The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1945 QUANTITY AND QUALITY

New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25345, 29 October 1945, Page 4

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1945 QUANTITY AND QUALITY

High commanders of the British and American services have spoken in glowing terms of the quality of New Zealand's sailors, soldiers and airmen in the Second World War. They have been kind enough to say those things we believe to be true, but which we could not ourselves mention. To cap the splendid record of quality, statistics have been released of the quantity of the Dominion's effort. They are figures in which the Dominion may have becoming pride. In the six years of the war, 205,000 men and women between the ages of 18 and 45 were mobilised for full-time service. There is a rule, the soundness of which was proved again in the war, that, if more than 10 per cent of the total population is transferred to the armed services, the production and transportation fronts will suffer. The calling-up of 205.000 men and women was equal to 12.8 per cent of the population. If it is objected that not all these were serving at the same time, that some of the losses in killed were made good during the war by births, and that some of the wounded were able during the period of hostilities to resume their civil occupations as did furlough men, the rule can be tested by another set of figures. The greatest number of men withdrawn from industry at one time was in September, 1912, the total being 170,000, or 10.6 per cent of the population. This total, however, concerns only men. To it must be added a substantial number of the Waacs, Waafs and Wrens who by then had joined the colours. Had it been necessary to mobilise the Home Guard and the E.P.S. for full-time service, the grand total in the armed and civil defence forces would have been over 488,000, or 30.5 per cent of the population.

The import of these figures should be studied, particularly by those who urged that the Dominion was capable of doing a great deal more during the war. The 10 per cent rule is the safety margin.* It can be exceeded, as it was in New Zealand and in Britain, but it must not be done without appreciation of the consequences. Occasions can arise during a war when every effort must be subordinated to that of placing soldiers in the front lines. This happened in Germany in the last phases of the war, and it could have occurred in New Zealand had the Japanese invaded the Dominion. In Germany's case, ruin was precipitated, as the manpower left to sustain the transportation services was insufficient to repair the damage of the bombing by the Allied air forces. Those who care may speculate on what may have been the fate of New Zealand had a third of the population been withdrawn from normal life to meet the Japanese. Suffice it that all have been made aware of shortages in production due to the transfer to the armed services of 12.8 per cent of the population. It is to the credit of the Dominion that none of the shortages was in respect of goods needed by our own forces and the services of Britain and our Allies. Another aspect of the total mobilisation problem of importance is that mechanisation does not carry with it a saving in manpower. More may be done by machines, but, as in civil life, the manufacture of machines, their employment and care and maintenance create more jobs. In the First World War about three men were required on the lines of communication to keep one man in the front line. Detailed analyses have not yet been made concerning the Second World War, but it is 'thought the proportion was roughly ten to one.

In their detail, the statistics issued by the Minister of Defence reflect the growth of the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Royal New Zealand Air Force. Many will be surprised that we had only 11,000 men in the Navy. It is fair to remark that the Navy could have had many more men had it been able to take them. From the adventurous few of 1914-18 who transferred to the Royal Flying Corps, the Royal New Zealand Air Force became a firmly established service during the war. The Minister makes the comment that enlistment in the Navy and the Air Force remained voluntary throughout the war. So long as there was no dearth of recruits, there was no real reason why recruitment should not be on a voluntary basis. It should be remembered, nevertheless, that behind it was the fact of universal compulsory service. Every young man had to enlist, and the volunteering amounted simply to expression of a preference for the Navy or the AitForce. In this connection, the Maoris have a splendid record as volunteers for overseas service. So, too, have our New Zealand women who staffed the hospitals and institutes as volunteers. On the night of the declaration of war, Mr Savage said, "Where Britain goes, we go." The statistics of the Dominion's manpower effort, added to those of the production fronts and enriched by the records of honours and awards for gallant service, are testimony of the Government's and New Zealand's fulfilment of that pledge. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY President Truman's statement on American foreign policy loses substance and reality by comparison with the grim pronouncements of Mr Ernest Bevin and Mr Anthony Eden. The fact is that the British statesmen are much closer to Europe and Britain cannot dissociate herself from the Continent. Wilson's 14 points produced profound political reactions when they were announced in 1917 but today Europe has sunk too deep to be uplifted by Mr Truman s 12 points. ' His amiable generalities will not feed the hungry noi inspire faith in the hopeless. The lack of food promotes a lack of confidence and the spiritual dearth aggravates the material shortages. Mr Bevin, who keeps his feet much more firmly planted on the ground, mentioned the case of Yugoslavia, which illustrates the interaction of food and confidence. There, because of a lack of confidence, a great army

of 400,000 to 600,000 is being maintained. As a result Yugoslavia cannot feed herself, let alone make the material contribution to Europe's larder that she did before the war. Her exports used to include wheat, maize, cattle, pigs, meat, iruit, eggs and timber. If Yugoslavia would trust the Allies to settle her claims justly and convert soldiers into peasants she could cease drawing on Unrra and, instead, start adding to Europe's scanty store. America could give the lead, so long as it was as severely practical as Europe's plight demands. Eood would at least assuage the gnawing that kills confidence. Mr Bevin speaks frankly of how much depends on Congress voting £150,000,000 for Unrra. Unfortunately Mr Truman does not descend to such bread and butter levels. His 12 points comprise a generally excellent statement of ends but at this moment Europe and most of the world are far more desperately concerned about means.

In one sense, of course, Mr Truman was not relying on words but on power in being. He may have had one eye on Russia. He may have remembered Theodore Roosevelt's advice always to speak gently but to carry a big stick. The occasion was Navy Day. He proceeded from his disarming definition of foreign policy to an inspection of a mighty naval concentration in the Hudson River. He prefaced his innocuous statement of ends by dwelling upon American military power and especially on her predominance on the sea and in the air. He concluded it by a reference to the atomic bomb and "other new weapons." He based his policy on force in reserve. As Mr Truman clearly accepts the reign of power politics, some nations may find it hard to accept his assurance that in the new weapons "there is no threat to any nation." He had earlier stated definitely that the Becret of the production of the atomic bomb would not be shared—"the secret of the engineering knowledge of putting all the different pieces together and finding the resources and plant to complete the work." At present and for years to come, that so-called secret is in the sole keeping of the United States. In an era of power politics it provides America with an unanswerable argument in any international negotiations. Mr Truman gave no indication that America intended to forgo this decisive advantage. Yet it will be impossible otherwise to obtain the real international co-operation he desires. Here is what the French call a crisis of confidence. If America trusted all her Allies, she would be prepared to share the secret or place it in international keeping. On the other hand, if the Allies put complete trust in American professions, they would not be uneasy or resentful that the United States alone should command the awful power of the atomic bomb. It cannot be said that Mr Truman has contributed anything to resolving this crisis and it is fundamental.