The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1945 THE ISSUE AT HAMILTON

New Zealand Herald, Volume 82, Issue 25211, 25 May 1945, Page 6

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1945 THE ISSUE AT HAMILTON

The i§sue before the electors of Hamilton is of vital importance—it concerns the question, whether the Government of the. country should be made responsible to the House of Representatives. The questions whether a Labour or a" National candidate shall be returned, whether there shall be socialism or otherwise, are important. But they are overshadowed by a further question : for how long is this country to be governed by a junta of trade union bosses who are not responsible to Parliament and who can and do control Ministers in the interests of a class ! The whole issue of responsible government is at stake, .as indeed it has been at stake in this country for some time. New Zealand has backstairs government by trade union presidents and secretaries. Their power has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished. It is careless of the interests of the country as a whole; it has been responsible for the setting aside of industrial and manpower decisions ; its demands are insatiable. It is this irresponsible power for which Mr Barrel] seeks endorsement at Hamilton : government by. a clique for a class.

SUCCESS IN PHILIPPINES

Current fighting in the Philippines is as severe as any General MacArthur's forces have experienced in the group. There seems to be a good deal yet to be done, although strategically the campaign has long since been won by the Americans. What have been described as the remnants of the Japanese army in the Philippines, but which are 'still considerable and effective bodies, are compressed into five main pockets, three on Luzon Island and two on Mindanao. On Luzon, one group is in the hills north-east of Manila, where it controls the aqueducts to the city from the principal reservoirs at Ipo and also the filter works. Until the Japanese are removed from the aqueducts Manila must continue to subsist on the small rations of water obtainable from a near-by reservoir. This is one of the most urgent tasks confronting the American forces. In northern Luzon two groups are making something of a last-ditch stand in the rich Cagayan Valley. The southern entrance to the valley has been forced by the Americans by their capture of Balete Pass, but there are numerous fine defensive positions to which the enemy may withdraw ere more open country is reached where the Americans can show their unquestioned superiority in battles of manoeuvre. The northern exit from Cagayan Valley at Aparri is dominated, but not sealed, by the American Air Force. On Mindanao, the Japanese are fighting bitterly for the central highway and the airfields it serves and also for the last two of a group of six airfields near Davao City. In addition to these major battles, enemy units on Cebu and Negros Islands have still to be mopped up, while there are parties of fugitives to be found on most of the other islands. The Philippines campaign was opened on October 20 with the landing on Leyte Island. That in six months the Americans should have obtained command of the group 'speaks volumes for their skill in leadership and organisation and the valour of the troops. When they went back to the Philippines there were officers well acquainted with the country and the enemy who advanced the opinion that the reconquest of the group would take two years. The first surprise of the campaign was the ease with which a footing was obtained on Leyte. This led General Mac Arthur into making a premature announcement that the island had been freed. However, the Japanese decided to make the fight for Leyte their major attempt to hold the Philippines. They reinforced the army there, presumably from Luzon, and sent in the navy in two heavy squadrons to suffer the heaviest defeat* of the war in what is now known officially as "The Battle for Leyte Gulf." This battle broke the backbone of the Japanese resistance and eased the way for the subsequent operations through Mindoro to Luzon and so to Mindanao and the other smaller islands. Another surprise, greater than the first, was the absence of the expected enemy resistance to the landing in Lingaven Gulf which opened the fighting on Luzon. The points chosen by General Mac Arthur were the obvious ones for the recapture of this island. They were discussed in some detail as far back as J9OB by General Homer Lea in his work "The Valour of Ignorance." Various reasons have been suggested why General Yamashita, who still had adequate forces, did .not strenuously oppose the landing. They are all technical and convincing, but to them two others may be added. One is that the chosen landing points were so obvious that an attacker would be certain they would be strongly held and would therefore go elsewhere. The other reason is supported by the experience of the British forces in Burma. It is that while the Japanese are formidable in static defence, as on the small islands like Saipan, Two Jima and Okinawa, they can be easily de ceived and beaten in country where there is room to manoeuvre. Japanese strategical and tactical ability seems unequal to the task of making' the right decision where choice has to be made between several possible courses of action. Thus in Burma a stand was made at Mandalay and south of the city, the fact apparently being ignored that still further south other British columns were interposing themselves on the lines of retreat. Yamashita had faulty dispositions for the defence of Luzon, his efforts to regroup were foiled by the Americans and his tactical use of an armoured division, the first to appear as such in the Pacific war, was very weak. The American success in the Philippines and that of the British in Burma are a good augury for a continental campaign.

THE COALITION AND LABOUR

: Universal regret will be felt at ; the break-up of the Coalition Gov- ; ernment. It has served Britain and the Empire well since May 10, 1940, ; bringing them out of the shadow of i defeat and through the long tribulation into the light of victory. The men of all parties and no party who pooled their abilities in the Coalition showed the highest sense of responsibility. They put the nation above faction. Their achievement can be the better appreciated when it is remembered that in none of the Dominions was political unity attained in face of the emergency. In Britain the Coalition produced a unity not formal but real. The combination was close-knit and worked like a well-trained team. In this concerted endeavour all parties had to make concessions and accept compromises, but were ready to subordinate politics and honest opinion to forward the common cause. They set a fine example—a pity it was not more followed. A special meed of praise is due to the Labour Party as it leaves the Coalition. It is regrettable that it felt unable to lend its services until the defeat of Japan. Nevertheless, it is understandable that, as domestic politics have come to the fore with the beginning of reconstruction, Labour should feel it could no longer compose its differences upon programmes with Conservatives and Liberals. Its secession now should not obscure the large part the party has played in making Britain's War Administration a success. As deputyPrime Minister Mr Attlee helped most on the political side, exercising a sound but moderating influence in council and a composing influence in the Commons. Mr Bevin was probably Mr Churchill's greatest tower of strength. His administration of the touchy portfolios of Labour and National Service was firm and skilful, mobilising _ thewhole nation while keeping Britain remarkably free of serious industrial trouble. Mr Morrison at the Home Office and Mr Alexander at the Admiralty discharged heavy tasks with sure hands. It is a proud record, enhancing British Labour's reputation and prestige at Home and abroad.