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The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1945 BACK TO SINGAPORE

The stain placed upon the British Commonwealth by the Japanese in the disasters of 1941 and 1942 is being removed. The British 14th Army in Burma and the Australians in New Guinea and Borneo proved that the Japanese army at its best and in numbers could be defeated by the citizen soldiers of the Commonwealth. The surrender of Hongkong, Penang and Singapore by enemy forces capable of fighting, had they been permitted to do so, in part atones for the ignominy with which the Empire forces were hustled from these bastions and entrepots in the opening stages ofthe war. The nation is entitled to rejoice in the events of the past few weeks. It has a right to look forward to new and better days in the Far East. But in its rejoicings and hopefulness for the future it is morally bound to look backwards. The terrible lessons of the war will not be learned, the road to enduring peace will not be made clear, unless thorough search is made into the causes of the loss of Hongkong, Malaya and Singapore. It is not enough to say that the fall of Singapore was a great but retrievable military disaster. Nor is the excuse sufficient that men and equipment which might have been sent there were more urgently required in other theatres. The starting point of the inquiry must be in the days before the war and must concern itself with the attitude of the Commonwealth to war in general and the steadfast refusal to heed the warnings of those who could see the intentions of aggressor nations. Such an inquiry will' place the blame for the loss of Hongkong, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, Borneo, New Guinea and the Solomons, to mention only the major British possessions, on the people of the nation as a whole. Those who claim they were not told of what was impending are not excused. The information was there for any who cared to use it. Instead, the majority asked for soothing syrup which strangely enough gave them pseudo courage to denounce as war-mongers, scaremongers and prophets of gloom those who urged the necessity of adequate defensive measures. It was the citizen taxpayer who was responsible for the lack of trained men and equipment in Malaya, for the lack of the battle fleet without which Singapore was a bluff. It was the taxpayer who denied the Royal Air Force 'adequate aircraft at Singapore. Admiral Phillips took Prince of Wales and Repulse to attack Japanese convoys fully aware of the importance of air strength. He knew the risks he was taking. The taxpayer—that is every citizen within the Commonwealth —has a share in the responsibility of compelling Admiral Phillips and his gallant men to accept those risks. In sum, the severe losses suffered by the British nation and by the Americans were due to unprefparedness.

Yet when the basic 'responsibility for the tragic "events of the war with Japan is placed on the people as a whole, there is room for inquiry whether the best use was made of the forces available, particularly in Malaya and Singapore. Sir George Sansom has written one of the best defences of the services in Malaya. It has much special pleading which can be easily broken down. Time and again he speaks of the concentration of greater Japanese strength at decisive points and of outflanking movements down the west coast. What else could be expected Of an alert enemy? Sir George mentions that new plans for the defence of Singapore against a Japanese attackeither from Siam or from landing points on the Malayan coast were prepared in 1940 and revised in 1941. He then observes: "But a plan is one thing, and the force to carry it out is another." It is true that badly needed aeroplanes for the Far East were sent to Russia. But it may be asked whether the plans of 1940 and the revision of the following year were based on realities —the numbers and especially the quality of the troops actually available, the equipment they actually possessed, not what they should have possessed or what they expected, the degree of co-operation between army and air force perfected in training, not what should have been the case. The habit of looking at the best side of the picture is a bad one in British military appreciations prepared in advance of hostilities. It characterised appreciations for the defence of New Zealand in 1942. Now that General Percival and his staff and commanders have been freed and the Japanese archives are available, it shoujd be possible to make an accurate survey of the campaign in Malaya. Whether the resultant document is heartening or disquieting it should be published in full. Our ability and willingness to accept the findings will be an additional help in removing the stains of 1941 and 1942. AMERICAN WAR LOSSES With remarkable promptitude the United States has published returns" showing American expenditure in blood and treasure in the Second World War. The figures include both European and Pacific wars. They reveal not only the magnitude of the American war effort, but also how greatly it. exceeded that exerted in the First World War. Comparative figures are as follows: — Casualties: 1041-45 1017-18 Killed .. '25'2,8*5 115,660 Wounded .. 651,' it 8 '205,690 Missing and prisoner* . 166,710 4,5*26 Totals . . 1.070,819 325.876 i Cost (millions of dollars) '287,181 35,500 Noteworthy are the facts that America in the latest struggle incurred more than three times the number of casualties and spent, eight times more money than in the First World War. Her forces were, engaged for 45 months, compared with 19 months. The expenditure of about £70,000.000,000 sterling involves sums beyond ordinary com prehension. The casualties bring out a feature common to the lists of all countries—-the much highar propor-

tion of prisoners and missing. The war of movement, contrasted with the of 1914-18, is usually held accountable. The proportion of wounded is higher by comparison with other lists, suggesting that this category was opened wider in the American forces. The casualties also show that the United States took a much larger share in fighting the Second World War. In the First, her losses were only JO per cent of those suffered by the British Empiic (3,260,581 casualties). In the Second they amounted to about 75 per cent of the Empire total (1,427,034). Unfortunately the Empire sustained higher losses in the more serious categories. Its killed numbered 532.233. or over twice as many, while wounded totalled 468,388, actually about 200,000 less than American roll. Another point, the Empire's losses (compiled up to May 31) were spread over 70 months of war, against 15 months for America. The United States returns offer eloquent evidence of how intensely and unreservedly America fought in the Second World War. MR ATTLEE'S BROADCAST Although the Japanese surrender made the occasion for Mr Attlee s broadcast, its main theme was demobilisation. Fortunately Britain is working to a clear and simple order of priorities devised by Mr Bevin months ago. Its provisions are familiar to servicemen, who know exactly where they stand on the roster. Even so, the men are chafing at the slowness of release to civil life. There is the natural eagerness to be quit of the services the equally natural anxiety to go on the labour market while jobs are plentiful. The restlessness in the services is matched in industries, still languishing for lack of labour. A democratic Government cannot ignore such popular pressure, explaining why Mr Attlee felt obliged to dwell principally on the process of demobilisation. He showed, first, how world-wide British -commitments would for some time make considerable demands on the forces and, what is more, would call for replacement drafts drawn from the 18-30 class. Britain cannot lay down her Imperial and international burdens. Next he was able to show that, in spite of continuing calls, an average of 45,000 will be discharged weekly until the end of the year, a total of 750,000. Finally he sought to banish the haunting fear of unemployment among servicemen by showing that 5,000,000 jobs await them. They will not "miss the bus" through detention in the forces. No doubt Mr Attlee would not relish having to return a "dusty answer" to servicemen, or. mOre generally, to call on the war-worn British people to accept denial and duty when they had hbped for relief and a measure of relaxation,. but the Prime Minister has shown courage and quality in refusing to nourish 'illusions or false hopes.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19450905.2.25

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25299, 5 September 1945, Page 6

Word Count
1,432

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1945 BACK TO SINGAPORE New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25299, 5 September 1945, Page 6

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1945 BACK TO SINGAPORE New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25299, 5 September 1945, Page 6

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