular question—that he had up to a certain time adopted a certain political course; but had on a particular occasion gone out of the place of meeting of the Provincial Council, saw the chief of the Executive, gone back to the hall, changed his opinion and voted for him. There could be no mistake about conversions of that sort, and such a transaction, if true, must stamp a man with ignominy for the term of his natural life, or at any rate should do. "Mr. Anderson went out of the Council Hall

met the man he denounced, there was a pi-ivate conversation ; Mr. Anderson, always open to conviction of the i*ight sort, saw the error of his ways . . . and being conscientiously convinced that he is wrong, he, careless of the

world's opinion, proudly conscious of his own rectitude, caring not to justify himself so long as his own conscience approved his action, re-entered the hall, and voted for the man and the measures which had alike been the object of his vigorous denunciation shortly before." That plaintiff had sold his vote, therefore, was most distinctly imputed, and the question was, had the statement been borne out. Booking at plaintiff's evidence it seemed to go to show first that he had generally agreed in provincial politics with Henry Bunny ; that in previous sessions when Mr. Bunny was in opposition he gave him his support, and that he also supported himj when at last he got into office. He did not deny at the same time that he looked forward as a reward for that support to a possible advantage to accrue to himself by reason of Mr. Bunny obtaining office ; not that there was a definite understanding as to his being given a particular place, or that he was in any sense a bought man, but that his votes were sdven to Mr. Bunny conscientiously, though he at the same time iooked to him when he left the Council for a reward for his political services. That was his (the Judge's) impression of the evidence. Mr. Gordon Allan had told them that this was a very usual sort of thing among politicians ; however, it was to be hoped that our first-rate, politicians were a little more honest. Yet when electors returned men who were wholly without means they could scarcely expect that what was called " the bread-and-butter question" should in all cases be lost sight of. That, however, was a very different thing to selling a particular vote, because it was by no means inconsistent with reason that a man might be voting according to his conscience and not betraying his constituents, and yet have an eye to " the bread and butter question." His Honor pointed out that what the jury had to discover in the first instance was, whether the statements made by the defendants in the article complained of were or were not true. The plaintiff's evidence was the only evidence there was on the subject, and he referred to the evidence given, and asked, first—Whether it was shown that plaintiff had ever been an opponent of Mr. Bunny ? He then went through the evidence of plaintiff generally, and asked whether it supported the allegation that plaintiff had, on a particular occasion, sold his vote to Mr. Bunny ? That was the most important point in the case, and it was for the jury to say whether such a bargain had been made. It was not enough to say that he may have had a corner in his political mind devoted to his own interests. The plaintiff, in fact, almost admitted he had been in that predicament, but that did not support the allegation—that did not afford justification for the libel. As to the second count there was more difficulty. Defendants had pleaded that the language used was not capable of the construction which had been placed upon it—that it was not defamatory. His Honor went through the evidence, pointing out that the witnesses had differed respecting the meaning of it; and he said if they came to the conclusion that it was defamatory, they must recognise that the libel was worse if it imputed embezzlement than it would be if only misconduct were imputed. The jury must judge of that. This, however, was certain, for the defendants had never questioned it, plaintiff had not been dismissed from the Independent in consequence of anything which took place in respect of the West Coast trip. His Honor then went through the issues, explaining each, and asked the jury to consider their verdict. The foreman drew his Honor's attention to a remark made by Mr. Travers to the effect that if the jury could place an innocent construction on the article they were bound to do so, and inquired whether the law so stood.

His Honor said Mr. Travers had put the question rather too broadly. The jury had to consider whether the words might have had and were calculated to have had anjurious effect with the persons to whom the alleged defamatory matter was addi-essed. If they thought the words were tised in an injurious sense, and had been taken in that sense, the plaintiff would be entitled to damages. The jury retired, and after half an hour's consideration returned with the issue paper as follows:

1. Did the defendants print and publish of and concerning the plaintiff the words set forth in the first count of the declaration in manner therein alleged ?—Yes ; admitted. 2. Were the words set forth in the said first count of the declaration defamatory of the plaintiff in their natural sense ?—Yes. 3. Had the said words set forth in the said first count of the declaration the meaning alleged in the said first count of the declaration, and were they in that meaning defamatory of the plaintiff ?—Yes. - 4. Were the allegations in the said words set forth in the said first count of the declaration true in their natural sense ?—No.

5. Did the defendants print and publish of and concerning the plaintiff the words set forth in the second count of the declaration in manner therein alleged ?—Yes. 6. Were the said words set forth in the said second count of the declaration defamatory of the plaintiff in their natural sense ? —No. 7. Had the said words set forth in the said second count of the declaration any meaning alleged in said second count of the declaration, and were they in that meaning defamatory of the plaintiff ?—No. 8. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover any, and if so, what damages, by reason of the cause of action in the first count of the declaration alleged ?—Yes ; 40s. 9. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover any, and if so, what damages, by reason of the cause of action in the second count of the declaration as alleged ?—No. The jury were then discharged, and the Court rose.

SUPREME COURT—IN BANCO. Tuesday, July 10. (Before his Honor the Chief Justice and his Honor Mr. Justice Richmond,)

I-lAIR V. THE BOROUGH COUNCIL OF WANGANUI.

The Chief Justice delivered judgment in this case .as follows :

This is a motion to dissolve an injunction granted by Mr. Justice Richmond ex parte on the 7th April last. The plaintiff claims to be the owner of a small lake, known as Virginia Water, situate near the town of Wanganui, from which the defendants have for some time past been drawing a supply of water for the town. The level of the lake having been lowered by the operations of the defendants, they have proposed to restore it, and to increase the supply of water, by leading into Virginia Water the waters of another pond or lake at a higher level, called Westmere; and they have begun to lay pipes for the purpose between the two lakes. The injunction restrains the defendants from bringing the waters of Westmere into Virginia Water. The motion was argued before Mr. Justice Richmond and myself on Wednesday and Thursday, the 27th and 28th ult., and the Court took time to consider its judgment on one or two points. The plaintiff asserts a right to the whole bed of Virginia Water, with, perhaps, the exception of a very small portion included in the old road reserve known as the Waitotara line. The plaintiff's title to some part of the lake bed is admitted by the defendants. A public road runs for a short distance along the margin. The defendants claim to be entitled under the powers of the Municipal Corporation Waterworks Act, 1872, to * draw water from the lake for the supply of Wanganui, and being so, as they say, entitled, it was argued before us, that they were further entitled to maintain the proper water-level by bringing in water from other sources. This contention was founded upon the Bth section of the Act of 1872. It is not material to consider whether that enactment could have been capable of the meaning which, on behalf of the defendants, it was attempted to put upon it, because it turns out that the whole Act is repealed by the Municipal Corporations Act, 1876, as from the Ist of January last. The question of legal right presents, therefore, no difficulty whatever ; because even if it could be established that the Corporation acquired the exclusive property in the waters of Virginia Water (though it is impossible on the evidence to come to any such conclusion), it is still apparent that the right to these waters does not include, or Garry with it, the entirely different right to use the bed of the lake as a reservoir for the waters of Westmere. Upon one point there was a serious difference between the case made for maintaining the injunction, and that on which it was in the first instance granted. It was originally stated that the waters of Westmere were less pure than those of Virginia Water. This ground is now abandoned. The Court has taken time to consider whether having regard to the public interests involved, and to the nature and ex- | tent of the apprehended injury, and having regard especially to the variation from the case originally made by the plaintiff, the injunction ought to be continued until the hearing. There are several grounds for the interference of a Court of Equity to restrain the apprehended infringement of a legal right in a case like the present. The aggressors are a corporate body, acting under color of a compulsory statutory power to enter upon and take lands, and to acquire property in streams, springs, and running waters. It is well settled that the proceedings of such bodies, when of an illegal character, or of' doubtful legality, will be restrained by injunction ; and the Court has not only jurisdiction to interfere, but is almost bound to do so. (See the cases collected by Mr. Kerr in his work on Injunctions, pp. 295, 1867.) In such cases, if there be any doubt, the construction will always be against the corporate body. (Simpson v. South Staffordshire Waterworks Company, 34 Daw Journal, ch. 380.) And it is altogether in favor of such interference that the party whose rights are menaced is a private individual ; for if the complainant were a public body, the Court might balance one kind of public convenience against another. But even a minute infringement of the legal rights of an individual will not be allowed. (Wandsworth Board of Works v. South-Western Railway Company, 31 Daw Journal, ch. 855.) Nor is the Court moved by any argument of expediency grounded on the magnitude of the public interest represented by the defendant Corporation. "It is a matter of almost absolute indifference," says V. C. Sir W. Page Wood, in Attorney-General v. Council of Borough of Birmingham, 4, Kay and J. (judgme t), p.p. 539, 541, "whether the decision will affect a population of 250,000, or a single individual carrying on a manufactory for his own benefit If they cannot drain Birmingham without invading the plaintiff's private rights, they must apply to Parliament for power to invade his rights." There exists also in the present case another well-known ground for the interference of an English Court of Equity, viz., that the plaintiff's right can (or rather, under the old practice, could) only be asserted at law by an indefinite series of actions—seethe judgment of the ViceChancellor in the last cited case. The same ground exactly cannot be taken in this colony, because the Supreme Court unites to the powers of a Court of Equity those of a Court of Law, and as a part of the latter jurisdiction possesses the power (under R.G. 447, 448, and 449, taken from the Common Daw Procedure Act, 1854) of inhibiting the repetition of an injury for which an action of trespass has been brought. Nevertheless, we are of opinion that where the legal right is indisputable the plaintiff ought not to be obliged to commence an action of trespass, but may, upon a proper occasion, at once invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the Court without awaiting the commission of an actual trespass. In fact the plaintiff has done better to apply before the completion of the works of which she complains, inasmuch as parties who stand by and see moneys expended in the construction of public -works are in peculiar danger of losing their right to call upon the Court for its summary interference. Then, has the plaintiff disentitled herself to re«

lief by departing from her first representation respecting the quality of the Westmere water ? Whether pnre or impure she has, it is plain, a legal right to object to its being poured on to her land ; but if there had been any intentional concealment from the Judge who had granted the ex parte application that would be a reason for discontinuing the injunction. There is, however, no such feature in the case. The quality of water can often be determined only by nice scientific experiment. It seems that fitrther information upon the subject has been obtained ; but it is not asserted by the defendants that the Court has been intentionally deceived. Some little stress, however, was laid upon the allegation that the affidavits in support of the injunction did not disclose that the defendants were rightfully using the waters of Virginia Water for the supply of the town. But the defendants have not now shown that they possess any such right ; and even had they done so, that would not affect the present question. On the whole we are of opinion that this motion must be refused. The plaintiff's costs to be costs in the cause. DIVORCE JURISDICTION. In the case Kendall v. Kendall, an application in support of a petition for alimony, Mr. Travers stated that the parties were likely to come to some agreement, and he therefore asked that the case should be postponed. The postponement was granted.