FOREIGN POLICY

New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25286, 21 August 1945, Page 3

FOREIGN POLICY

NEED FOE CONTINUITY A DETERRENT FROM WAR SOME ASPECTS OF PROBLEM By LORD HANKEY, in the Sunday Times It is easy to state a case in favour of continuity in foreign policy, with the corollary that the Leaders of the Opposition parties in Parliament should be kept fully informed on the subject by the Government, but it would bo a mistake to underrate the difficulties. To take the advantages first, Britain is a great stabilising force in world politics, and the knowledge that the nation was united would act as a deterrent lroin war. Abroad, such knowledge would give confidence to our aljies and to all the nations who share our views on the conduct of international relations. It would also discourage countries with warlike and predatory ambitions from pursuing their policies to the point ot actual aggression, as Germany has done twice during the present century. Delence Problems _ At home the achievement of real continuity in foreign policy would facilitate a corresponding unity in defence policy which, as Lord Cliatfield has shown, is equally important and should be aimed at for its own sake. Unity in foreign policy would enable the Government, whatever party was in power, to take a firm line, irrespective of the size of its Parliamentary majority. The Opposition leaders also would be better placed than at present for giving guidance to their supporters,' of course without revealing confidential information, and this would help members of Parliament in giving a lead to public opinion in their constituencies. Thanks to the checks provided by our Parliamentary system, there is already a larger degree of unity on foreign policy than is generally realised. All political parties desire peace and aim at achieving it by international cooperation. All attach the utmost importance to the sanctity of international obligations. At the other end of the scale, all parties seem now to agree that the aggressions of powerful States involving the domination of continents and the extinction of smaller nations must be resisted in the last resort by force of arms if we are to have world peace. Patriotism also, although an unfashionfable word, is at rock bottom a dominating factor among all the British race 3 irrespective of party. The Main Differences The main differences arise in the application of principles and policies, as illustrated by the rejection of the Geneva protocol in 1925 and its replacement by the Locarno Treaties. One difficulty is that Governments cannot always reveal the reasons for their policy and especially a failure to take strong action, without precipitating the very emergency they are anxious to avoid or postpone. This may be due to some fatal flaw in our armaments or in those of our actual or prospective allies, or to some difference of opinion between the nations concerned, or to the attitude of some powerful neutral, or to other circumstances the public revelation of which would be disastrous. .In such conditions the Government would often be helped by an arrangement for keeping the Opposition leaders confidentially informed about the international situation. But it would not alwavs prevent disagreement, especially in matters where foreign policy links up with domestic policy, such as the ideological differences which from the French Revolution to the Spanish Civil War that preceded the present war have so often spread across frontiers from country to country causing dissension and confusion. The controversy _ that sprang up in connection with the liberation of Greece furnishes a later example. Unity of Parties In such circustances the conduct of foreign policy presents great difficulties and it is possible that the inter-party arrangements for securing unity might break down for a time, although not necessarily for a long time. ' ' There nave been many instances of ad hoc consultations between the Government and Opposition leaders on foreign policy, for example, during the Munich crisis, but the politicians have sometimes felt shy of a more permanent arrangement. In March, 1915, when Mr Asquith's Liberal Government was getting into difficulties, Mr Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne accepted an invitation to attend a meeting of the War Council ad hoc to disCuss Russian desiderata in the event of a successful issue to the Dardanelles operations. Agreement was reached in that matter, but in the conditions then prevailing the experiment did not lead to a more permanent association of the Conservative leaders with the War Council, as Mr Asquith had hoped, although a National Government was formed a month or two later. The truth is that at times the possession of knowledge that cannot be used publicly may prove embarrassing to a party leader. Objection to Plan Another'class of objection to the plan is that, in the absence of effective Parliamentary criticism the whole nation may be gripped by some ideal that, howeve: attractive in theory, is incapable of realisation in the actual state of world opinion, like disarmament between the two wars. In that case the Parliamentary system failed, because there was too much unity between the parties. The national and local leaders of the three parties even appeared together on the same public platf6rins to support disarmament, and criticism was left to a few far-sighted individuals like the late Lord Lloyd, who foresaw whither the policy was leading us, but was not listened to. Even that danger, however, might have been lessened if the party leaders had had continuous access to the facts of, and had been rogularh consulted on, the armaments situation. How To Do It On balance, the advantages of continuity of foreign policy outweight the disadvantages, especially if the arrangement extends also to defence policy. The problem of machinery should present no difficulty. The Committee of Imperial Defence which has often been attended by Opposition leaders for the consideration of particular defence questions, points the way. That organisation could perfectly well be used, or a separate organisation on similar lines could be created. If that precedent was not acceptable, some system could bo created on the analogy of the arrangements for keeping in touch with the Dominions about foreign policy. In any event Empire and Commonwealth aspects would always have to be kept in mind, for, to quote Viscount Bennett, "there must be unity or there will be disaster." The experiment ought at any rate to be tried, but an essential condition is that Cabinet responsibility must remain unimpaired, and the Opposition leaders would be sure to reserve their full right of Parliamentary opposition in case of disagreement. Now that the general election is over it is to bo hoped that it will bo possible to make further progress in a more favourable atmosphere. THINKING OF OTHERS Sir Wilson Jameson, chief medical officer of the Ministry of Health, at the annual meeting of the Chari f v Organisation Society, discussed the state of health of the British people, and said that it had withstood to a remarkable degree the strains and stresses of six years of war. He attributed thnt fir.st of all to a scientificallyplanned diet. In the second place, ever.v one had been fully occupied. People had had enough money to buy what food had been available. Then we had all been keyed up to win the war; people had thought less about themselves and more about the sufferings of others, and that made a lot of difference to one's health.