The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1944 ORGANISING SECURITY

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 25058, 23 November 1944, Page 4

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1944 ORGANISING SECURITY

The lines of French foreign policy as drawn by the Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, have reached a stage where the logical design can be recognised. As anticipated, he has now brought in Russia as essential to French and therefore to European security. Looked at from one angle, it can be seen that the absence of the Soviet from western councils in 1938-39 "brought death into the world, and all our woe." France, as strongly as Britain, is determined that Russia shall not be left out in the post-war years. Security must not be rendered insecure a second time for the same reason. Britain has since May, 1912, been joined with the Soviet in a 20-year Treaty of Alliance. Now that she is free again, and having informally renewed the Entente Cordiale with Britain, France is also looking toward Moscow. M. Bidault energetically rejects any western pact that excludes Russia. He says, "Russia and France have a great task before them, and together they will accomplish it." The former leader of French Catholic Youth makes no bones about pooling fortunes with Communist Russia. Neither did the democratic leaders of Republican France in 1892 baulk at a defensive alliance with the autocrats of Tsarist Russia. The new approach contrasts sharply with French hesitations and stand-offish-ness in respect of Russia in some of the years between the wars. The new policy is realistic. It goes to support the much-criticised statement of Mr Churchill that the wai is becoming less ideological. M. Bi da tilt's declaration fixes the foundations on which will be built the security of Europe, the continent that too often in the pasthas set the world ablaze. If the Soviet's acceptance of the French approach can be presumed, the new peace structure will rest upon Britain, France and Russia. The components are the same as those of the Triple Entente, which was organised before 1914 to balance the power of the ,Triple Alliance of Germany, AustriaHungary and Italy. If the earlier entente did not avert the conflict of 1914-18, why should its successor prove more effective"? Todays circumstances are entirely different. The new entente will not rely, like the old, on Balance of Power, but on an overwhelming preponderance of power. Italy could be counted out of the Central Powers in 1914 and need not be seriously considered today. The Austro-Hungarian Empire is gone and several elements of its former strength can now be counted in support of Russia. Germany alone will be left, a Germany exhausted, totally disarmed, _ apd probably ■ dismembered. Britain, France and Russia will not therefore be creating a new Balance of Power, an arrangement whose very name implies its liability to be upset. Instead they are mounting a strong security guard over the chronic disturber of European peace. If the problem of security in Europe can be largely solved on this broad basis, the solution of world security advances into plain view. The United States makes herself responsible for order in the New World. As for the Pacific or Asia, Japanese aggression has been emboldened by, and owed its success to, the preoccupation of Britain, France and Russia with Europe. If in future their forces are not tied down by the fearful priority dictated by Germany, the Japanese will not dare to., challenge their power combined with that of America. A lasting settlement of Europe cannot, however, be produced solely by the overlordship of the three Great Powers. That would imply falling back on Power politics and reliance on complete and permanent agreement between the three. On her side Russia makes it plain that she expects to live with friendly Governments on her western frontiers. She asserts, in effect, that neutrality is not enough. In any case, experience since 1939 has shown that neutrality as a policy is not merely bankrupt but also a danger to the neutral and her neighbours. Russia insists that neighbours shall be neighbourly, in the good sense. So lonfe as it does not imply submission to the Great Power neighbour, the policy needs no recommendation. The folly of its opposite was seen all over Europe before 19,39. Poland and Rumania offered examples of nations living at odds with their immediate neighbours and placing what proved to be illusory reliance on help from less accessible allies. Subject to an unfortunate question mark over Poland, Russia seems intent on replacing the mutual animosities of Central and East Europe by a region of good neighbourhood.' With the elimination of Germany, such a condition would seem easier of attainment in the west. Now that neutrality is utterly discredited, a good neighbour policy that. included mutual assistance and economic co-opera-tion should be capable of realisation under Franco - British leadership. The obvious danger that the result might be regarded as a lining up of east opposite west is removed by the British-Soviet and prospective Franco-Soviet alliances.